Hispanopedia Wiki
Articulo de referencia

Turkistan Islamic Party

{{cite web |url = http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/turkistan-islamic-party-emir-thought-killed-in-2010-reemerged-to-lead-group-in-2014.php |title = Turkestan Islam...

Hispanopedia WikiContenido en espanolLectura gratuita

The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)[note 1] is an Islamic militant organisation founded in Pakistan by Hasan Mahsum, who relocated the organization to Afghanistan following anti-terror crackdowns by the Pakistani government. Its stated goal is to establish an Islamic state in Xinjiang, China (i.e. East Turkestan), and throughout the rest of Central Asia.[16][17]

The Chinese government asserts that the TIP is synonymous with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). ETIM has been described by scholars as demanding the total independence of Xinjiang and supporting or being indifferent to more radical methods driven by religious and ethnic motives.[18][19]

Influenced by the success of the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union in the Soviet–Afghan War, Mahsum established the ETIP (which changed its name to the TIP in 2001) in September 1997. After the September 11 attacks, the Chinese government strove to include the removal of Uyghur Islamic extremist networks in the international effort against terrorism.[20] The TIP's slogans contain anti-communist rhetoric and calls for the unity of Turkic peoples, indicating a movement akin to pan-Turkism historically congruent with Southern Xinjiang rather than pure, radical Salafi jihadism or religious extremism. The Chinese government views the group as a jihadist movement akin to the mujahideen in Afghanistan across the border, which inspired groups like ETIM.[20]

The Syrian branch of the TIP was active in the Syrian civil war and were largely grouped in Idlib.[21][22] The Syrian branch dissolved following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime and was incorporated into the newly formed Ministry of Defense.

History

Earlier groups

Abdul Hameed (Abduhamit), Abdul Azeez Makhdoom (Abliz Mehsum) and Abdul Hakeem Makhdoom (Ablikim Mehsum) launched the Hizbul Islam Li-Turkestan (Islamic Party of Turkistan or Turkistan Islamic Movement) in 1940. During the 1940s through 1952, the three led the movement in a series of uprisings against local warlords and later against the Chinese Communists.[23] They were killed, imprisoned or driven underground by China by the late 1950s.[24] In 1956, after the death of Abdul Hameed, the group reformed as Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan Ash-Sharqiyah (Islamic Party of East Turkistan or East Turkistan Islamic Party) under the new leadership of Mullah Baquee and Mullah Muhammad. The organization led a failed uprising, leading to a decline of the organization and its activity until the late 1970s or early 1980s.[25] After being set free from prison in 1979, Abdul Hakeem Makhdoom instructed Muhammad Amin Jan and other Uyghurs in his version of Islam.[26] With the death Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan Ash-Sharqiyah founder Abdul Hakeem in 1993, the movement was briefly reborn under the leadership of Hotan natives Abdurahman and Memet Tohti.[27][25]

Founding

The East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) was organised in Pakistan by Hasan Mahsum and Abudukadir Yapuquan in September 1997.[23][28][29] In 1998, Mahsum moved the ETIP (which China claims is ETIM)'s headquarters to Kabul, taking shelter under Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.[30] The leader, Hasan Mahsum, was killed by a Pakistani raid on a suspected Al-Qaeda camp in South Waziristan in 2003, leading to the group's collapse.[31][29]

However, ETIP resurged after the Iraq War inflamed mujaheddin sentiment.[32] The group was mentioned again in 2007, when China announced it raided its militants in Akto County.[33] ETIM received material support from the Taliban and had links to the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek i Taliban Pakistan),[30] prompting China to urge Pakistan to take action against the militants in 2009.[34]

From ETIP to TIP

The new organization called itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) to reflect its new domain and abandoned usage of the name ETIP, although China still calls it by the name ETIM.[33][35] The Turkistan Islamic Party was originally subordinated to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) but then split off and declared its name as TIP and started making itself known by promoting itself with its Islamic Turkistan magazine and Voice of Islam media in Chinese, Arabic, Russian, and Turkish in order to reach out to global jihadists.[36] Control over the Uyghur and Uzbek militants was transferred to the Pakistani Taliban from the Afghan Taliban after 2001, so violence against the militant's countries of origins can no longer restrained by the Afghan Taliban since the Pakistani Taliban does not have a stake in doing so.[37][38]

In 2013, the group announced it was moving fighters to Syria, its profile in China and even Afghanistan and Pakistan has decisively waned since then, while in Syria it has risen.[39]

In March 2025, the group announced it was returning to its former name of the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP).[40]

The TIP has links to al-Qaeda and affiliated groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,[41] and the Pakistani Taliban.[42] The US has designated it as having received "training and financial assistance" from al-Qaeda.[43]

University of Virginia associate professor Philip B. K. Potter wrote in 2013 that, even though "throughout the 1990s, Chinese authorities went to great lengths to publicly link organizations active in Xinjiang—particularly the ETIM—to al-Qaeda [...] the best information indicates that before 2001, the relationship included some training and funding but relatively little operational cooperation."[44][43] Meanwhile, specific incidents were downplayed by Chinese authorities as isolated criminal acts.[45][46] However, in 1998 the group's headquarters were moved to Kabul, in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, while "China's ongoing security crackdown in Xinjiang has forced the most militant Uyghur separatists into volatile neighboring countries, such as Pakistan," Potter writes, "where they are forging strategic alliances with, and even leading, jihadist factions affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban."[45]

However, according to the US Treasury, TIP member Abdul Haq al-Turkistani joined al-Qaeda's Majlis-ash-Shura (executive leadership council) in 2005[47] and TIP member Abdul Shakoor Turkistani was appointed military commander of its forces in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.[48] Abdul Haq was considered sufficiently influential by the al-Qaeda leadership that he served as a mediator between rival Taliban factions and played a role in military planning.[49]

In the mid-2010s, TIP's relationship to al-Qaeda was still contested but they became more closely aligned and TIP leader head Abdul Haq confirmed loyalty to al-Qaeda in May 2016.[50] In 2014, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, the al-Qaeda aligned al-Fajr Media Center began to distribute TIP promotional material, placing it in the "jihadist mainstream".[51] The East Turkestan independence movement was endorsed in the serial Islamic Spring's 9th release by Ayman Al-Zawahiri in 2016. Zawahiri confirmed that the Afghanistan war after 9/11 included the participation of Uighurs and that the jihadists like Zarwaqi, Bin Ladin and the Uighur Hasan Mahsum were provided with refuge together in Afghanistan under Taliban rule.[52][53] This was before the Bishkek Chinese Embassy Bombing.[54] The Turkistan Islamic Party slammed and attacked Assad, Russia, NATO, the United States and other western countries in its propaganda outlets such as the Islamic Turkestan magazine and its Telegram channel.[55]

Afghanistan and Waziristan

In February 2018, airstrikes were conducted by American forces in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province against training camps belonging to the Taliban and the Turkistan Islamic Party.[56][57][58][59][60] Speaking with Pentagon reporters, US Air ForceMaj. Gen.James B. Hecker, commander of NATO Air Command Afghanistan was quoted "The destruction of these training facilities prevents terrorists from planning any acts near the border with China and Tajikistan. The strikes also destroyed stolen Afghan National Army vehicles in the process of being converted to vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. ETIM enjoys support from the Taliban in the mountains of Badakhshan, so hitting these Taliban training facilities and squeezing the Taliban's support networks degrades ETIM capabilities."[59]

After the 2021 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, TIP was removed from Badakhshan, as the new Afghan government seeks aid from China.[61]

Syria

TIP (ETIM) sent the "Turkistan Brigade" (Katibat Turkistani), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria to take part in the Syrian Civil War as part of a network of al-Qaeda linked groups alongside al-Nusra, most notably in the 2015 Jisr al-Shughur offensive where they were part of the Army of Conquest coalition.[62][63][64] They have been described as well organized, experienced and as having an important role in offensives against President Bashar al-Assad's forces in Syria's northern regions.[22] On 29 January 2025, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, most factions of the armed opposition including the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria announced their dissolution and were incorporated into the newly formed Ministry of Defense.[65] Fighters from the Turkistan Islamic Party participated in the 2025 massacres of Syrian Alawites.[66]

Ideology

The group is staunchly Uyghur nationalist.[12] The NEFA Foundation, an American terrorist analyst foundation, translated and released a jihad article from ETIM, whose membership it said consisted primarily of "Uyghur Muslims from Western China." The TIP's primary goal is the independence of East Turkestan.[67] ETIM continues this theme of contrasting "Muslims" and "Chinese", in a six-minute video in 2008, where "Commander Seyfullah" warns Muslims not to bring their children to the 2008 Summer Olympics, and also saying "do not stay on the same bus, on the same train, on the same plane, in the same buildings, or any place the Chinese are".[68]

Structure

TIP is led by Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, who's the group's Emir and leader of the Shura Council.[69] The council also includes a Deputy Emir, and the heads of at least three groups: Religious Education Division, Military Affairs Division and Information Center.[69] There have also been reports of an Intelligence Division and a Logistics Division.[69]

Media

In 2008, TIP's Ṣawt al-Islām (Voice of Islam) media arm was created and began releasing video messages.[39] The full name of their media center is "Turkistan Islamic Party Voice of Islam Media Center" (Uyghur: تۈركىستان ئىسلام پارتىيىسى ئىسلام ئاۋازى تەشۋىقات مەركىزى, romanized: Türkistan Islam Partiyisi Islam Awazi Teshwiqat Merkizi).[70][71][72]

Members

In October 2008, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security released a list of eight terrorists linked to ETIM, including some of the leadership, with detailed charges.[73] They are:

Detenidos de la Bahía de Guantánamo

En 2006, Estados Unidos capturó a 22 militantes uigures en zonas de combate de Afganistán tras recibir información que los vinculaba con Al-Qaeda . [ 78 ] Fueron encarcelados sin juicio durante cinco a siete años, donde testificaron haber sido entrenados por el líder del ETIM, Abdul Haq, en un campo de entrenamiento del ETIM. Tras ser declarados excombatientes enemigos , [ 79 ] es decir, sin haberlo sido nunca, un panel de jueces ordenó su liberación en Estados Unidos. A pesar de la alarma de los políticos ante la inseguridad e ilegalidad de la liberación de exdetenidos de Guantánamo en Estados Unidos, este país no quiso devolverlos a China, ya que eran buscados por cargos que incluían incendio provocado y fabricación ilegal de explosivos, [ 80 ] aunque ABC News escribió que «se cree que si Estados Unidos devolviera a los hombres a China, podrían ser torturados». [ 81 ]

Ataques e incidentes

  • Entre 1990 y 2001, el gobierno chino atribuyó a diversos grupos uigures, incluido el ETIP, después de 1997, más de 200 actos de terrorismo , que causaron 800 muertos y más de 440 heridos. [ 82 ] Sin embargo, en muchas declaraciones oficiales chinas se hace referencia a las "fuerzas terroristas del Turkestán Oriental" en lugar de a un grupo específico. [ 83 ]
  • Entre 1992 y 1998, cuatro imanes de mezquitas en Xinjiang fueron asesinados por diferentes grupos del Turkistán Oriental. [ 84 ] [ 85 ]
  • En 2007, militantes del ETIP en automóviles dispararon contra ciudadanos chinos en Baluchistán paquistaní , lo que las autoridades paquistaníes creyeron que fue en represalia por la ejecución de un funcionario del ETIM a principios de julio de ese año. [ 86 ]
  • ETIM también se atribuyó la responsabilidad de una serie de ataques antes de los Juegos Olímpicos de Verano de 2008 , incluyendo una serie de atentados con bomba en autobuses en Kunming , un intento de secuestro de avión en Urumqi , [ 79 ] y un ataque contra tropas paramilitares en Kashgar que mató a 17 oficiales. [ 87 ]
  • On 29 June 2010, a court in Dubai convicted two members of an ETIM cell for plotting to bomb a government-owned shopping mall that sold Chinese goods. This was the first ETIM plot outside of China or Central Asia. The key plotter was recruited during Hajj and was flown to Waziristan for training.[88]
  • In July 2010, officials in Norway interrupted a terrorist bomb plot; one perpetrator was Uyghur, leading to speculation about TIP involvement. New York Times correspondent Edward Wong says that ETIM "give[s] them a raison d'être at a time when the Chinese government has... defused any chance of a widespread insurgency... in Xinjiang."[87]
  • Several attacks in 2011 in Xinjiang were claimed by the Turkistan Islamic Party.[89]
  • In October 2013, a suicide attack in Tiananmen Square caused 5 deaths and 38 injuries. Chinese police described it as the first terrorist attack in Beijing's recent history. Turkistan Islamic Party later claimed responsibility for the attack.[90]
  • In March 2014, a knife-armed group attacked passengers at the Kunming's railway station, resulting in 31 civilians dead and +140 injured.[91] No group claimed responsibility. Chinese authorities and state media stated that the attack had been linked to TIP, while other sources were skeptical of this claim.[92][93]
  • Between July and December 2014, a series of riots, bombings, arson and knife attacks in Xinjiang which led to the deaths over 183 people (including civilians, attackers and security forces) and left dozens injured. Chinese authorities attributed attacks to "gangs" and "terrorists".[94][95][96][97]
  • Assassination of Juma Tayir, a government-appointed Imam in Id Kah mosque was attributed to by the Chinese government to TIP-inspired militants.[98]
  • On 18 September 2015 in Aksu, a group of knife-wielding terrorists attacked sleeping workers at a coalmine and killed 16 of them. The Turkistan Islamic Party claimed responsibility for the attack.[99]
  • On 30 August 2016, the Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan was targeted in a suicide bombing which left Kyrgyz staffers injured; the attack was later attributed by Kyrgyzstan's state security service to TIP.[100][101]
  • On 14 February 2017, attackers killed 5 people in Pishan county before killed by police. Chinese authorities stated that the attackers were affiliated with TIP.[102][103]
  • On 14 July 2021, an attack killed 13 people, including 9 Chinese engineers who were working on the Dasu Dam in Kohistan, Pakistan. Asia Times reported that a "joint China-Pakistan investigation" showed ETIM and TTP colluded in the attack,[104] but Reuters and Al Jazeera reported that Pakistan blamed the TTP, with support from Afghan and Indian intelligence services, without mentioning ETIM. The claims were denied by both the Indian government and TTP.[105][106]

Terrorist designation

  Countries designating the ETIM/TIP as a terrorist organization

Since the September 11 attacks, the group has been designated as a terrorist organization by the following countries and international organizations:

Former:

  • Estados Unidos (hasta 2020): El ETIM fue clasificado anteriormente como una organización terrorista bajo el Título 8 del Código de los Estados Unidos Sección 1189 por los Estados Unidos desde 2002 hasta 2020. [ 128 ] [ 129 ] El Departamento del Tesoro de los Estados Unidos confiscó la propiedad de la organización y prohibió transacciones con ella de acuerdo con la Orden Ejecutiva 13224 , [ 130 ] mientras que el Departamento de Estado bloqueó la entrada de sus miembros al país. [ 131 ] Los EE. UU. revocaron esa clasificación para el ETIM en octubre de 2020 sobre la base de que "no ha habido evidencia creíble de que el ETIM continúe existiendo". [ 132 ] [ 133 ] Sin embargo, el Departamento de Estado de los EE. UU. continúa considerando al Partido Islámico del Turkistán (TIP) como una organización terrorista. Un portavoz del Departamento de Estado declaró a Newsweek que «los terroristas uigures que luchan en Siria y Afganistán son miembros del Partido Islámico del Turkistán (TIP)», y que se trata de «una organización independiente que China y otros han identificado erróneamente como ETIM». [ 134 ] China acusó a Estados Unidos de doble rasero al eliminar a ETIM de su lista de organizaciones terroristas, [ 135 ] [ 136 ] [ 137 ] mientras que Estados Unidos sostiene que la denominación se ha utilizado indebidamente para oprimir a los musulmanes en Xinjiang. [ 138 ] [ 139 ] [ 140 ]

Análisis

En 2009, Dru C. Gladney , una autoridad en la investigación sobre el nacionalismo étnico y cultural en Asia, afirmó que existía una "brecha de credibilidad" respecto al grupo, ya que la mayor parte de la información sobre ETIM "se remontaba a fuentes chinas", y que algunos creían que ETIM formaba parte de un intercambio de favores entre Estados Unidos y China, donde China apoyaba la guerra contra el terrorismo liderada por Estados Unidos , y "el apoyo de Estados Unidos a la condena de ETIM estaba vinculado a ese apoyo". [ 141 ] La Asociación Uigur Americana ha puesto en duda públicamente la existencia de ETIM. [ 142 ]

Andrew McGregor, writing for the Jamestown Foundation in 2010, noted that "though there is no question a small group of Uyghur militants fought alongside their Taliban hosts against the Northern Alliance [...] the scores of terrorists Beijing claimed that Bin Laden was sending to China in 2002 never materialized" and that "the TIP's 'strategy' of making loud and alarming threats (attacks on the Olympics, use of biological and chemical weapons, etc.) without any operational follow-up has been enormously effective in promoting China's efforts to characterize Uyghur separatists as terrorists."[143]

On 16 June 2009, US Representative Bill Delahunt convened hearings to examine how organizations were added to the US blacklist in general, and how the ETIM was added in particular.[144] Uyghur expert Sean Roberts testified that the ETIM was new to him, that it wasn't until it was blacklisted that he heard of the group, and claimed that "it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the organization no longer exists at all."[144] The Congressional Research Service reported that the first published mention of the group was in the year 2000, but that China attributed attacks to it that had occurred up to a decade earlier.[144]

Stratfor has noted repeated unexplained attacks on Chinese buses in 2008 have followed a history of ETIM targeting Chinese infrastructure, and noted the group's splintering and subsequent reorganization following the death of Mahsum.[145]

In 2010, intelligence analysts J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke acknowledge that reporting in China presents obstacles not found in countries where information is not so tightly controlled. However, they found that ETIM's existence and activities could be confirmed independently of Chinese government sources, using information gleaned from ETIM's now-defunct website, reports from human rights groups and academics, and testimony from the Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Reed & Raschke also question the information put out by Uyghur expatriates that deny ETIM's existence or impact, as the Uyghurs who leave Xinjiang are those who object most to government policy, are unable to provide first-hand analysis, and have an incentive to exaggerate repression and downplay militancy. They say that ETIM was "obscure but not unknown" before the September 11 attacks, citing "Western, Russian, and Chinese media sources" that have "documented the ETIM's existence for nearly 20 years".[146]

In 2010, Raffaello Pantucci of Jamestown Foundation wrote about the convictions of two men linked to an ETIM cell in Dubai with a plot to attack a shopping mall.[147]

Nick Holdstock, in a 2015 New York Times interview, said that no organization is taking responsibility for attacks in Xinjiang, and that there is not enough proof to blame any organization for the attacks, that most "terrorism" there is "unsubstantiated", and that posting internet videos online is the only thing done by the "vague and shadowy" ETIM.[148]

In 2016, David Volodzko wrote that the Al-Qaeda allied Uyghur Turkistan Islamic Party members were fighting in Syria, and refuted and disproved the claims that Uyghurs were not in Syria made by "The Sydney Morning Herald", the Daily Mail, and Bernstein's article in the New York Review of Books.[149]

Muhanad Hage Ali wrote on Uyghur Turkistan Islamic Party jihadists in Syria for Al Arabiya.[150]

In 2019, Uran Botobekov from ModernDiplomat has written about the Turkistan Islamic Party along with other Central-Asian jihadist groups in a report titled Think like Jihadist: Anatomy of Central Asian Salafi groups.[151][152]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑
    • Arabic: الحزب الإسلامي التركستاني, romanized: al-Ḥizb al-Islāmī al-Turkistānī
    • Uyghur: تۈركىستان ئىسلام پارتىيىسى, romanized: Türkistan Islam Partiyisi
    • Chinese:突厥斯坦伊斯兰党; pinyin:Tūjuésītǎn yīsīlán dǎng
  2. ↑The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party, Organization for Freeing Eastern Turkistan and the Islamic Party of Turkistan were outlawed by Kyrgyzstan's Lenin District Court and its Supreme Court in November 2003[114][115]

References

  1. 12"Turkestan Islamic Party emir thought killed in 2010 reemerged to lead group in 2014". The Long War Journal. 11 June 2015. Archived from the original on 17 May 2016. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  2. ↑"TIP Leader Congratulates Attack in Hotan in Video". SITE Intel Group. 10 June 2015. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  3. ↑MacLean, William (23 November 2013). "Islamist group calls Tiananmen attack 'jihadi operation': SITE". Reuters. Archived from the original on 17 October 2015. Retrieved 2 July 2017.
  4. ↑"Many Jihadi Groups In Asia & Africa Pledge Allegiance To Taliban Leader, Group Sources". Afghanistan International. 9 October 2024.
  5. ↑"Turkistan Islamic Party head decries Chinese occupation". FDD's Long War Journal. 18 March 2018.
  6. ↑Weiss, Caleb (29 September 2016). "Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria shows more 'little jihadists'". Long War Journal. Retrieved 2 May 2020.
  7. ↑Zenn, Jacob. "An Overview of Chinese Fighters and Anti-Chinese Militant Groups in Syria and Iraq". Jamestown. Retrieved 3 May 2020.
  8. ↑Bennett-Jones, Owen (8 March 2017). "North Waziristan: What happened after militants lost the battle?". BBC News. Retrieved 3 May 2020.
  9. ↑Sarwar, Mustafa (14 February 2018). "Taliban Increasing Presence In Remote Afghan Region Bordering China". Rfe/Rl. Retrieved 3 May 2020.
  10. ↑Standish, Reid (5 October 2021). "Taliban 'Removing' Uyghur Militants From Afghanistan's Border With China". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 23 December 2021.
  11. ↑"TIP Division in Syria Releases Video Promoting Cause, Inciting for Jihad". SITE Institute. 6 June 2014. Archived from the original on 14 July 2014. Retrieved 26 June 2014.
  12. 12Exporting Global Jihad: Volume Two: Critical Perspectives from Asia and North America, 2020, pp. 89-90, ISBN 978-1-83860-756-2
  13. ↑"Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations". Gov.UK. 27 February 2025. Retrieved 21 June 2025.
  14. ↑"The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in China, Syria and Beyond". Grey dynamics. 10 April 2024. Retrieved 28 June 2025.
  15. ↑"S/2022/419". United Nations Security Council. Retrieved 9 June 2022.
  16. ↑"Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing | Security Council". main.un.org. Retrieved 2 March 2025.
  17. ↑Moubayed, Sami (29 September 2015). Under the Black Flag: At the Frontier of the New Jihad. I.B.Tauris. pp. 161–. ISBN 978-0-85772-921-7. Archived from the original on 19 October 2017. Retrieved 23 April 2016.
  18. ↑Özkan, Güner (2023), "The Uyghur Movement in Exile", in Shei, Chris; Chen, Jie (eds.), Routledge Resources Online – Chinese Studies, Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780367565152-RECHS60-1
  19. ↑Reed, J. Todd; Raschke, Diana (2010). "The Contemporary and Historical Contexts of Uyghur Separatism". The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-0-313-36541-6.
  20. 12Castets, Rémi (1 October 2003). "The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows. After September 11th 2001, the Chinese government strove to include its removal of Uyghur Islamic terrorist networks". China Perspectives (in French). 2003 (49). doi:10.4000/chinaperspectives.648.
  21. ↑ Clarke, Colin P.; Kan, Paul Rexton (1 de noviembre de 2017). "Un desafío yihadista poco examinado" . Combatientes extranjeros uigures: un desafío yihadista poco examinado . JSTOR . Consultado el 8 de noviembre de 2020 .
  22. 1 2 "El auge de los yihadistas chinos en Siria genera preocupación en el país" . Associated Press . 22 de abril de 2017. Consultado el 7 de noviembre de 2020 .
  23. 1 2 "China: La evolución de ETIM" . Stratfor.com . 13 de mayo de 2008. Archivado del original el 11 de octubre de 2017. Recuperado el 13 de mayo de 2016 .
  24. ↑ Acharya, Arabinda; Gunaratna, Rohan; Pengxin, Wang (22 de junio de 2010). Identidad étnica y conflicto nacional en China . Palgrave Macmillan. págs. 53–. ISBN  978-0-230-10787-8Archivado del original el 5 de enero de 2016. Consultado el 29 de noviembre de 2015 .
  25. 1 2 "China: La evolución de ETIM" . Stratfor.com . 13 de mayo de 2008. Archivado del original el 14 de octubre de 2019. Recuperado el 14 de noviembre de 2025 .
  26. ↑ Acharya, Arabinda; Gunaratna, Rohan; Pengxin, Wang (22 de junio de 2010). Identidad étnica y conflicto nacional en China . Palgrave Macmillan. págs. 54–. ISBN  978-0-230-10787-8Archivado del original el 5 de enero de 2016. Consultado el 29 de noviembre de 2015 .
  27. ↑ "El salafismo en China y sus variantes yihadistas-takfiríes" . Mesbar.org . 18 de enero de 2018. Archivado del original el 19 de septiembre de 2025. Consultado el 15 de noviembre de 2025 .
  28. ↑ Gunaratna, Rohan; Oreg, Aviv (1 de julio de 2015). El movimiento yihadista global . Rowman & Littlefield . págs. 244–. ISBN  978-1-4422-4542-6.
  29. 1 2 Kashgarian, Asim (26 de diciembre de 2020). "La diáspora uigur celebra la eliminación del ETIM de la lista de organizaciones terroristas de EE. UU." . VOA . Consultado el 8 de septiembre de 2022 .
  30. 1 2 Reed, J. Todd; Raschke, Diana (2010). El ETIM: militantes islámicos de China y la amenaza terrorista global . Santa Bárbara: Praeger. págs. 68–72 . 
  31. ↑ "Militante chino "muerto a tiros"BBC News . 23 de diciembre de 2003. Archivado del original el 18 de agosto de 2018. Consultado el 27 de enero de 2007 .
  32. ↑Guang, Pan (May 2006). "East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: china's Post-9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy". China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. 4 (2). ISSN 1653-4212.
  33. 12"China: The Evolution of ETIM". Stratfor. 13 May 2008. Archived from the original on 30 June 2009. Retrieved 7 August 2010.
  34. ↑"Hu Jintao urges Zardari to crush ETIM extremists". The Nation (Pakistan). Archived from the original on 18 March 2013. Retrieved 3 November 2013.
  35. ↑Winterbottom, Vaughan (14 August 2013). "No end in sight to Xinjiang unrest". China Outlook. Archived from the original on 25 September 2015. Retrieved 18 September 2015.
  36. ↑Zenn, Jacob (24 June 2013). "On the Eve of 2014: Islamism in Central Asia". Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. Hudson Institute. Archived from the original on 15 September 2015. Retrieved 18 September 2015.
  37. ↑Zenn, Jacob (2 October 2013). "Increasing Numbers of Central Asian Jihadists in Syria". The Central Asia-Caucasus Analystb. Archived from the original on 25 September 2015. Retrieved 18 September 2015.
  38. ↑"The Taliban". Tony Blair Faith Foundation. Archived from the original on 20 April 2016. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  39. 12"The Turkistan Islamic Party in Double-Exile: Geographic and Organizational Divisions in Uighur Jihadism". Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 7 September 2018.
  40. ↑Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (26 March 2025). "The East Turkestan Islamic Party's 'Fundamental System'". www.aymennaltamimi.com. Retrieved 29 March 2025.
  41. ↑Zenn, Jacob (23 May 2014). "Beijing, Kunming, Urumqi and Guangzhou: The Changing Landscape of Anti-Chinese Jihadists". China Brief. 14 (10). Archived from the original on 12 July 2015. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
  42. ↑A. Acharya; R. Gunaratna; W. Pengxin (21 June 2010). Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China. Palgrave Macmillan US. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-230-10787-8.
  43. 12Foreign terrorist organizations(PDF) (Report). U.S. State Department. p. 237. Archived(PDF) from the original on 6 June 2019. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  44. ↑Potter, Philip B. K. (Winter 2013). "Terrorism in China: Growing Threats with Global Implications"(PDF). Strategic Studies Quarterly. 7 (4): 71–74. Archived(PDF) from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 9 June 2018.
  45. 12"China: The Evolution of ETIM". Stratfor. 13 May 2008. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 10 June 2018.
  46. ↑"Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang"(PDF). Human Rights Watch. 17 (2): 16. April 2005. Archived(PDF) from the original on 17 April 2019. Retrieved 9 June 2018. Post 9/11: labeling Uighurs terrorists
  47. ↑Roggio, Bill (23 January 2010). "US airstrike killed 15 Turkistan Islamic Party fighters in Afghanistan". The Long War Journal. Archived from the original on 4 July 2015. Retrieved 12 May 2015.
  48. ↑Roggio, Bill (25 August 2012). "Turkistan Islamic Party leader thought killed in US drone strike". The Long War Journal. Archived from the original on 11 April 2019. Retrieved 12 May 2015.
  49. ↑Potter, Philip B. K. (Winter 2013). "Terrorism in China: Growing Threats with Global Implications"(PDF). Strategic Studies Quarterly. 7 (4): 71–74. Archived(PDF) from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 15 June 2018.
  50. ↑Clarke, Michael (7 September 2016). "Uighur militants infiltrating Indonesia". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 15 November 2016. Retrieved 14 November 2016.
  51. ↑"TIP Enters Jihadist Mainstream". SITE Intel Group. 15 October 2010. Archived from the original on 11 May 2015. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  52. ↑Hua S. (July 2016) Zawahiri Addresses Uyghur Muslims in Ninth Episode of "Islamic Spring"Site Intelligence Group. Retrieved 4 December 2020.
  53. ↑"New video message from Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī: "The Islamic Spring #9: Turkistān: Patience and Then Victory"". jihadology.net. Retrieved 11 April 2021.
  54. ↑"Al-Qaeda, the Turkestan Islamic Party, and the Bishkek Chinese Embassy Bombing". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 4 November 2016.
  55. ↑Botobekov l, Uran (17 August 2016). "China's Nightmare: Xinjiang Jihadists Go Global". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 2 December 2016.
  56. ↑Lamothe, Dan (10 February 2018). "Bombing of Chinese separatists in Afghanistan is a sign of how Trump's war there has changed". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 2 May 2021. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
  57. ↑"U.S. Forces Target Taliban, Chinese Militants In Afghanistan". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. 8 February 2018. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
  58. ↑"U.S. Airstrikes Target Terrorist Networks in Northern Afghanistan.S. Forces Target Taliban, Chinese Militants In Afghanistan". U.S. Central Command. 8 February 2018. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
  59. 12Moon Cronk, Terri (7 February 2018). "U.S. Forces Strike Taliban, East Turkestan Islamic Movement Training Sites". U.S. Dept of Defense. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
  60. ↑"U.S. forces in Afghanistan attack anti-China militants". Reuters. 8 February 2018. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
  61. ↑ Standish, Reid (5 de octubre de 2021). "Los talibanes 'expulsan' a militantes uigures de la frontera de Afganistán con China" . Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty . Consultado el 23 de diciembre de 2021 .
  62. ↑ Weiss, Caleb (23 de abril de 2015). "El Partido Islámico de Turkistán en Siria participa en una nueva ofensiva en Idlib" . Long War Journal . Archivado del original el 18 de mayo de 2015. Consultado el 9 de mayo de 2015 .
  63. ↑ Weiss, Caleb (30 de abril de 2015). "El Partido Islámico de Turkistán tuvo un papel significativo en la reciente ofensiva de Idlib" . Long War Journal . Archivado del original el 21 de julio de 2015. Recuperado el 28 de julio de 2015 .
  64. ↑ Joscelyn, Thomas (29 de septiembre de 2015). "Esfuerzos antiterroristas de EE. UU. en Siria: ¿Una estrategia ganadora?" . Long War Journal . Archivado del original el 30 de septiembre de 2015. Recuperado el 29 de septiembre de 2015 .
  65. ↑ "El líder sirio Ahmed Al-Sharaa pronuncia un 'discurso de victoria', describe la hoja de ruta futura de Siria y anuncia la disolución del partido Baaz y la formación de un nuevo 'ejército sirio' por parte del Comando de Operaciones Militares; el Comando de Operaciones Militares declara a Al-Sharaa presidente de Siria durante la fase de transición" . MEMRI . Consultado el 29 de enero de 2025 .
  66. ↑ Michael, Maggie (30 de junio de 2025). "Las fuerzas sirias masacraron a 1.500 alauitas. La cadena de mando condujo a Damasco" . Reuters . Consultado el 3 de julio de 2025 .
  67. ↑ Bashir, Shaykh (1 de julio de 2008). "¿Por qué luchamos contra China?" (PDF) . Fundación NEFA. Archivado del original (PDF) el 9 de junio de 2012. Recuperado el 7 de agosto de 2010. ...Luchamos contra China... China es un enemigo que ha invadido países musulmanes y ocupa el Turquestán Oriental musulmán. No hay mayor obligación, aparte de la fe en Alá, que expulsar a los enemigos de los musulmanes de nuestros países... Luchamos contra China para que testifiquen que "no hay más Dios que Alá, Mahoma es el Mensajero de Alá" y para que se conviertan al Islam...
  68. ↑ "Islamistas chinos amenazan los Juegos Olímpicos: grupo estadounidense" . Agence France-Presse . 7 de agosto de 2008. Archivado del original el 12 de diciembre de 2011. Consultado el 7 de agosto de 2010 .
  69. 123J. Todd Reed; Raschke, Diana (2010). The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat. ABC-CLIO. pp. 48–. ISBN 978-0-313-36540-9.
  70. ↑"Sherqiy Türkistan Radio Téléviziyisi-East Turkistan Radio & Television – Uyghurche". East-turkistan.tv. Archived from the original on 21 April 2016. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  71. ↑"Xewerler – Sherqiy Türkistan Jumhuriyiti Sürgündiki Hökümiti – East Turkistan Government in Exile". Uy.eastturkistan-gov.org. Archived from the original on 15 April 2016. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  72. ↑"Sherqiy Türkistan Radio Téléviziyisi-East Turkistan Radio & Television – Uyghurche". East-turkistan.tv. Archived from the original on 23 April 2016. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  73. ↑"'Eastern Turkistan' terrorists identified". China Daily. Xinhua. 21 October 2008. Archived from the original on 6 June 2011. Retrieved 31 July 2010.
  74. ↑"Xinjiang fighter 'killed by drone'". Al Jazeera. 2 March 2010. Archived from the original on 5 March 2010. Retrieved 26 August 2012. The leader of a Chinese separatist movement, believed to have links with al-Qaeda, has been killed in a US missile strike, Pakistani and Taliban officials have said.
  75. ↑"TIP leader killed in Pakistan drone strike". Neil Doyle. 1 March 2010. Archived from the original on 24 January 2016. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  76. ↑Walsh, Declan; Schmitt, Eric (24 August 2012). "Militant Leader Believed Dead in Pakistan Drone Strike". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 27 August 2012. Retrieved 26 August 2012. Among the 18 people reported to have been killed was Emeti Yakuf, a senior leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a group from western China whose members are Chinese Uighur Muslim militants.
  77. 1 2 "Badruddin Haqqani: Presunto segundo al mando de la red Haqani asesinado en ataque de la OTAN" . Centro de Investigación FATA. Archivado del original el 25 de septiembre de 2015. Recuperado el 3 de noviembre de 2013 .
  78. ↑ Fletcher, Holly; Bajoria, Jayshree (31 de julio de 2008). "El Movimiento Islámico del Turkestán Oriental (ETIM)" . Documento informativo . Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores . Archivado del original el 3 de agosto de 2010. Consultado el 31 de julio de 2010 .
  79. 1 2 Pike, John. "Movimiento Islámico del Turkestán Oriental / Partido Islámico del Turkestán Oriental (ETIP)" . GlobalSecurity.org . Archivado del original el 3 de octubre de 2011. Recuperado el 18 de diciembre de 2011 .
  80. ↑ Poolos, Alexandra (2009). "Albania: Saliendo de Guantánamo" . PBS FRONTLINE .
  81. ↑ de Vogue, Ariane; Powell, Dennis; Ryan, Jason (24 de abril de 2009). "Detenidos uigures de Guantánamo: ¿Vienen a Estados Unidos?" . ABC News . Archivado del original el 5 de noviembre de 2013. Recuperado el 31 de julio de 2010 .
  82. ↑ "Las fuerzas terroristas del "Turquestán Oriental" no pueden quedar impunes . China.org.cn . 21 de enero de 2002. Archivado del original el 21 de marzo de 2015. Consultado el 15 de febrero de 2015 .
  83. ↑ Acharya, Arabinda; Gunaratna, Rohan; Pengxin, Wang (22 de junio de 2010). Identidad étnica y conflicto nacional en China . Palgrave Macmillan. pág. 48. ISBN  978-0-230-10787-8Consultado el 15 de noviembre de 2020 .
  84. ↑ Reed, J. Todd; Raschke, Diana (2010). El ETIM: militantes islámicos de China y la amenaza terrorista global . ABC-CLIO. págs. 59–61 . 
  85. ↑ Dillon, Michael (2003). Xinjiang: el extremo noroeste musulmán de China . Routledge. pág. 23. 
  86. 1 2 Ansari, Massoud (3 de agosto de 2007). "El nuevo rostro de la yihad" . Newsline . Archivado del original el 10 de junio de 2009. Recuperado el 31 de julio de 2007 .
  87. 1 2 Wong, Edward (9 de julio de 2010). "Separatistas chinos vinculados a complot para bomba en Noruega" . The New York Times . Archivado del original el 27 de agosto de 2011. Recuperado el 1 de agosto de 2010 .
  88. ↑ Pantucci, Raffaello (22 de junio de 2010). "Uigures condenados por complot del Movimiento Islámico del Turkestán Oriental en Dubái" (PDF) . Terrorism Monitor . Fundación Jamestown . Archivado del original (PDF) el 4 de noviembre de 2013. Recuperado el 31 de julio de 2010 .
  89. ↑ "El Partido Islámico de Turkistán reivindica los ataques en el oeste de China - Mundo" . Dawn.com . 8 de septiembre de 2011. Archivado del original el 4 de marzo de 2016. Consultado el 3 de junio de 2016 .
  90. ↑ «Grupo islamista reivindica la autoría del ataque en la plaza de Tiananmen, China» . TheGuardian.com . 25 de noviembre de 2013. Archivado del original el 5 de diciembre de 2019. Consultado el 9 de agosto de 2014 .
  91. ↑ "Separatistas chinos culpan del ataque con cuchillo en Kunming" . BBC News . 2 de marzo de 2014. Archivado del original el 2 de marzo de 2014. Consultado el 2 de marzo de 2014 .
  92. ↑新華社：昆明案涉新疆分離勢力[ Agencia de Noticias Xinhua: Separatistas de Xinjiang involucrados en el ataque de Kunming ] (en chino (Taiwán)). Archivado del original el 17 de marzo de 2014. Consultado el 26 de septiembre de 2019 .
  93. ↑ "Los atacantes de la estación de tren intentaban salir de China para unirse a la yihad: comunicado oficial" . Voz de América (5 de marzo de 2014)
  94. ↑ "Violencia en Xinjiang: China afirma que una 'banda' mató a 37 personas la semana pasada" . BBC News . 3 de agosto de 2014. Archivado del original el 14 de febrero de 2018. Consultado el 21 de julio de 2018 .
  95. ↑ Levin, Dan (25 de septiembre de 2014). "Al menos 50 muertos en la violencia de Xinjiang, dicen las autoridades" . The New York Times . Archivado del original el 12 de enero de 2018. Recuperado el 23 de febrero de 2017 .
  96. ↑ "22 muertos en ataque a un mercado agrícola en la prefectura de Kashgar, Xinjiang" . Radio Free Asia . 18 de octubre de 2014. Archivado del original el 12 de noviembre de 2014. Consultado el 6 de noviembre de 2014 .
  97. ↑ «China afirma que 15 personas murieron en un "ataque terrorista" en Xinjiang» . Yahoo! Noticias. 29 de noviembre de 2014. Archivado del original el 4 de marzo de 2016. Consultado el 15 de enero de 2017 a través de Agence France-Presse.
  98. ↑ Nealy, Kimakra (5 de agosto de 2014). "Xinjiang, China: Imán designado por el gobierno asesinado por terroristas" . Guardian Liberty Voice . Consultado el 26 de agosto de 2014 .
  99. ↑عملية أظهرت عجز سلطات الصين[ La operación demostró la incapacidad de las autoridades chinas ] (PDF) . تركستان الإسلامية (Turquestán islámico) (en árabe). No.  العدد 19. Abril de 2016. p.  25. Archivado desde el original (PDF) el 25 de septiembre de 2016.
  100. ↑ O'Grady, Siobhán (30 de agosto de 2016). «Surgen interrogantes sobre la responsabilidad tras el ataque a la embajada china en Kirguistán» . Foreign Policy . Archivado del original el 4 de febrero de 2017.
  101. ↑ Dzyubenko, Olga (7 de septiembre de 2016). «Kirguistán afirma que grupos militantes uigures están detrás del ataque a la embajada de China» . Reuters . BISHKEK. Archivado del original el 12 de junio de 2017. Consultado el 3 de julio de 2017 .
  102. ↑ "Atacantes armados con cuchillos matan a cinco personas en Xinjiang, China: gobierno" . Reuters . 14 de febrero de 2017. Archivado del original el 14 de octubre de 2017.
  103. ↑ "Ataque con cuchillo en China: Ocho muertos en la región de Xinjiang" . BBC News . 15 de febrero de 2017. Archivado del original el 30 de abril de 2018.
  104. ↑ Shakil, Ministro de Finanzas (5 de agosto de 2021). "Los talibanes no romperán fácilmente sus lazos con el ETIM antichino" . Asia Times .
  105. ↑ Shahzad, Asif (12 de agosto de 2021). "Pakistán afirma que el ataque que mató a ciudadanos chinos fue un atentado suicida" . Reuters . Consultado el 17 de agosto de 2021 .
  106. ↑ "Pakistán vincula a Nueva Delhi y Kabul con el atentado con bomba en un autobús que mató a ciudadanos chinos" . Al Jazeera . Consultado el 17 de agosto de 2021 .
  107. ↑"Governance Asia-Pacific Watch". United Nations. April 2007. Archived from the original on 24 August 2007. Retrieved 23 August 2007.
  108. ↑"Consolidated TEXT: 32002R0881 — EN — 10.10.2015". eur-lex.europa.eu. Archived from the original on 11 December 2018. Retrieved 25 August 2016.
  109. ↑Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos de la Nación. "RePET" (in Spanish). Retrieved 20 February 2020.
  110. ↑National Police Agency (Japan) (18 February 2022). "国際テロリスト財産凍結法第３条に基づき公告された国際テロリスト"(PDF) (in Japanese). Archived from the original(PDF) on 2 March 2022. Retrieved 2 March 2022.
  111. ↑Omelicheva, Mariya Y. (13 September 2010). Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia. Routledge. pp. 131–. ISBN 978-1-136-92372-2.
  112. ↑The World Almanac of Islamism: 2014. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 30 January 2014. pp. 673–. ISBN 978-1-4422-3144-3.
  113. ↑J. Todd Reed; Diana Raschke (2010). The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat. ABC-CLIO. pp. 206–. ISBN 978-0-313-36540-9.
  114. ↑Karagiannis, Emmanuel (4 December 2009). Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb Ut-Tahrir. Routledge. pp. 67–. ISBN 978-1-135-23942-8. Archived from the original on 27 May 2016. Retrieved 21 July 2016.
  115. ↑Karagiannis, Emmanuel (4 December 2009). Political Islam in Central Asia: The challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Routledge. pp. 112–. ISBN 978-1-135-23941-1. Archived from the original on 21 August 2016. Retrieved 21 July 2016.
  116. ↑Lansford, Tom (24 March 2015). Political Handbook of the World 2015. SAGE Publications. pp. 818–. ISBN 978-1-4833-7158-0.
  117. ↑"Individuals declared as specified entity"(PDF). Archived from the original(PDF) on 9 October 2022. Retrieved 6 July 2020.
  118. ↑ «SENARAI KDN 2024-ESP» . Ministerio del Interior (Malasia) . 5 de septiembre de 2024 . Consultado el 18 de diciembre de 2024 .
  119. ↑ "Listas asociadas con las Resoluciones 1267/1989/2253 y 1988" . Policía de Nueva Zelanda. 24 de febrero de 2020. Consultado el 2 de marzo de 2020 .
  120. ↑ "Tres grupos activos en Xinjiang prohibidos - Pakistán" . Dawn.com . 24 de octubre de 2013. Archivado del original el 17 de noviembre de 2016. Consultado el 29 de agosto de 2017 .
  121. ↑ "هؤلاء انغماسيو أردوغان الذين يستوردهم من الصين - عربي أونلاين" . 3arbionline.com . 31 de enero de 2017. Archivado desde el original el 14 de agosto de 2017 . Consultado el 29 de agosto de 2017 .
  122. ↑ "Turquía incluye al "Movimiento Islámico del Turkestán Oriental" en su lista de organizaciones terroristas - People's Daily Online" . En.people.cn . 3 de agosto de 2017. Archivado del original el 7 de agosto de 2017. Consultado el 29 de agosto de 2017 .
  123. ↑ "Relaciones Turquía-China: ¿De la "cooperación estratégica" a la "asociación estratégica"?" . Instituto de Oriente Medio . Archivado del original el 31 de diciembre de 2019. Consultado el 31 de diciembre de 2019 .
  124. ↑ «Lista de grupos designados como organizaciones terroristas por los EAU» . The National (Abu Dabi) . 16 de noviembre de 2014. Archivado del original el 6 de mayo de 2015. Consultado el 19 de mayo de 2015 .مجلس الوزراء يعتمد قائمة التنظيمات الإرهابية. Agencia de Noticias de los Emiratos (WAM) وكالة أنباء الإمارات. 15 de noviembre de 2014. Archivado desde el original el 17 de noviembre de 2014 . Consultado el 16 de noviembre de 2014 .«El gabinete de los EAU aprueba una nueva lista de grupos terroristas» . Agencia de Noticias de Kuwait . 15 de noviembre de 2014. Archivado del original el 29 de noviembre de 2014. Consultado el 16 de noviembre de 2014 .Emiratos Árabes Unidos incluye en su lista negra a 5 grupos pakistaníes entre 83 organizaciones como "organizaciones militantes" . The Express Tribune . AFP. 15 de noviembre de 2014. Archivado del original el 18 de noviembre de 2014. Consultado el 16 de noviembre de 2014 .
  125. ↑ "El Gabinete de los EAU aprueba la lista de organizaciones y grupos terroristas designados | WAM" . Archivado del original el 30 de enero de 2016. Consultado el 10 de febrero de 2016 .
  126. ↑ Martina, Michael; Blanchard, Ben; Spring, Jake (20 de julio de 2016). Ruwitch, John; Macfie, Nick (eds.). «Gran Bretaña añade a un grupo militante chino a su lista de organizaciones terroristas» . Reuters . Archivado del original el 14 de agosto de 2017.
  127. ↑ "Grupos terroristas proscritos" . Ministerio del Interior . Consultado el 2 de marzo de 2020 .
  128. ↑ "Personas y entidades designadas por el Departamento de Estado en virtud de la Orden Ejecutiva 13224" . Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. Archivado del original el 11 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 4 de agosto de 2016 .
  129. ↑ "Lista de exclusión de terroristas del Departamento de Estado de EE. UU." Archivada el 3 de julio de 2019 en Wayback Machine (Consultada el 29 de julio de 2014).
  130. ↑ "Personas y entidades designadas por el Departamento de Estado en virtud de la Orden Ejecutiva 13224" . Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. Archivado del original el 11 de noviembre de 2019. Consultado el 4 de agosto de 2016 .
  131. ↑ "Lista de exclusión de terroristas" . Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. Archivado del original el 3 de julio de 2019. Consultado el 4 de agosto de 2016 .
  132. ↑ Lipes, Joshua (5 de noviembre de 2020). "EE. UU. retira al ETIM de la lista de organizaciones terroristas, debilitando el pretexto de China para la represión en Xinjiang" . Radio Free Asia . Consultado el 5 de noviembre de 2020 .
  133. ↑ "EE. UU. retira de la lista de organizaciones terroristas a un grupo separatista condenado por China" . DW News . 7 de noviembre de 2020.
  134. ↑ O'Connor, Tom (21 de septiembre de 2021). "¿Terroristas islámicos o disidentes chinos? Estados Unidos se enfrenta al dilema uigur" . Newsweek . Consultado el 14 de febrero de 2024 .
  135. ↑ "China podría enfrentar una mayor amenaza terrorista a medida que EE. UU. 'elimina' la lista de organizaciones terroristas, según expertos" . South China Morning Post . 7 de noviembre de 2020. Consultado el 7 de noviembre de 2020 .
  136. ↑ "EE. UU. elimina a un grupo militante antichino de la lista de organizaciones terroristas" . Voz de América . 6 de noviembre de 2020. Consultado el 8 de noviembre de 2020 .
  137. ↑ "China acusa a EE. UU. de doble rasero al eliminar al ETIM de la lista de organizaciones terroristas" . South China Morning Post . 6 de noviembre de 2020. Consultado el 8 de noviembre de 2020 .
  138. ↑ Hua, Sha (6 de noviembre de 2020). "China indignada después de que EE. UU. eliminara la etiqueta de 'terrorista' del grupo separatista" . The Wall Street Journal . Consultado el 17 de agosto de 2021 .
  139. ↑ Roberts, Sean R. "¿Por qué Estados Unidos creyó a China sobre los supuestos terroristas uigures?" . Foreign Policy . Consultado el 17 de agosto de 2021 .
  140. ↑ "El ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de China critica la retirada 'precipitada' de Estados Unidos de Afganistán" . Reuters . 16 de agosto de 2021. Consultado el 17 de agosto de 2021 .
  141. ↑ Clabaugh, Rich (24 de abril de 2009). «Liberado de Guantánamo, un uigur se aferra a sus sueños de asilo en Suecia» . The Christian Science Monitor . Archivado del original el 9 de agosto de 2010. Recuperado el 7 de agosto de 2010 .
  142. ↑ "Congreso Mundial Uigur" . Uyghurcongress.org . Archivado del original el 6 de octubre de 2014. Consultado el 3 de noviembre de 2013 .
  143. ↑ McGregor, Andrew (11 de marzo de 2010). "¿Sobrevivirá el Partido Islámico Turkistán de Xinjiang a la muerte de su líder en un ataque con misiles no tripulados?" . Terrorism Monitor . 8 (10). Archivado del original el 14 de mayo de 2016. Recuperado el 11 de abril de 2016 .
  144. 1 2 3 "AFP: Legisladores estadounidenses solicitan revisión de la etiqueta de 'terrorismo' para los uigures" . Agence France Presse . 16 de junio de 2009. Archivado del original el 24 de febrero de 2014. Consultado el 3 de noviembre de 2013 .
  145. ↑ "China: La amenaza directa del ETIM a los Juegos Olímpicos" . Stratfor . 25 de julio de 2008. Archivado del original el 25 de mayo de 2009. Consultado el 31 de julio de 2010 .
  146. ↑ Reed, J. Todd; Raschke, Diana (2010). El ETIM: militantes islámicos de China y la amenaza terrorista global . ABC-CLIO . págs. 14–16 , 46–47 . 
  147. ↑ "Uigures condenados por complot del Movimiento Islámico del Turkestán Oriental en Dubái" . Jamestown . Consultado el 11 de abril de 2021 .
  148. ↑ Johnson, Ian (13 de agosto de 2015). "Preguntas y respuestas: Nick Holdstock sobre Xinjiang y 'Los pueblos olvidados de China'"" . Sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com . Xinjiang, China. Archivado del original el 19 de agosto de 2015 . Consultado el 29 de agosto de 2017 .
  149. ↑ Volodzko, David (8 de marzo de 2016). "El nuevo dolor de cabeza de China: los militantes uigures en Siria" . The Diplomat . Archivado del original el 15 de noviembre de 2016.
  150. ↑ Ali, Mohanad Hage (2 de marzo de 2016). «La guerra indirecta de China en Siria: revelando el papel de los combatientes uigures» . Al Arabiya English . Archivado del original el 15 de noviembre de 2016.
  151. ↑ "Piensa como un yihadista: Anatomía de los grupos salafistas de Asia Central" . Issuu . Consultado el 11 de abril de 2021 .
  152. ↑ Botobekov, Uran (29 de mayo de 2019). "Piensa como un yihadista: Anatomía de los grupos salafistas de Asia Central" . Diplomacia Moderna . Consultado el 11 de abril de 2021 .

Lecturas adicionales

  • Reed, J. Todd; Raschke, Diana (2010). El ETIM: militantes islámicos de China y la amenaza terrorista global . Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-313-36540-9.