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4.º Ejército Panzer

'''1 July 1943''' (start of the [[Battle of Kursk]]): 223,907 Armeeintendant Pz. A.O.K. 4 532/43 g. Kdos. Verpflegungsstärken nach dem Stand vom 1.7.43. NARA T313, R390, F868005...

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El 4.º Ejército Panzer ( en alemán : 4. Panzerarmee ), que operó como Grupo Panzer 4 ( Panzergruppe 4 ) desde su formación el 15 de febrero de 1941 hasta el 1 de enero de 1942, fue una formación panzer alemana durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial . Como componente blindado clave de la Wehrmacht , el ejército participó en las batallas cruciales de la guerra germano-soviética de 1941-1945 , incluyendo la Operación Barbarroja , la Batalla de Moscú , la Batalla de Stalingrado , la Batalla de Kursk y la Batalla de Kiev de 1943 .

El ejército fue destruido durante la Batalla de Stalingrado, [ 5 ] [ 6 ] pero posteriormente fue reconstituido.

Formación y preparativos para la Operación Barbarroja

Como parte de los preparativos del Alto Mando alemán para la Operación Barbarroja , el Generaloberst Erich Hoepner fue nombrado comandante del 4.º Grupo Panzer en febrero de 1941. Su misión era avanzar hacia Leningrado como parte del Grupo de Ejércitos Norte bajo el mando de Wilhelm von Leeb . [ 7 ] El 30 de marzo de 1941, Hitler pronunció un discurso ante unos doscientos oficiales superiores de la Wehrmacht en el que expuso sus planes para una guerra ideológica de aniquilación ( Vernichtungskrieg ) contra la Unión Soviética. [ 8 ] Declaró que «quería que la inminente guerra contra la Unión Soviética se llevara a cabo no según los principios militares, sino como una guerra de exterminio» contra un enemigo ideológico, ya fuera militar o civil. Muchos líderes de la Wehrmacht, incluido Hoepner, se hicieron eco de este sentimiento. [ 9 ] Como comandante del 4.º Grupo Panzer, emitió una directiva a sus tropas: [ 10 ]

La guerra contra Rusia constituye un capítulo crucial en la lucha por la supervivencia de la nación alemana. Es la eterna batalla entre los pueblos germánicos y eslavos, la defensa de la cultura europea frente a la invasión moscovita-asiática y el rechazo del judeo-bolchevismo. El objetivo de esta batalla debe ser la destrucción de la Rusia actual y, por consiguiente, debe librarse con una severidad sin precedentes. Toda acción militar debe planificarse y ejecutarse con una férrea voluntad de exterminar al enemigo de forma implacable y total. En particular, ningún seguidor del actual sistema ruso-bolchevique quedará impune.

— 2 de mayo de 1941 [ 10 ]

The order was transmitted to the troops on Hoepner's initiative, ahead of the official OKW (Wehrmacht High Command) directives that laid the groundwork for the war of extermination, such as the Barbarossa Decree of 13 May 1941 and other orders. Hoepner's directive predated the first OKH (Army High Command) draft of the Commissar Order.[11] The historian Jürgen Förster wrote that Hoepner's directive represented an "independent transformation of Hitler's ideological intentions into an order".[11]

1941: Invasion of the Soviet Union

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Advance on Leningrad

The 4th Panzer Group consisted of the LVI Army Corps (motorised) (Erich von Manstein) and the XXXXI Army Corps (motorised) (Georg-Hans Reinhardt).[12] Their composition was as follows:

The Army Group was to advance through the Baltic States to Leningrad. Barbarossa commenced on 22 June 1941 with a massive German attack along the whole front line. The 4th Panzer Group headed for the Dvina River to secure the bridges near the town of Daugavpils.[14] The Red Army mounted a number of counterattacks against the XXXXI Panzer Corps, leading to the Battle of Raseiniai.[15]

Después de que el cuerpo de Reinhardt se acercara, los dos cuerpos recibieron la orden de cercar las formaciones soviéticas alrededor de Luga . Habiendo penetrado nuevamente en las líneas soviéticas con los flancos desprotegidos, el cuerpo de Manstein fue el objetivo de una contraofensiva soviética a partir del 15 de julio en Soltsy por parte del 11.º Ejército soviético . Las fuerzas de Manstein fueron duramente castigadas y el Ejército Rojo detuvo el avance alemán en Luga. [ 16 ] Finalmente, el grupo de ejércitos derrotó al Frente Noroccidental soviético defensor , infligiendo más de 90 000 bajas y destruyendo más de 1000 tanques y 1000 aviones, para luego avanzar al noreste de la Línea Stalin . [ 17 ]

El 6 de julio de 1941, Hoepner emitió una orden a sus tropas instruyéndoles a tratar con justicia a la "población leal", añadiendo que "los actos individuales de sabotaje debían imputarse simplemente a comunistas y judíos". [ 18 ] Al igual que todos los ejércitos alemanes en el Frente Oriental, el grupo panzer de Hoepner implementó la Orden de Comisarios que ordenaba a las tropas de la Wehrmacht asesinar a los oficiales políticos del Ejército Rojo inmediatamente después de su captura, contraviniendo las leyes de la guerra aceptadas. [ 19 ] Entre el 2 y el 8 de julio, el 4.º Grupo Panzer fusiló a 101 comisarios políticos del Ejército Rojo, y la mayoría de las ejecuciones procedían del XLI Cuerpo Panzer. [ 18 ] Para el 19 de julio, se habían reportado 172 ejecuciones de comisarios. [ 20 ]

A mediados de julio, el 4.º Grupo Panzer tomó la cabeza de puente de Luga y planeaba avanzar hacia Leningrado. El estado mayor y los destacamentos 2 y 3 del Einsatzgruppe A , uno de los escuadrones móviles de exterminio que seguían a la Wehrmacht en la Unión Soviética ocupada, fueron trasladados al distrito de Luga con la ayuda del ejército. «El movimiento del Einsatzgruppe A —que el ejército pretendía utilizar en Leningrado— se llevó a cabo de común acuerdo con el 4.º Grupo Panzer y a petición expresa de este», señaló Franz Walter Stahlecker , comandante del Einsatzgruppe A. [ 21 ] Stahlecker describió la cooperación del ejército como «generalmente muy buena» y «en ciertos casos, como por ejemplo con el 4.º Grupo Panzer al mando del general Hoepner, extremadamente estrecha, incluso podría decirse que cordial». [ 22 ]

By late July, Army Group North positioned 4th Panzer Group's units south and east of Narva, Estonia, where they could begin an advance on Leningrad in terrain conditions relatively suitable for armoured warfare. By that time, however, the army group lacked the strength to take Leningrad, which continued to be a high priority for the German high command. A compromise solution was worked out whereas the infantry would attack north from both sides of Lake Ilmen, while the panzer group would advance from its current position. Hoepner's forces began their advance on August 8, but the attack ran into determined Soviet defences. Elsewhere, Soviet counter-attacks threatened Leeb's southern flank. By mid to late August, the German forces were making gains again, with the 4th Panzer Group taking Narva on 17 August.[23]

On 29 August, Leeb issued orders for the blockade of Leningrad in anticipation that the city would soon be abandoned by the Soviets. On September 5, Hitler ordered Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group and an air corps transferred to Army Group Centre effective 15 September, in preparation for Operation Typhoon, the German assault on Moscow. Leeb objected and was given a reprieve in the transfer of his mobile forces, with the view of making one last push towards Leningrad. The 4th Panzer Group was to be the main attacking force, which reached south of the Neva River, where it was faced with strong Soviet counter-attacks. By 24 September, Army Group North halted its advance and transferred the 4th Panzer Group to Army Group Centre.[24]

Battle of Moscow

Erich Hoepner (right) with commander of the SS Polizei Division, Walter Krüger, October 1941

As part of Operation Typhoon, the 4th Panzer Group was subordinated to the 4th Army under the command of Günther von Kluge. In early October, the 4th Panzer Group completed the encirclement at Vyazma. Kluge instructed Hoepner to pause the advance, much to the latter's displeasure, as his units were needed to prevent break-outs of Soviet forces. Hoepner was confident that the clearing of the pocket and the advance on Moscow could be undertaken at the same time and viewed Kluge's actions as interference, leading to friction and "clashes" with his superior, as he wrote in a letter home on 6 October.[25] Hoepner did not seem to appreciate that his units were very short on fuel; the 11th Panzer Division, reported having no fuel at all. Only the 20th Panzer Division was advancing towards Moscow amid deteriorating road conditions.[26]

Once the Vyazma pocket was eliminated, other units were able to advance on 14 October. Heavy rains and onset of the rasputitsa (roadlessness) caused frequent damage to tracked vehicles and motor transport further hampering the advance.[27] By early November, the 4th Panzer Group was depleted from earlier fighting and the weather but Hoepner, along with other panzer group commanders and Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, was impatient to resume the offensive.[28]

On 17 November, the 4th Panzer Group attacked again towards Moscow alongside the V Army Corps of the 4th Army, as part of the continuation of Operation Typhoon by Army Group Centre. The panzer group and the army corps represented Kluge's best forces, most ready for a continued offensive. In two weeks' fighting, Hoepner's forces advanced 60 km (37 mi) (4 km (2.5 mi) per day).[29] Lacking strength and mobility to conduct battles of encirclement, the Group undertook frontal assaults which proved increasingly costly.[30] A lack of tanks, insufficient motor transport and a precarious supply situation, along with tenacious Red Army resistance and the air superiority achieved by Soviet fighters hampered the attack.[31]

El 3.er Grupo Panzer, más al norte, experimentó un progreso ligeramente mejor, con un promedio de 6 km (3,7 mi) por día. El ataque del 2.º Grupo Panzer sobre Tula y Kashira , a 125 km (78 mi) al sur de Moscú, solo logró un éxito fugaz y precario, mientras Guderian vacilaba entre la desesperación y el optimismo, dependiendo de la situación en el frente. [ 32 ] Ante la presión del Alto Mando alemán, Kluge finalmente comprometió su flanco sur, más débil, al ataque el 1 de diciembre. Tras la batalla, Hoepner y Guderian atribuyeron el fracaso alemán en alcanzar Moscú a la lenta incorporación del flanco sur del 4.º Ejército al ataque, sobreestimando enormemente las capacidades de las fuerzas restantes de Kluge, según Stahel. [ 33 ] Tampoco se tuvo en cuenta que Moscú era una posición fortificada que la Wehrmacht carecía de la fuerza para rodear o tomar en un asalto frontal, nuevamente según Stahel. [ 34 ] Por el contrario, Forczyk [ 35 ] atribuye parte de la culpa a la falta de compromiso poco sincero de Kluge con la operación de Moscú.    

El 2 de diciembre, Hoepner instó a sus tropas a avanzar, afirmando que «el objetivo [el cerco de Moscú] aún puede lograrse». Al día siguiente, advirtió a Kluge que si no se detenía el ataque, sus formaciones quedarían diezmadas e incapaces de defenderse. Kluge se mostró comprensivo, ya que el flanco sur del 4.º Ejército ya había tenido que retirarse bajo la presión del Ejército Rojo y se encontraba a la defensiva. [ 36 ] Hoepner recibió la orden de pausar el ataque, con el objetivo de reanudarlo el 6 de diciembre. [ 37 ] El 5 de diciembre de 1941, con órdenes de atacar al día siguiente, Hoepner convocó una conferencia de jefes de estado mayor de su cuerpo. Los informes fueron desalentadores: solo cuatro divisiones se consideraban capaces de atacar, tres de ellas con objetivos limitados. El ataque se canceló; el Ejército Rojo lanzó su contraofensiva de invierno ese mismo día. [ 38 ]

1942: Batalla de Stalingrado

On 1 January 1942, the 4th Panzer Group was redesignated 4th Panzer Army. The 4th Panzer Army held defensive positions in the spring of 1942 and then was reinforced, re-fit and transferred to Army Group South for Case Blue, its offensive in Southern Russia. Command was transferred to general Hermann Hoth in June. As the operation progressed, Hitler divided Army Group South into two army groups. Army Group A which was composed of the German 17th Army and 1st Panzer Army and Army Group B which was composed of 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army. The 4th Panzer Army was on 1 Aug 1942 composed of:[39]

  • XXXXVIII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer Troops Rudolf Veiel): 14th Panzer Division, 29th Motorized Division, (24th Panzer Division from 6th Army on 14 Aug)
  • IV Army Corps (General of Infantry Viktor von Schwedler): 94th Infantry Division, 371st Infantry Division, (297th Infantry-Division from 6th Army on 14 Aug)
  • Romanian VI Army Corps (Lieutenant General Corneliu Dragalina): Romanian 1st Infantry Division, 2nd Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 20th Infantry Division

Army Group B's objective was to anchor itself on the Volga while Army Group A drove into the oil fields of the Caucasus. The 4th Panzer Army approached Stalingrad from the south while the 6th Army approached it from the west. Their aim was to meet up at Stalingrad and encircle the Soviet 62nd and 64th armies outside the city. The 6th Army was faced by a strong counterattack by the Soviet forces and failed to meet up with the 4th Panzer Army for three crucial days, allowing the two Soviet armies to withdraw into Stalingrad.

The 4th Panzer Army guarded the outside perimeter of Stalingrad while the 6th Army was engaged in the battle to capture the city. For over two months, the 6th Army was embroiled in vicious fighting in the city; though it was able to take over 90% of the city, it was unable to destroy the last pockets of resistance. On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus, a counter-offensive which encircled the entire 6th Army and the 24th Panzer Division of the 4th Panzer Army. The 4th Panzer Army tried and failed to break the encirclement of Stalingrad in Operation Winter Storm. It was destroyed as a result of the battle.[5][6]

1943: Battles of Kursk and Kiev

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4th Panzer Army locations, 1943-44

The army was then given reinforcements including 160 new tanks. It then was able to halt the Soviet winter offensive in Southern Russia and then counterattacked in the Third Battle of Kharkov, retaking the city in March 1943. The army saw little or no action over the next three months as both sides built up their strength for the upcoming Battle of Kursk.

During the Battle of Kursk

The army throughout the spring of 1943 was significantly reinforced and grew to a strength of 1,100 tanks and 250,000 men by July 1943. It was to form the southern spearhead in the Battle of Kursk. The army tried but failed to break through the Soviet defences around Kursk. It then fought a series of defensive battles throughout the remainder of 1943 to hold back the Red Army's Lower Dnieper Strategic Offensive Operation. By November 1943, the Soviets had reached Kiev and the 4th Panzer Army was tasked to defend the city. The Soviet aim was to take the city and break the rail link with Army Group Center or envelop Army Group South. But even though the Soviets had liberated Kiev, broken the Dnieper line, and inflicted massive casualties, the 4th Panzer Army held on and the Soviets failed to break the rail link.

1944–45: The retreat

By early 1944, the 4th Panzer Army had been pushed back to the pre-war 1939 Polish border. The army defended positions in Ukraine west of Kiev until late June 1944, fighting in the southern regions of the Pinsk Marshes, and around Lutsk, Shepetovka, Tarnopol, and Kovel in western Galicia. However, following the transfer of several of its panzer divisions northwards in the aftermath of Army Group Center's collapse in Operation Bagration, 4th Army was progressively outmatched and forced into a fighting withdrawal by the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive. The right flank of 4th Army, including XIII Army Corps, was surrounded and destroyed at Brody in late July, 1944.

By August 1944, Soviet attacks forced a full retreat of the 4th Panzer Army through the area of Chełm and Lublin, ending on the west bank of the Vistula River and an initially successful attempt to contain the Soviet bridgehead at Baranow. [40] In November 1944, the army was composed of:

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Positions of 4th Panzer Army in 1945One corps of the 4th PzA was encircled in the Halbe Pocket in late April 1945.

The defense along the Vistula took place from August 1944 until the renewed Soviet offensive in January 1945. By January 1945, the 4th Panzer Army was holding static defensive positions on Hitler's direct orders and during the lull in the fighting it had created a defensive zone in southern Poland.

On 1 January 1945, the 4th Panzer Army, then under Army Group A, had a total strength of 133,474 men spread across seven infantry divisions (68th, 72nd, 88th, 168th, 291st, 304th, 342nd), two Panzergrenadier divisions (10th, 20th), two panzer divisions (16th, 17th), two autonomous brigades, an autonomous regiment and several autonomous artillery detachments. With its manpower, it was the largest single contributor to Army Group A's overall manpower of 400,556.[41]:504

Unknown to the Wehrmacht, the Soviet command planned to saturate the entire defensive zone with artillery bombardment. The Red Army began their Vistula–Oder Offensive on January 17, quickly encircling the LVI Panzer Corps and destroying half of all armoured forces concentrated with the 4th Panzer Army. The commander of the LVI Corps, General Johannes Block, was killed in action on 26 January. The remnants of the army retreated along the entire front before re-grouping on the western bank of the Oder River in February 1945.

The Red Army halted its offensive in February 1945. The 3rd Panzer Army was tasked to halt the Soviets in the north, while the 9th Army was guarding against the Soviets in the centre. During February 1945, the 4th Panzer Army defended along the Oder River, containing the Soviet bridgehead at Steinau on the Oder. In March and the first half of April 1945, the army concentrated on defenses along the Lusatian Neisse River between Görlitz and Guben.[40]

On April 16, 1945, the Red Army renewed its offensive by crossing the Oder River. While the 9th Army held the Soviet forces at the Battle of Seelow Heights, the 4th Panzer Army was being pushed back. V Corps of the retreating 4th Panzer Army was pushed into the operational region of the German 9th Army, forming a pocket of some 80,000 men. The Red Army then encircled this force in a pocket in the Spree Forest south of the Seelow Heights and west of Frankfurt.[42] Some of the 4th Panzer Army troops trapped in the Halbe Pocket broke out to the west and surrendered to the US Army on the west bank of the Elbe River. The bulk of the 4th Panzer Army was pushed south of Dresden into the Ore Mountains where it surrendered to the Red Army in the wake of the early May 1945 Prague Offensive.

Aftermath

One of the 4th Panzer Army commanders, Erich Hoepner, was executed for his role in the 20 July plot.

Following the end of the war, one of the 4th Panzer Army former commanders, Hermann Hoth, was tried in the High Command Trial, one of the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials. Explaining his harsh measures against Jews and other civilians, he claimed that "it was a matter of common knowledge in Russia that it was the Jew in particular who participated in a very large extent in sabotage, espionage, etc."[43] Hoth was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. On 27 October 1948, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. In January 1951, the sentence was reviewed with no changes. Hoth was released on parole in 1954; his sentence was reduced to time served in 1957.[44]

None of the other commanders ever faced charges.

Commanders

See also

References

Citations

  1. ↑Armeeintendant Pz. A.O.K. 4 532/43 g. Kdos. Verpflegungsstärken nach dem Stand vom 1.7.43. NARA T313, R390, F8680057.
  2. ↑Pz. AOK 4 Oberquartiermeister Nr. 1834/43 g. Kdos. Verpflegungsstärken nach dem Stande vom 1.11.43. NARA T313, R390, F8680072.
  3. ↑Armeeintendant Pz. A.O.K. 4 an Heeresgruppen Intendant Süd, 1227/43 geh. Kdos. Verpflegungsstärken nach dem Stande vom 20.12.43. NARA T313, R390, F8680079.
  4. ↑Armeeintendant Pz. A.O.K. 4, 399/44 g. Kdos. An Heeresgruppenintendant Süd. Verpflegungsstärken nach dem Stande vom 10.4.44. NARA T313, R408, F8700017.
  5. 12Tarrant, V.E. (1992). Stalingrad: Anatomy of an Agony. London: Leo Cooper. p. 230. ISBN 978-0850523423.
  6. 12Childers, Thomas (2017). The Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (1st ed.). Simon & Schuster. p. 518. ISBN 978-1-4516-5113-3.
  7. ↑Zabecki 2014, p. 615.
  8. ↑Förster 1998, pp. 496–497.
  9. ↑Crowe 2013, p. 90.
  10. 12Burleigh 1997, p. 76.
  11. 12Förster 1998, pp. 519–521.
  12. ↑Melvin 2010, pp. 198–199.
  13. ↑ Manstein, Lost victories p,178 / Mungo Melvin Manstein p,205
  14. ↑Melvin 2010, pp. 205.
  15. ↑Melvin 2010, pp. 209–210.
  16. ↑Melvin 2010, pp. 217–218.
  17. ↑Glantz 2012.
  18. 12Stein 2007, p. 301.
  19. ↑Stahel 2015, p. 28.
  20. ↑Lemay 2010, p. 252.
  21. ↑Jones 2008, p. 35.
  22. ↑Stahel 2015, p. 37.
  23. ↑Megargee 2006, pp. 104–106.
  24. ↑Megargee 2006, pp. 115–116.
  25. ↑Stahel 2013, pp. 74–75, 95.
  26. ↑Stahel 2013, p. 95.
  27. ↑Stahel 2013, pp. 173–174.
  28. ↑Stahel 2015, pp. 78–80.
  29. ↑Stahel 2015, p. 228.
  30. ↑Stahel 2015, p. 223.
  31. ↑Stahel 2015, pp. 240–244.
  32. ↑Stahel 2015, p. 186−189, 228.
  33. ↑Stahel 2015, pp. 229–230.
  34. ↑Stahel 2015, pp. 235–237, 250.
  35. ↑Forczyk 2006.
  36. ↑Stahel 2015, pp. 295–296.
  37. ↑Stahel 2015, pp. 304–305.
  38. ↑Stahel 2015, pp. 306–307.
  39. ↑Glantz, David M. To The Gates of Stalingrad (ISBN 978-0-7006-1630-5) p.272
  40. 12Tessin 1973, p. 229
  41. ↑Lakowski, Richard (2008). "Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Verteidigung zwischen Ostsee und Karpaten". In Müller, Rolf-Dieter (ed.). Die Militärische Niederwerfung der Wehrmacht. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (in German). Vol. 10/1. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. pp. 491–681. ISBN 9783421062376.
  42. ↑Beevor 2002, p. 329
  43. ↑Hebert 2010, pp. 121–122.
  44. ↑Hebert 2010, pp. 216–217.
  45. ↑Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operations p. 352

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  • Burleigh, Michael (1997). Ethics and Extermination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511806162. ISBN 9780521582117.
  • Crowe, David M. (2013). Crimes of State Past and Present: Government-Sponsored Atrocities and International Legal Responses. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-98681-2.
  • English, John A. (2011). Surrender Invites Death: Fighting the Waffen SS in Normandy. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books. ISBN 978-0-8117-4437-9.
  • Forczyk, Robert (2006). Moscow 1941: Hitler's first defeat. Osprey. ISBN 9781846030178.
  • Förster, Jürgen (1998). "Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest and Annihilation". In Boog, Horst; Förster, Jürgen; Hoffmann, Joachim; Klink, Ernst; Müller, Rolf-Dieter; Ueberschär, Gerd R. (eds.). Germany and the Second World War: Attack on the Soviet Union. Vol. IV. Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-822886-8.
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  • Hebert, Valerie (2010). Hitler's Generals on Trial: The Last War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1698-5.
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  • Stahel, David (2015). The Battle for Moscow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-08760-6.
  • Stahel, David (2013). Operation Typhoon: Hitler's March on Moscow, October 1941. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-03512-6.
  • Stein, Marcel (2007). Field Marshal von Manstein: The Janushead – A Portrait. Helion & Company. ISBN 978-1-906033-02-6.
  • Tessin, Georg (1973). Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939-1945. Vol. 2. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag.
  • Zabecki, David T. (2014). Germany at War: 400 Years of Military History. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-59884-981-3.