Consociationalism

Consociationalism (/kənˌsoʊʃiˈeɪʃənəlɪzəm/kən-SOH-shee-AY-shən-əl-iz-əm) is a form of democratic power sharing.^[1]Political scientists define a consociational state as one which has major internal divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, but which remains stable due to consultation among the elites of these groups. Consociational states are often contrasted with states with majoritarian electoral systems.

The goals of consociationalism are governmental stability, the survival of the power-sharing arrangements, the survival of democracy, and the avoidance of violence. When consociationalism is organised along religious confessional lines, as in Lebanon, it is known as confessionalism. Consociationalism is sometimes seen as analogous to corporatism,^[2][3] and some scholars consider consociationalism a form of corporatism. Others claim that economic corporatism was designed to regulate class conflict, while consociationalism developed on the basis of reconciling societal fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines.^[4]

Concurrent majority can be a precursor to consociationalism. A consociational democracy differs from consensus democracy (e.g. in Switzerland), in that consociational democracy represents a consensus of representatives with minority veto, while consensus democracy requires consensus across the electorate.^[5] The idea has received significant criticism in its applicability to democratic political systems, especially with regard to power-sharing.

Consociation was first discussed in the 17th centuryNew England Confederation. It described the interassociation and cooperation of the participant self-governing Congregational churches of the various colonial townships of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. These were empowered in the civil legislature and magistracy.^[6] It was debated at length in the Boston Synod of 1662.^[7] This was when the Episcopalian Act of Uniformity 1662 was being introduced in England. Consociationalism was originally discussed in academic terms by the political scientistArend Lijphart. However, Lijphart has stated that he "merely discovered what political practitioners had repeatedly – and independently of both academic experts and one another – invented years earlier".^[8] Theoretically, consociationalism was inducted from Lijphart's observations of political accommodation in the Netherlands, after which Lijphart argued for a generalizable consociational approach to ethnic conflict regulation.^[9]

Los Países Bajos, como estado consociacional, estuvieron divididos entre 1857 y 1967 en cuatro pilares no territoriales : calvinista , católico , socialista y liberal , aunque hasta 1917 existía un sistema electoral de mayoría simple ("primero en llegar") en lugar de uno proporcional . En su apogeo, cada uno comprendía grupos, escuelas, universidades, hospitales y periódicos muy organizados, todos divididos según una estructura social balcanizada . La teoría, según Lijphart, se centra en el papel de las élites sociales, su acuerdo y cooperación, como clave para una democracia estable. Basándose en este estudio inicial de la democracia consociacional, John McGarry y Brendan O'Leary remontan el consociacionalismo a 1917, cuando se empleó por primera vez en los Países Bajos , mientras que Gerhard Lehmbruch sugiere "precursores" del consociacionalismo ya en la Paz de Augsburgo de 1555. ^{[ 10 ] [ 11 ]}

Si bien la teoría inicial de Lijphart se basó principalmente en las democracias de Europa Occidental para formular el consociacionalismo, ha ganado una enorme influencia en contextos de construcción estatal posconflicto en las últimas décadas. ^{[ 12 ] [ 13 ]} Este desarrollo también se ha reflejado en la ampliación de las condiciones favorables a factores externos en la literatura. ^{[ 13 ] [ 12 ] [ 14 ]} En lugar de ser construidos internamente por las élites estatales, estos ejemplos recientes se han caracterizado por la facilitación externa, y en ocasiones la imposición, a través de actores internacionales. ^{[ 14 ] [ 13 ] [ 12 ]} En el proceso, los acuerdos consociacionales se han utilizado con frecuencia para transformar conflictos violentos inmediatos y consolidar acuerdos de paz en contextos extremadamente frágiles de sociedades profundamente divididas. ^{[ 15 ]}

The volatile environments in which these recent examples have been implemented have exhibited the need for external interference not only for their initial implementation but also for their continued existence.^[14][12] As such, a range of international actors have assumed mediating and supporting roles to preserve power-sharing agreements in targeted states. Most prominently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this has involved an "international regulating body" in the form of a High Representative who in one period frequently intervened in the domestic political affairs of the state to implement legislation on which domestic elites were reluctant to come to an agreement.^[16]

While the current results of consociational arrangements implemented in post-conflict state-building endeavours have been mixed, scholars such as O'Leary and McGarry maintain that they have often proven to be the most practical approach to ending immediate conflict and creating the necessary stability for peace-building to take place.^[15] Its utility has been seen in its transformative aspect, flexibility, and "realist" approach to existing identity formations that are difficult to incorporate in a majoritarian system.^[17]

Lijphart identifies four key characteristics of consociational democracies:^[18]

Lijphart has also written, "The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system."^[19]

Consociational policies often have these characteristics:^[20]

• Coalition cabinets, where executive power is shared between parties, not concentrated in one. Many of these cabinets are oversized, meaning they include parties not necessary for a parliamentary majority;
• Balance of power between executive and legislative;
• Decentralized and federal government, where (regional) minorities have considerable independence;
• Incongruent bicameralism, where it is very difficult for one party to gain a majority in both houses. Normally one chamber represents regional interests and the other national interests;
• Proportional representation, to allow (small) minorities to gain representation too;
• Organized and corporatist interest groups, which represent minorities;
• A rigid constitution, which prevents government from changing the constitution without consent of minorities;
• Judicial review, which allows minorities to go to the courts to seek redress against laws that they see as unjust;
• Elements of direct democracy, which allow minorities to enact or prevent legislation;
• Proportional employment in the public sector;
• A neutral head of state, either a monarch with only ceremonial duties, or an indirectly elected president, who gives up his or her party affiliation after being elected;
• Referendums are only used to allow minorities to block legislation: this means that they must be a citizen's initiative and that there is no compulsory voting.
• Equality between ministers in cabinet, the prime minister is only primus inter pares;
• An independent central bank, where experts and not politicians set out monetary policies.

Lijphart also identified a number of "favourable conditions" under which consociationalism is likely to be successful. He has changed the specification of these conditions somewhat over time.^[21] Michael Kerr summarised Lijphart's most prominent favourable factors as:^[22]

• Segmental isolation of ethnic communities
• A multiple balance of power
• The presence of external threats common to all communities
• Overarching loyalties to the state
• A tradition of elite accommodation
• Socioeconomic equality
• A small population size, reducing the policy load
• A moderate multi-party system with segmental parties

Lijphart stresses that these conditions are neither indispensable nor sufficient to account for the success of consociationalism.^[18] This has led Rinus van Schendelen to conclude that "the conditions may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short conditions or no conditions at all".^[23]John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary argue that three conditions are key to the establishment of democratic consociational power-sharing: elites have to be motivated to engage in conflict regulation; elites must lead deferential segments; and there must be a multiple balance of power, but more importantly the subcultures must be stable.^[24] Michael Kerr, in his study of the role of external actors in power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, adds to McGarry and O'Leary's list the condition that "the existence of positive external regulating pressures, from state to non-state actors, which provide the internal elites with sufficient incentives and motives for their acceptance of, and support for, consociation".^[22]

In a consociational state, all groups, including minorities, are represented on the political and economic stages. Supporters of consociationalism argue that it is a more realistic option in deeply divided societies than integrationist approaches to conflict management.^[25]

Se han formulado numerosas críticas contra el despliegue del consociacionalismo en la construcción del Estado. Se le ha criticado por institucionalizar y profundizar las divisiones existentes, ^{[ 26 ]} por depender gravemente del apoyo externo para su supervivencia, ^{[ 15 ] [ 12 ]} y por congelar temporalmente los conflictos pero no resolverlos. ^{[ 17 ]} Dada la aparente necesidad de regulación externa de estos acuerdos, muchos académicos han caracterizado estos proyectos de construcción del Estado como profundamente invasivos. ^{[ 16 ] [ 27 ]} Una preocupación recurrente es la erosión de la rendición de cuentas de la élite gobernante ante su población y el fomento de la política clientelista. ^{[ 16 ] [ 28 ] [ 27 ]} Estas dinámicas se han señalado como obstáculos para la resolución de las profundas divisiones que las consociaciones pretenden aliviar. ^{[ 17 ] [ 29 ]} Otras críticas han señalado que las consociaciones han fomentado en ocasiones condiciones de " estados frágiles ", que la construcción del Estado pretende prevenir. ^{[ 27 ]}

Brian Barry ha cuestionado la naturaleza de las divisiones existentes en los países que Lijphart considera "casos clásicos" de democracias consociativas. Por ejemplo, argumenta que en el caso suizo, "los partidos políticos trascienden las divisiones sociales y ofrecen una imagen de notable consenso en lugar de un conflicto de objetivos altamente estructurado". ^{[ 30 ]} En el caso de los Países Bajos, sostiene que "la causa principal del desacuerdo fue la percepción de algún neerlandés... de que importaba lo que creyeran todos los habitantes del país. Las demandas de políticas destinadas a producir uniformidad religiosa o secular presuponen una preocupación... por el estado de gracia de los conciudadanos". Contrasta esto con el caso de una sociedad marcada por el conflicto, en este caso Irlanda del Norte , donde argumenta que "los habitantes... nunca han mostrado mucha preocupación por la posibilidad de que los seguidores de la otra religión vayan al infierno". ^{[ 31 ]} Barry concluye que en el caso holandés, el consociacionalismo es tautológico y argumenta que "la relevancia del modelo 'consociacional' para otras sociedades divididas es mucho más dudosa de lo que comúnmente se supone". ^{[ 30 ]}

Rinus van Schendelen has argued that Lijphart uses evidence selectively. Pillarisation was "seriously weakening", even in the 1950s, cross-denominational co-operation was increasing, and formerly coherent political sub-cultures were dissolving. He argued that elites in the Netherlands were not motivated by preferences derived from the general interest, but rather by self-interest. They formed coalitions not to forge consociational negotiation between segments but to improve their parties' respective power. He argued that the Netherlands was "stable" in that it had few protests or riots, but that it was so before consociationalism, and that it was not stable from the standpoint of government turnover. He questioned the extent to which the Netherlands, or indeed any country labelled a consociational system, could be called a democracy, and whether calling a consociational country a democracy isn't somehow ruled out by definition. He believed that Lijphart suffered severe problems of rigor when identifying whether particular divisions were cleavages, whether particular cleavages were segmental, and whether particular cleavages were cross-cutting.^[23]

Ian Lustick has argued that academics lack an alternative "control" approach for explaining stability in deeply divided societies and that this has resulted in the empirical overextension of consociational models.^[32] Lustick argues that Lijphart has "an impressionistic methodological posture, flexible rules for coding data, and an indefatigable, rhetorically seductive commitment to promoting consociationalism as a widely applicable principle of political engineering",^[33] that results in him applying consociational theory to case studies that it does not fit. Furthermore, Lustick states that "Lijphart's definition of 'accommodation' ... includes the elaborately specified claim that issues dividing polarized blocs are settled by leaders convinced of the need for settlement".^[33]

Consociationalism focuses on diverging identities such as ethnicity instead of integrating identities such as class, institutionalizing and entrenching the former. Furthermore, it relies on rival co-operation, which is inherently unstable. It focuses on intrastate relations and neglects relations with other states. Donald L. Horowitz argues that consociationalism can lead to the reification of ethnic divisions, since "grand coalitions are unlikely, because of the dynamics of intraethnic competition. The very act of forming a multiethnic coalition generates intraethnic competition – flanking – if it does not already exist".^[34]

Consistent with Horowitz's claims, Dawn Brancati finds that federalism/territorial autonomy, an element of consociationalism, strengthens ethnic divisions if it is designed in a way that strengthens regional parties, which in turn encourage ethnic conflict.^[35] James Anderson also supports Horowitz's contention that consociational powersharing built around diverging identities can entrench and sharpen these divisions. Citing the example of Northern Ireland, Anderson argues such approaches tend to "prioritise the same general type of territorial identity as the ethno-nationalists". Nonetheless, Anderson concedes difficulty lies in the fact such identities cannot simply be wished away, as he argues is attempted when focusing only on individual rights at the expense of group rights.^[36] As an alternative of consociationalism Horowitz suggested an alternative model – centripetalism. Centripetalism aims to depoliticize ethnicity and to encourage multi-ethnic parties instead of reinforcing ethnic divides through political institutions.^[37]

In 2022, Yascha Mounk argued that the case for consociationalism and power-sharing had weakened significantly since first proposed based on experiments and real-life observations. He argues that in some cases it can bring short-term peace, but that it is always temporary and is likely to worsen tensions in the long-run.^[38]

Los críticos señalan que el consociacionalismo es peligroso en un sistema de ideologías antagónicas diferentes , generalmente el conservadurismo y el comunismo . Afirman que deben existir condiciones específicas para que tres o más grupos desarrollen un sistema múltiple con líderes fuertes. Esta filosofía está dominada por las élites, y las masas marginadas por estas tienen menos que perder si estalla una guerra. El consociacionalismo no puede aplicarse de forma imperial. Por ejemplo, no se aplica eficazmente en Austria . Los críticos también señalan el fracaso de este razonamiento en el Líbano , un país que sufrió una guerra civil, donde la élite de la posguerra utilizó el sistema consociacional para capturar instituciones y recursos estatales. ^{[ 39 ]} Solo se aplica realmente en Suiza , Bélgica y los Países Bajos, y no en sociedades más profundamente divididas. Si uno de los tres grupos obtiene la mitad más uno de los votos, los otros grupos se encuentran en perpetua oposición, lo cual es en gran medida incompatible con el consociacionalismo.

El consociacionalismo presupone que cada grupo es cohesionado y cuenta con un liderazgo sólido. Si bien la minoría puede bloquear decisiones, esto requiere un acuerdo unánime. Los derechos se otorgan a las comunidades en lugar de a los individuos, lo que conlleva una sobrerrepresentación de algunos en la sociedad y una subrepresentación de otros. Es improbable que se formen grandes coaliciones debido a la dinámica de la competencia étnica. Cada grupo busca obtener mayor poder. Se critica a los consociacionalistas por centrarse demasiado en la creación de instituciones y no lo suficiente en cuestiones de transición que trascienden dichas instituciones. Finalmente, se afirma que las instituciones consociacionales promueven el sectarismo y afianzan las identidades existentes.

Los sistemas políticos de varios países operan o solían operar sobre una base consociacional, incluyendo Bélgica , Italia , Chipre (vigente entre 1960 y 1963), ^{[ 40 ] [ 41 ] [ 42 ]} la Primera República Checoslovaca , ^{[ 43 ]} Israel , Líbano , los Países Bajos (1917-1967), Irlanda del Norte , Suiza (consulta principalmente entre diferentes ideologías), Etiopía , Zimbabue-Rodesia y Sudáfrica . Algunos académicos también han argumentado que la Unión Europea se asemeja a una democracia consociacional, con consulta entre diferentes ideologías. ^{[ 44 ] [ 45 ]} Además, varios acuerdos de paz son consociacionales, incluyendo:

• El Acuerdo de Dayton que puso fin a la guerra de 1992-1995 en Bosnia y Herzegovina , descrito como un "ejemplo clásico de acuerdo consociacional" por Sumantra Bose ^{[ 46 ]} y "una democracia consociacional ideal-típica" por Roberto Belloni. ^{[ 47 ]}
• El Acuerdo de Viernes Santo de 1998 en Irlanda del Norte ^{[ 48 ]} (y su posterior refuerzo con el Acuerdo de St Andrews de 2006 ), que Brendan O'Leary describe como "compartición de poder plus". ^{[ 49 ]}
• El Acuerdo de Ohrid de 2001 establece el marco constitucional para el reparto del poder en Macedonia del Norte . ^{[ 50 ]}

El sistema político de la República Islámica de Afganistán también fue descrito como consociacional, ^{[ 51 ]} aunque carecía de cuotas étnicas. ^{[ 52 ]} Además de la solución de dos Estados para resolver el conflicto árabe-israelí , algunos han defendido una solución de un solo Estado bajo una democracia consociacional en el Estado de Israel , pero esta solución no es muy popular ni ha sido discutida seriamente en las negociaciones de paz. ^{[ 53 ]}

During the 1980s, the South African government attempted to reform apartheid into a consociational democracy. The South African Constitution of 1983 applied Lijphart's powersharing ideas by establishing a Tricameral Parliament. During the 1990s negotiations to end apartheid the National Party (NP) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) proposed a settlement based upon consociationalism. The African National Congress (ANC) opposed consociationalism and proposed instead a settlement based upon majoritarian democracy. The NP abandoned consociationalism when the U.S. Department of State came out in favor of the majoritarian democracy model in 1992.^[54]

• Conflict management
• Consensus democracy
• Corporative federalism
• Directorial system
• Horizontalidad
• Minority groups
• Minority rights
• Negarchy
• Pillarisation
• Plural society
• Polycentric law
• Sui iuris

• O'Leary, Brendan. 2020. " Consociación en el presente. " Revista Suiza de Ciencia Política .
• Bogaards, Matthijs; Helms, Ludger; Lijphart, Arend. 2020. " La importancia del consociacionalismo para la política y la ciencia política del siglo XXI. " Revista Suiza de Ciencia Política .
• Selway, Joel y K. Templeman. 2012. " El mito del consociacionalismo ". Estudios Políticos Comparados 45: 1542–1571.
• Issacharoff, S. "Constitucionalizando la democracia en sociedades fracturadas". Texas Law Review . 82 : 2004.