Convoy HG 70

El HG 70 fue un convoy aliado de la serie HG (Homeward from Gibraltar ) durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial . Fue atacado por un grupo de diez submarinos alemanes , sin éxito. Todos los submarinos fueron repelidos y no hundieron ningún barco del convoy. Dos barcos se perdieron a causa de la aviación; 23 barcos llegaron a salvo.

El HG 70 estaba compuesto por 25 buques que regresaban de Gibraltar, muchos de ellos en lastre o transportando mercancías. ^{[ 1 ]} El comodoro del convoy era el R Almirante EW Leir, a bordo del carguero Polo , y el convoy estaba protegido por un grupo de escolta del Comando de Aproximaciones Occidentales , compuesto por cinco corbetas . La escolta del convoy se reforzó durante los primeros días con el destructor Avon Vale y el submarino Clyde , y dos arrastreros antisubmarinos . A ellos se unieron durante la primera parte del viaje los destructores Boreas y Eridge , y un segundo grupo de escolta del OG 70, compuesto por la balandra HMS Deptford , los destructores Nestor y Encounter , y la corbeta Convolvulus ; también recibieron refuerzos en varios momentos a lo largo del viaje a medida que los buques de guerra llegaban y partían. ^{[ 2 ]}

Frente a ellos se encontraba una manada improvisada (y sin nombre) de cinco submarinos U-boat, reforzada con un grupo de cuatro U-boat que regresaban de una misión cancelada al Atlántico Sur , todos capitaneados por capitanes experimentados y todos condecorados con la Cruz de Caballero . ^{[ 3 ]}

El HG 70 zarpó de Gibraltar el 9 de agosto de 1941, ^{[ 1 ]} y fue reportado casi de inmediato por agentes alemanes al otro lado de la bahía, en la neutral España ; estos pudieron reportar la composición del convoy, el número de escoltas y la hora de partida. En respuesta, el Mando de Submarinos ( BdU ) ordenó a cinco submarinos de una línea de patrulla norte (Grupo Sur) que lo interceptaran, y desvió cuatro submarinos que regresaban de una misión cancelada al Atlántico Sur, en ese momento frente a las Canarias . También solicitó la presencia de aeronaves del KG 40 , una unidad de Fw 200 "Condor" con base en Burdeos , para patrullar e informar sobre el progreso de los convoyes.

On 10 August the convoy was sighted by U-79, from Group South, which commenced shadowing, but she was attacked by escorting ships and aircraft. She was driven under and lost contact.

On 11 August the convoy was found again, this time by U-93 from the Canaries group; she was found by an escorting aircraft, bombed and damaged so severely that she had to break off and return to base for repairs. The report from U-93 enabled U-79 to regain contact, and for U-94 from the Canaries group to join; Both were depth-charged heavily by escorts, but remained in contact. A third U-boat, U-331 from South group, also joined, but was also detected and driven off by the escorts, and had to break off due to damage. Also that day HG 70 was attacked by aircraft; two ships, Empire Hurst and Sud, were hit and reported sunk,^[2] though other sources say Sud was still afloat on 14 August when she was found and sunk by Italian submarine Marconi^[4] and by U-126,^[5] en route to join the attack on HG 70.

On 12 August the convoy was sighted by a patrolling Condor, and another Freetown boat, U-123, joined the pursuit. She too was detected and counter-attacked; Her crew counted 126 depth-charges dropped on them, 36 of them close enough to damage the boat so severely that she too had to return to base for repairs.

Later HG 70 was found by U-109 and U-124, both returning from Freetown. Both U-boats were attacked before they could obtain a firing position. U-109 was driven off, and returned to base with damage; U-124 found it impossible to approach and also broke off the attack.

On 15 August BdU cancelled the operation against HG 70 and the convoy continued on without further incident, arriving at Liverpool on 23 August.^[3][1]

The attack on HG 70 was, for the Germans, a disastrous failure. Ten U-boats had been involved in the operation; none had been able to get close enough to fire on the merchant ships, and four had been so severely handled that h they had been obliged to return to base for repairs. Using radio-detection (HF/DF) to locate the U-boats as they broadcast their sighting reports, and by vigorously attacking any contact to drive them under and thus unable to keep up, the escorts kept the merchant ships in the convoy safe from attack.

El fracaso llevó a BdU a considerar la pérdida de moral como un factor, y a su regreso tres de los cuatro comandantes de mayor edad (de la operación de Freetown) fueron trasladados a puestos en tierra. ^{[ 3 ]}

• Blair, Clay (2000) [1996]. La guerra submarina de Hitler: Los cazadores 1939-1942 . Vol.  I (  ed. Cassell). Nueva York: Random House. ISBN 978-0-304-35260-9.
• Hague, Arnold (2000). El sistema de convoyes aliados 1939-1945 . ISBN 1-86176-147-3.