Caso Guibord

Brown solicitó entonces ante el Tribunal Superior de Quebec una orden de mandamus que obligara a los funcionarios de la iglesia a proporcionar sepultura para su esposo en el cementerio de Côte des Neiges. Los alegatos presentados por ambas partes fueron complejos, con varios alegatos suplementarios de cada una. Brown buscaba que los restos de Guibord fueran enterrados en la sección católica del cementerio, "de conformidad con la costumbre y la ley", y argumentó que su esposo había sido católico practicante al momento de su muerte, presentando su certificado de bautismo y su certificado de matrimonio. ^{[ 2 ]} Los funcionarios de la iglesia impugnaron la procedencia del recurso de mandamus, además de negar haberle negado a Guibord la sepultura civil. Afirmaron que estaban dispuestos a cumplir con su deber civil de enterrar los restos, pero que, en virtud de la libertad religiosa, la Iglesia tenía derecho a decidir si lo enterraba en la sección del cementerio reservada para los católicos. ^{[ 3 ]} También alegaron que Guibord había sido un "pécheur public" (es decir, un pecador público) y, por lo tanto, se le podía negar el entierro según la doctrina católica romana.

La petición fue debatida el 17 de marzo de 1870 ante el juez Mondelet. El 2 de mayo de 1870, el juez Mondelet concedió la petición de Brown y ordenó que los funcionarios de la iglesia se encargaran del entierro del difunto, de acuerdo con la costumbre y la ley, al igual que cualquier otro feligrés que falleciera siendo católico, y que se inscribiera su nombre en el registro parroquial conforme a la ley. Asimismo, ordenó que los funcionarios de la iglesia pagaran las costas judiciales de Brown. ^{[ 4 ]}

The church officials then appealed to the Court of Review, which heard argument on 23 June 1870. On 10 September 1870, that Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the widow's petition. Speaking for the Court, Mr Justice Mackay held that the pleadings and judgment below were both defective. A writ of mandamus is only available to give specific, defined relief. The order to have Guibord buried "according to custom and law" was not a specific remedy, as it did not make clear where the burial was to take place. The church officials could comply with it by burying him in the portion for non-Roman Catholics, which would not be satisfactory to the widow. As well, the order to fill out the parochial records was defective, since the church officials named in the petition did not have custody of the parochial records. Finally, the decision below was bad for dismissing the church officials' plea of their religious freedom.^[5]

Brown then appealed to the Quebec Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal Side).

When the matter first came on for argument, on 2 December 1870, Brown's counsel applied to have four of the judges who were about to hear the appeal recuse themselves under s. 176 of the Code of Civil Procedure.^[6] They argued that one of the points in issue was the extent of the civil courts' power over the church, which was denied by Roman Catholic church doctrine under pain of anathema and excommunication. Since the four judges (Chief Justice Duval and Justices Caron, Badgley and Monk) were Roman Catholics, counsel argued that they "acknowledged the authority of the Roman power" and could be under the threat of excommunication if they did not rule in favour of the church officials. The Court heard argument on the motion for recusation and reserved their decision. A week later, on 9 December 1870, they gave their decision, refusing to receive the petitions for recusation, or to allow them to be entered in the register of the Court. The Court, composed of Duval C.J., Caron, Drummond, Badgely and Monk, then heard the appeal.^[7]

On 7 September 1871, the Queen's Bench unanimously dismissed Brown's appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Review, but on divided grounds, with each judge giving reasons:

• Caron J. held that the original writ was void for not containing a command; that it was defective in being addressed to both the curé and the fabrique, as only the curé had superintendence of burials and entries in the register; that the petition was only for civil burial, which the church officials had offered to perform; and that the church officials' condition that the burial be in a particular part of the burial ground was reasonable.
• Duval C.J. agreed with Caron J., but based his judgment on the defect in the form of the writ.
• Drummond J. held that the writ was right in form, but agreed that the appeal should be dismissed because the civil courts had no jurisdiction to order ecclesiastical burial when refused by the ecclesiastical authorities.
• Badgley J. held that the writ was right in form, and that the courts did have the power to order the performance of the duties although affecting spiritual rights, but agreed that the appeal should be dismissed because the writ commanded the performance of two duties, the burial and the entry into the parochial register, and the church officials named in the petition had no power to carry out the command to enter the burial in the parochial register.
• Monk J. held that the writ and all proceedings were regular and sufficient, but agreed that the appeal should be dismissed because the courts had no jurisdiction over the matters in dispute.^[8]

The Court ordered Brown to pay the church officials' court costs.

Brown then applied successfully for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, at that time the court of last resort within the British Empire. However, before her appeal could be heard, Brown died on 24 March 1873. In her will, she left all that she had to the Institut Canadien. The Institut then applied to be allowed to prosecute the appeal, on the basis that as Brown's heir, the Institut was liable to pay the court costs in the Quebec courts and therefore had a legitimate interest in the litigation. In an interim decision in 1873, the Judicial Committee gave the Institut standing to carry the appeal, without prejudice to the church officials' right to challenge the standing at the hearing of the appeal.^[9]

The Judicial Committee heard the appeal in the early summer of 1874, devoting seven sitting days to the hearing. The Institut was represented by Mr Doutre, Q.C., of the Quebec Bar, and Mr Bompas, of the English Bar. The church officials were represented by Mr Matthews, Q.C., and Mr Westlake, Q.C., both of the English Bar. On 21 November 1874, the Judicial Committee gave its decision, allowing the appeal and ordering the church officials to provide a burial for the deceased in the area of the cemetery reserved for Roman Catholics.

El dictamen del Comité fue emitido por Sir Robert Phillimore , un reconocido experto en derecho eclesiástico en Inglaterra. Abordó las diversas cuestiones procesales que se habían planteado en el caso, comenzando por señalar que los funcionarios de la iglesia no habían insistido en sus objeciones a la legitimación del Institut para continuar con la apelación, ya que el Institut era el legatario universal de Brown y, por lo tanto, tenía interés en que se revocara la orden de pago de costas. También confirmó que el Comité no consideraba que el argumento para la recusación de los jueces del Tribunal Superior pudiera sostenerse. Asimismo, dictaminó que el auto original de mandamus estaba en forma correcta y otorgó al tribunal suficiente discreción para elaborar el remedio solicitado. ^{[ 10 ]}

En cuanto al fondo de la apelación, el juez Phillimore se abstuvo de pronunciarse sobre el estatus preciso de la Iglesia Católica Romana en Quebec, como por ejemplo si debía considerarse una iglesia establecida, y también se abstuvo de pronunciarse sobre si los tribunales civiles de Quebec conservaban la jurisdicción sobre la iglesia que los tribunales de Nueva Francia habían ejercido antes de la Conquista. En cambio, basó su decisión en el principio de que, incluso si las iglesias son meramente organizaciones voluntarias y privadas, sus miembros tienen derecho a que la iglesia sea administrada de acuerdo con sus propias leyes y normas internas. En este caso, la cuestión era si el difunto había perdido el derecho a un entierro eclesiástico según las leyes internas de la iglesia. ^{[ 11 ]}

El juez Phillimore examinó el Ritual de Quebec anterior a la Conquista relativo a la negativa a recibir sepultura eclesiástica. Las tres posibilidades que el abogado de los funcionarios eclesiásticos esgrimió para justificar la negativa, según el Ritual, eran que Guibord hubiera sido excomulgado por pertenecer al Instituto; que no hubiera comulgado en Pascua; y que fuera un «pescador público» por pertenecer al Instituto. El juez Phillimore dictaminó que, para que Guibord entrara en la categoría de excomunión, el obispo de Montreal habría tenido que excomulgarlo explícitamente. El juez Phillimore reconoció que tal acción era competencia exclusiva del obispo y que, de haberse producido, no habría sido revisable por los tribunales. Sin embargo, las pruebas demostraron que no se había producido tal excomunión explícita de Guibord. Phillimore J. también desestimó el argumento basado en el hecho de que Guibord no había tomado la comunión pascual, ya que Guibord había intentado participar del sacramento, pero la iglesia se lo había negado debido a su pertenencia al Instituto. ^{[ 12 ]}

Finally, Phillimore J. reviewed the category of a "pecheur public," which was defined in the Ritual by reference to activities such as prostitution and usury. Counsel for the church officials argued that this category was very broad, and could include any activities which the Bishop defined to be public sins. Phillimore J. rejected that interpretation of the Ritual and concluded that while it might be broadened beyond the specific examples of public sinners given in the Ritual, it could not be expanded indefinitely by the Bishop. The Bishop could not unilaterally dispense with the application of the general ecclesiastical law and prohibit ecclesiastical burial of a parishioner on whatever grounds the Bishop personally thought sufficient. Phillimore J. held that there was no indication in the record that the members of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec had at any time consented to such an expansion of the Bishop's authority. Phillimore J. concluded that Guibord had not been a "pécheur public" as defined by the Ritual and so the church officials did not have the power under their own Ritual to deny him ecclesiastical burial.^[13]

In conclusion, Phillimore J. noted that the Committee was not deciding whether the civil courts could order that the burial be accompanied by the usual ecclesiastical rites because Brown had forewent that demand and counsel for the Institut had not requested it in the appeal to the Committee. Instead, the Committee's judgment was that the orders of the Court of Review and Court of Queen's Bench be reversed and that an order issue, requiring the church officials to allow the burial of the deceased in the section of the cemetery reserved for Roman Catholics, upon payment of all the usual fees. The Committee also ordered costs to the Institut in all of the lower courts and the appeal to the Committee, except for the costs of the motion to recuse the judges in the Queen's Bench.^[14]

As was the practice of the Judicial Committee at that time, Phillimore gave the decision for the entire committee, with no reasons from any of the other judges.^[15][16]