Articulo de referencia

Red Week (Netherlands)

[[Pieter Jelles Troelstra]], [[David Wijnkoop]] and [[Henriette Roland Holst]] are depicted not feeling well after the Red Week."},"date":{"wt":"9–16 November 1918"},"location":...

The Red Week (Dutch: Ro(o)de Week) was a period from 9 to 16 November 1918 when a socialist revolution was anticipated in the Netherlands.[1] The anticipation stemmed from revolutions elsewhere in Europe and calls for revolution by some socialists.

The most prominent call for revolution came from Pieter Jelles Troelstra, leader of the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP). However, the majority of his party's leadership opposed a revolution and sought to calm their base. Meanwhile, the government took steps to prevent a revolution by strengthening security and implementing social measures. A counter-movement was formed by Catholic and protestant groups.

On 13 November, revolutionary socialists led by David Wijnkoop and Henriette Roland Holst organised a demonstration in Amsterdam, which turned violent and resulted in the deaths of four protesters. The protest had no follow-up, and it soon became clear that no revolution was materialising. At the end of the week, Troelstra admitted he had misjudged the situation, which is why it became known as Troelstra's mistake (Dutch: Vergissing van Troelstra).

Background

World War I

The Netherlands remained neutral during the First World War through careful diplomacy. Despite this neutrality, conscripts were mobilised. Food was rationed due to shortages, occasionally resulting in unrest, such as the 1917 Potato riots in Amsterdam. Unemployment was high, and the country was affected by the global Spanish flu pandemic.[2]

Revolutionary wave

Starting in 1917, a series of revolutions occurred around the world, most notably the Russian Revolution of 1917.[3] The main inspiration for the Netherlands was the German Revolution of 1918–1919, which began with minor mutinies in the navy on 28 October 1918[4] and the Kiel mutiny on 3 November 1918. This led to the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils. The abdication of German Emperor Wilhelm II was announced on 9 November 1918. An interim national revolutionary government was formed, led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the German sister party of the SDAP.

Socialism in the Netherlands

Pieter Jelles Troelstra (hacia 1912)

El Partido Socialdemócrata Obrero (SDAP) fue fundado en 1894 por una facción reformista que se oponía a la mayoría anarquista dentro de la Liga Socialdemócrata (SDB). [ 5 ] Uno de los fundadores más destacados del SDAP fue Pieter Jelles Troelstra , quien fue el líder del partido desde su creación. En 1909, un grupo de marxistas ortodoxos liderados por David Wijnkoop abandonó el partido para fundar el Partido Socialdemócrata (SDP, renombrado Partido Comunista en 1919). [ 6 ] A diferencia del SDP y la SDB, el SDAP buscaba alcanzar sus objetivos mediante métodos parlamentarios, pero no descartaba una revolución. [ 7 ]

La mayoría de los partidos políticos, incluido el SDAP, dejaron de lado sus diferencias para mantener la neutralidad neerlandesa en la guerra. Tras la Pacificación de 1917 , se introdujo el sufragio universal masculino , una antigua reivindicación del SDAP. El SDAP tenía grandes expectativas para las elecciones generales del 3 de julio de 1918 , pero su representación solo aumentó de 15 a 22 escaños (de un total de 100). En contraste, la Liga General de Asociaciones Electorales Católicas Romanas (ABRK) obtuvo 30 escaños y formó el primer gabinete de derecha de Ruijs de Beerenbrouck junto con el Partido Antirrevolucionario (ARP) y la Unión Histórica Cristiana (CHU). [ 8 ]

disturbios de Harskamp

Un cuartel incendiado tras los disturbios de Harskamp.

El 22 de octubre de 1918, el jefe de defensa Cornelis Jacobus Snijders solicitó la movilización de tropas adicionales y la suspensión de los permisos periódicos , temiendo que la retirada alemana de Bélgica pudiera llevar a algunas fuerzas alemanas a cruzar la frontera hacia Limburgo . [ 9 ] El 25 de octubre de 1918, los soldados del campamento militar de Harskamp se amotinaron debido a sus condiciones, [ 10 ] particularmente por la retirada de los permisos. [ 9 ] El motín fue rápidamente sofocado, aunque algunos disturbios se extendieron a otros campamentos militares, generando preocupación sobre la fiabilidad del ejército. [ 11 ]

The relation between Snijders and the cabinet was already bad, when another conflict arose over the inquiry into the riots. The cabinet had wanted to fire him for a while, but the queen supported him and prevented his removal. The cabinet finally announced on 6 November that he would step down, after public support for his removal had grown.[12]

Events

Internal SDAP discussions

SDAP party chair Willem Vliegen

The SDAP board discussed the national and international events on 2 November. They discussed a manifesto about the events written by Troelstra for an upcoming party conference. The manifesto contained a call to revolution: "that we will accept the revolutionary situation here and in Europe as the basis for our further work". Troelstra no longer believed socialism could be realised by exclusively parliamentary means. Of those present, only Goswijn Sannes and Franc van der Goes supported his proposal. Most others believed it was nonsense to call the situation at that time in the Netherlands revolutionary. Some believed that if a revolutionary situation arose, the SDAP should lead it. Party chairWillem Vliegen called revolution in a democracy foolish and noted "I did not fight for 25 years for universal suffrage, only to abolish it a few months after its introduction."[13]

They decided to meet again the next day with like-minded organisations, including the board of the Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions (NVV) and the editorial board of Het Volk.[14] The trade union supported preparations for a revolutionary situation, but primarily to prevent a destabilising general strike. The other attendees mostly opposed revolutionary language. A meeting with the trade union for conscripts on the same day had also revealed that there was no revolutionary sentiment among conscripts. Consequently, they decided to have a small group{\displaystyle \wedge }including Troelstra, Amsterdam aldermanFloor Wibaut and NVV leader Jan Oudegeest rewrite the manifesto without the controversial passages. The version published on 4 November invited members to attend the conference on 24 November "to determine the stance that the proletariat must adopt in this great struggle".[15]

During a debate about military policy on 5 November, Troelstra had requested Snijder's removal. The fact that his removal was announced the next day, was celebrated as a victory for the SDAP. During the debate, Troelstra also said, without coordination with his party:

¿Te mantienes firme? ¿No sientes, debido a los acontecimientos recientes, que estás parado sobre un volcán?  ... No olvides que, cuando llegue el momento en que ya no puedas mantenerte en pie, otras fuerzas vendrán a ocupar tu lugar. Entonces se acabará el sistema de gobierno burgués, y la clase obrera, el poder recién surgido, te pedirá que te retires y le cedas el lugar que es su futuro.  ... No somos tus amigos, somos tus adversarios, somos, si quieres, tus enemigos más acérrimos. [ 16 ]

Las revolucionarias palabras de Troelstra inicialmente recibieron poca atención. Una manifestación en Ámsterdam el 7 de noviembre, encabezada por Henriette Roland Holst, miembro del SDP , contó con la asistencia de tan solo unos cientos de personas y fue reprimida por la policía. [ 17 ]

Planes para la revolución en Róterdam

Arie de Zeeuw (1933 o antes)

Las palabras de Troelstra cobraron mayor relevancia tras el anuncio de la abdicación del emperador alemán el 9 de noviembre. La dirección liberal, que se reunió ese día con el primer ministro Charles Ruijs de Beerenbrouck , consideró que la revolución era imparable y que algunos socialistas debían formar parte del gabinete. [ 18 ]

Temiendo una revolución, el presidente de la asociación naviera de Rotterdam, Paul Henricus Nijgh , quien siempre había estado abierto al diálogo con los sindicatos, se reunió con los sindicalistas y concejales municipales del SDAP, Arie Heijkoop y Johan Brautigam, para otorgar al sindicato mayor influencia sobre las condiciones laborales. El alcalde de Rotterdam, Alfred Rudolph Zimmerman, también se reunió con Heijkoop y Brautigam ese mismo día. Zimmerman creía que la revolución llegaría también a los Países Bajos y deseaba cooperar con el SDAP para asegurar una transición pacífica. [ 19 ]

The next day, Troelstra met with Heijkoop and Brautigam, as well as MPs Goswijn Sannes and Willem Albarda, and local SDAP chair Arie de Zeeuw. Together, they devised a plan to initiate a revolution in Rotterdam, aiming to preempt a potential revolution in Amsterdam, where communist influence was stronger. In the afternoon, local SDAP and trade union leaders convened to discuss the plan, which included a list of demands and the proposal for a soldiers' council to assume control of the police, army, and postal services. However, several attendees, including MPs Jan ter Laan and Suze Groeneweg, opposed the plan, arguing that there were no indications of a revolution and that Nijgh and Zimmerman's stance did not suggest they would willingly transfer power. It was decided to review the plan further that evening with local and national leaders of the SDAP and NVV.[20]

In the evening meeting, where at least 64 people were present, De Zeeuw and Troelstra received little support. Local politicians from Amsterdam also saw no revolutionary mood in the capital. The meeting decided that only a party conference could decide on a revolution. The party conference would be brought forward to 16 November. A commission led by Oudegeest would write a manifesto with demands. Troelstra, disappointed by the meeting, decided not to take part in the commission.[21]

Demands for reform

Co-founder of the SDAP, Jan Oudegeest

On 11 November, the commission led by Oudegeest published a list of 15 demands, which included immediate demobilisation, women's suffrage, abolishment of the Senate, eight-hour work days and state pensions at the age of 60. Troelstra said after reading it: "Such a program is a revolution". To which Oudegeest replied that they were reforms, not revolution. De Zeeuw's call for a constituent assembly for new state institutions was not included, nor did the manifesto call for the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils.[22] The liberal Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (NRC) called the demands "not unreasonable" the same day and even supported some reforms.[23]

The Catholic and protestant unions kept supporting the cabinet, but also demanded reforms which they announced on 12 November. These demands partially overlapped with the social democrats, such as legal regulation of collective labor agreements, insurance against unemployment, illness, and incapacity for work, and state pensions.[24]

Calls for revolution

En la tarde del 11 de noviembre, se celebraron reuniones en Rotterdam, una de las cuales incluyó un discurso de Troelstra. Inspirado por los comentarios positivos del NRC, Troelstra incluyó un lenguaje revolucionario en su discurso: «No empañen este gran momento con acciones indignas; que quede claro de una vez por todas: el proletariado neerlandés demostró ser capaz de cumplir su cometido, ¡la revolución proletaria neerlandesa fue el punto culminante de la historia de los Países Bajos!» [ 25 ] Si bien los periódicos prestaron poca atención al discurso de Troelstra, los líderes del SDAP se mostraron preocupados por su lenguaje. Antes de la sesión parlamentaria del 12 de noviembre, Jan van den Tempel criticó el discurso de Troelstra en una reunión del grupo parlamentario. [ 26 ]

Durante la sesión parlamentaria, Ruijs de Beerenbrouck anunció oficialmente la destitución de Snijders y dio detalles sobre la desmovilización anunciada la noche anterior. También anunció que la ración diaria de pan se incrementaría de 200 gramos (7,1 oz) a 280 gramos (9,9 oz) . Ruijs de Beerenbrouck señaló que la violencia perturbaría el suministro de alimentos. [ 27 ] En su respuesta, Troelstra argumentó que era demasiado tarde para pequeñas reformas o el aumento de las raciones de pan, y que había llegado el momento del poder político. [ 28 ] En su discurso de una hora de duración dijo:  

Les doy mi palabra de honor —hablo en nombre de todo nuestro partido y del movimiento obrero moderno—: no debemos tener nada que ver con la violencia. Sin embargo, es nuestro deber aprovechar este momento histórico para la elevación política de la clase trabajadora, y cualquier dedicación personal y sacrificio que se nos exija, incluso si nos cuesta la vida, lo daremos con gusto y júbilo para cumplir con las exigencias de este momento histórico. [ 29 ] 

A pesar de que Troelstra afirmó hablar en nombre de su partido, muchos de sus diputados se mostraron sorprendidos. [ 30 ] Solo Henri Polak expresó públicamente sus críticas , pero internamente muchos líderes del partido criticaron las palabras de Troelstra. La postura del partido siguió siendo esperar a la conferencia del 16 de noviembre. [ 31 ]

Contramedidas

The Council of Ministers met after the debate. They decided not to give into the SDAP's demands, although Minister of Justice Theo Heemskerk had proposed to compromise. The Catholic Minister of Labour Piet Aalberse, who had been supportive of social reforms, feared that concessions would make the government look weak and strengthen the revolution.[32] A day later Ruijs de Beerenbrouck nevertheless announced the introduction of women's suffrage,[33] which was celebrated by Het Volk as a concession. In the House of Representatives, there was also great willingness to meet a number of demands from the SDAP. Parties emphasised that this was a matter of democratic politics, and not under the pressure of a revolution.[34]

The cabinet reinforced troops in The Hague, Rotterdam and Amsterdam, the only places where they expected riots. They mobilised the voluntary Landsturm, which were brought to these cities from all across the country.[35] Minister of Finance Simon de Vries Czn was sent to Rotterdam, to prevent Zimmerman from capitulating.[32]

Already on 7 November, Carel Gerretson and Horace van Gybland Oosterhoff, two private secretaries of Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij CEO and prominent ARP member Hendrikus Colijn, sent a note to CHU leader Alexander de Savornin Lohman urging the government to take precautions against a possible revolution.[36] This note was forwarded to the Minister of War, George August Alexander Alting von Geusau.[37] They had been early advocates for the mobilisation of the voluntary Landsturm. Meanwhile, they had formed their own political and military groups, maintaining contact with the authorities throughout the Red Week.[38]

The Catholics also organised. The Catholic labour leader in Limburg, Henri Poels, organised vigilance committees.[39]

Violence in Amsterdam

Henriette Roland Holst speaking at an event (1909)

El Comité Socialista Revolucionario, una colaboración de organizaciones de extrema izquierda dominadas por el SPD, se reunió la tarde del 13 de noviembre en Nieuwe Achtergracht 140 en Ámsterdam. Entre los oradores figuraban Roland Holst y el predicador anarquista Nicolaas Jacob Cornelis Schermerhorn . Durante la reunión, un grupo de soldados entró y prometió su apoyo a la revolución. [ a ] ​​[ 7 ] Posteriormente, los participantes realizaron una manifestación que fue dispersada por la policía montada . [ 40 ]

David Wijnkoop (alrededor de 1935)

Por la noche, las organizaciones se reunieron en la Diamantbeurs de Ámsterdam. [ 41 ] El exlíder de la SDB, Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis , también estuvo presente. [ 42 ] Después de este evento, realizaron una manifestación encabezada por Roland Holst, Wijnkoop y el líder de la Liga de Socialistas Cristianos, Willy Kruyt . [ 43 ] Caminaron hacia el Cuartel de Caballería de Ámsterdam en Sarphatistraat , donde cantaron e intentaron convencer a los soldados de que se unieran a ellos. Mientras tanto, un grupo de anarquistas intentó entrar al cuartel rompiendo la cerradura de la puerta con un hacha. [ 44 ] Después de que lo lograron, se encendieron las luces de la puerta y la gendarmería abrió fuego. [ 45 ] Cuatro manifestantes murieron y dieciséis resultaron heridos. [ 46 ]

Parte de la manifestación se trasladó entonces al cercano Kazerne de Oranje-Nassau , donde se ordenó a los soldados que dispararan si los manifestantes intentaban entrar. Frente a la puerta, Roland Holst pronunció un discurso, mientras que, según los relatos, Wijnkoop se desmayó por la impresión y pidió un vaso de agua a los presentes. [ 47 ] La protesta continuó en Beursplein , [ 48 ] donde Wijnkoop convocó una huelga general y a los trabajadores a reunirse a la mañana siguiente en Damrak . [ 46 ]

Esa misma noche, el SDAP organizó dos reuniones en Ámsterdam, una en el Concertgebouw y otra en el Teatro Bellevue . Políticos como Polak y Vliegen hicieron un llamamiento a la no violencia y advirtieron sobre escenas similares a las ocurridas en Rusia. Tras las reuniones del SDAP, los socialdemócratas planearon manifestarse. Sin embargo, al enterarse de la violencia que se estaba produciendo en otra parte de la ciudad, dieron por terminada su manifestación. [ 49 ]

When Wijnkoop arrived at Damrak the next day, less than 20 people were present.[50] Soldier's councils were created in some places, but undertook nothing significant.[51]

Troelstra backtracks

The SDAP held meetings throughout the country where they used radical, but no revolutionary language. In the morning of 14 November, the parliamentary group wanted Troelstra to distance himself from calls for revolution, which he refused. However, during a debate in the afternoon Troelstra replied to accusations from other parties:[31]

The word 'coup' was not used by me at all. The gentlemen have spent a few days getting worked up about representations that in no way correspond to what I explicitly said in this House ... I explicitly said several times in my speech that I do not want to know about violence.[52]

SDAP MP Jan Schaper

The next day, SDAP MP Jan Schaper was tasked with damage control in a debate. He downplayed the most radical statements by Troelstra and emphasised SDAP's democratic character, without abandoning his party leader.[53]

During the party conference in Rotterdam on 16 and 17 November, most speakers made it clear that they did not want a revolution, but they maintained their demands for reform. At times, speakers criticised Troelstra's actions. Troelstra himself was absent in an effort to maintain party unity. However, a telegram was sent on the first day urging him to attend, which he did on the second day, receiving a warm welcome with applause. In his speech, he acknowledged that he had misjudged the power dynamics but stated that he had never intended to seize power through violence or terrorism, against the will of the majority. The conference concluded in the afternoon in a calm and orderly manner.[53]

Orange Monday

The last day of the SDAP conference, queen Wilhelmina visited a church service in the Willemskerk, The Hague. The attendees spontaneously sang the Wilhelmus after the service, and upon arrival at Noordeinde Palace, she and her family were cheered. In the afternoon, more than 40.000 joined a manifestation at Houtrust Sports Park organised by Catholic organisations opposing the revolution.[54]

Queen Wilhelmina and her daughter, Princess Juliana at Malieveld on Orange Monday

The next day 'Orange Monday' (Dutch: Oranjemaandag) it became clear that there would be no revolution. A demonstration was organised by a group of loyal soldiers[55] on Malieveld to celebrate not only the failure of the revolution, but also the end of the war. The mayor, Jacob Adriaan Patijn, called on all the residents of the city to come. Queen Wilhelmina and her daughter, princess Juliana, made a tour through The Hague in the royal carriage. When they arrived at Malieveld, the horses were replaced by a group of soldiers, who pulled the carriage through the mass of people.[56] In the weeks after, Wilhelmina toured through the country where she was met with cheers.[57]

Aftermath

Troelstra's mistake enlarged differences between the SDAP and other parties. The board of the ABRK wanted to prohibit government cooperation with the SDAP in 1922, which was changed to only in "utmost necessity" by its parliamentary leader Willem Hubert Nolens (the so-called Nolens Doctrine). The SDAP would therefore not govern for the first time until 1939.[58]

The Central Intelligence Services (CI) was established in 1919 in response to the Red Week. In its early years, it focused on anarchists and communists.[59] The following year, an anti-revolution law was also enacted. Preparatory actions for a revolutionary act were forbidden, including maintaining contacts with foreign countries if it involved preparing for a 'revolution within the empire in Europe.'[60]

Notes

  1. Reports in newspapers varied on the number of soldiers present, citing figures ranging from 8 to 400.[7]

Citations

  1. Vossen, Koen (24 September 2015). "Waarom de socialistische revolutie in Nederland niet aansloeg". Historisch Niewsblad (in Dutch). Retrieved 1 January 2025.
  2. Hartmans 2018, pp. 22–24; Linmans 2024, pp. 21–23; Wijne 1999, p. 9.
  3. Hartmans 2018.
  4. Hartmans 2018, p. 12.
  5. Hartmans 2018, pp. 37; Linmans 2024, pp. 24–27.
  6. Linmans 2024, p. 27; Hartmans 2018, p. 43.
  7. 123Linmans 2024, p. 26.
  8. Hartmans 2018, pp. 28–29.
  9. 12Hartmans 2018, p. 53.
  10. Hartmans 2018, p. 49.
  11. Hartmans 2018, pp. 51–53.
  12. Hartmans 2018, pp. 54–55; Wijne 1999, p. 10.
  13. Hartmans 2018, pp. 57–59.
  14. Hartmans 2018, pp. 59–60.
  15. Hartmans 2018, pp. 60–62.
  16. Hartmans 2018, p. 56.
  17. Hartmans 2018, pp. 65–67.
  18. Hartmans 2018, p. 80.
  19. Hartmans 2018, pp. 76–77.
  20. Hartmans 2018, pp. 87–89.
  21. Hartmans 2018, pp. 89–91.
  22. Hartmans 2018, pp. 97–98.
  23. Hartmans 2018, p. 99.
  24. Hartmans 2018, pp. 121–122.
  25. Hartmans 2018, pp. 99–102.
  26. Hartmans 2018, pp. 106–107.
  27. Hartmans 2018, pp. 107–109.
  28. Hartmans 2018, p. 111.
  29. Hartmans 2018, p. 112.
  30. Hartmans 2018, pp. 115–116.
  31. 12Hartmans 2018, pp. 139–143.
  32. 12Hartmans 2018, pp. 117–120.
  33. Hartmans 2018, pp. 134–135; Linmans 2024, p. 53.
  34. Hartmans 2018, pp. 134–135.
  35. Hartmans 2018, p. 136.
  36. Hartmans 2018, pp. 71–76.
  37. Hartmans 2018, p. 95.
  38. Hartmans 2018, p. 96.
  39. Hartmans 2018, p. 119.
  40. Linmans 2024, p. 56.
  41. Linmans 2024, p. 57.
  42. Hartmans 2018, pp. 127–128; Linmans 2024, p. 60.
  43. Linmans 2024, pp. 78–82.
  44. Hartmans 2018, pp. 128–129; Linmans 2024, pp. 65–66.
  45. Hartmans 2018, pp. 128–129; Linmans 2024, pp. 66–67.
  46. 12Hartmans 2018, pp. 128–129.
  47. Hartmans 2018, pp. 128–129; Linmans 2024, pp. 193–199.
  48. Hartmans 2018, pp. 128–129; Linmans 2024, p. 68.
  49. Linmans 2024, pp. 109–110.
  50. Linmans 2024, p. 69.
  51. Hartmans 2018, p. 139.
  52. Hartmans 2018, p. 143.
  53. 12Hartmans 2018, pp. 146–154.
  54. Hartmans 2018, pp. 155–156.
  55. Wijne 1999, p. 34.
  56. Linmans 2024, p. 165; Hartmans 2018, pp. 158–159.
  57. Linmans 2024, p. 165.
  58. Gradus, Raymond; Harinck, George; Hoentjen, Karin; Van Kessel, Alexander; ten Napel, Hans-Martien (2012). "De uiterste noodzaak". Canon van de Christendemocratie(PDF) (in Dutch). Wetenschappelijk Instituut voor het CDA. ISBN 978-90-74493-79-6.
  59. Linmans 2024, pp. 168–169.
  60. Linmans 2024, p. 167.

References

  • Rob Hartmans (2018). De revolutie die niet doorging (in Dutch). Omniboek. ISBN 978-94-019-1340-9. OCLC 1055745782. Wikidata Q131749085.
  • Linmans, Wouter (2024). Revolutiekoorts[Revolution fever] (in Dutch). Amsterdam: Athenaeum-Polak & Van Gennep. ISBN 978-90-253-1355-5.
  • Wijne, Johan S. (1999). De 'vergissing' van Troelstra[The 'mistake' of Troelstra] (in Dutch). Hilversum: Verloren. ISBN 90-6550-449-4.