1982 Lebanon War

La guerra del Líbano de 1982 , también llamada la segunda invasión israelí del Líbano , ^{[ 22 ] [ 23 ] [ 24 ]} comenzó el 6 de junio de 1982, cuando Israel invadió el sur del Líbano . La invasión siguió a una serie de ataques y contraataques entre la Organización para la Liberación de Palestina (OLP) que operaba en el sur del Líbano y las Fuerzas de Defensa de Israel (FDI), que habían causado bajas civiles a ambos lados de la frontera. La operación militar israelí, con nombre en clave Operación Paz para Galilea , se lanzó después de que hombres armados de la Organización Abu Nidal intentaran asesinar a Shlomo Argov , embajador de Israel en el Reino Unido. El primer ministro israelí Menachem Begin culpó a la OLP, ^{[ 25 ] [ 26 ]} utilizando el incidente como casus belli . ^{[ 27 ] [ 28 ] [ i ]} Fue la segunda invasión del Líbano por parte de Israel, después del conflicto del sur del Líbano de 1978 .

The Israelis sought to end Palestinian attacks from Lebanon, destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the country, and install a pro-Israel Maronite Christian government.^[29][30][31] Israeli forces attacked and overran PLO positions in southern Lebanon and briefly clashed with the Syrian Army, who occupied most of the country's northeast. The Israeli military, together with the South Lebanon Army, seized control of the southern half of Lebanon and laid siege to the capital Beirut. The Lebanese Forces however, despite their clandestine alliance with Israel, refused to participate in the war against the PLO as their leader Bachir Gemayel viewed any direct involvement as assisting an invading army.^[32] Surrounded in West Beirut and subjected to heavy Israeli bombardment, the PLO and their allies negotiated a ceasefire with the aid of United States special envoyPhilip Habib. The PLO, led by Yasser Arafat, were evacuated from Lebanon, overseen by a multinational peacekeeping force. By expelling the PLO, removing Syrian influence over Lebanon, and installing a pro-Israeli Christian government led by PresidentBachir Gemayel, the Israeli government hoped to sign a treaty that would give Israel "forty years of peace".^[33]

Following the assassination of Gemayel in September 1982, Israel's position in Beirut became untenable and the signing of a peace treaty became increasingly unlikely. There was outrage at the IDF's role in the Israeli-backed, Phalangist-perpetrated Sabra and Shatila massacre of Palestinians and Lebanese Shias. This stoked Israeli public disillusionment with the war. The IDF withdrew from Beirut and ended its operation on 29 September 1982.^[34] The May 17 Agreement of 1983 ended the state of war between Israel and Lebanon, and provided for an Israeli withdrawal from the country. Amid rising casualties from guerrilla attacks, the IDF retreated south of the Awali river on 3 September 1983.^[35]

De febrero a abril de 1985, el ejército israelí emprendió una retirada gradual hacia su " zona de seguridad del sur del Líbano " a lo largo de la frontera. La ocupación israelí propició el surgimiento de Hezbolá , un grupo islamista chií respaldado por Irán. ^{[ 36 ]} Este libró una guerra de guerrillas contra la ocupación israelí hasta la retirada definitiva de las FDI del Líbano en 2000. ^{[ 37 ]} En Israel, la invasión de 1982 también se conoce como la Primera Guerra del Líbano . ^{[ ii ]}

Durante la guerra de Palestina de 1948 , 730.000 palestinos huyeron o fueron forzados a abandonar el país por las fuerzas sionistas, ^{[ iii ]} de los cuales 100.000 llegaron al Líbano. ^{[ 40 ] [ 41 ]} La mayoría de los guerrilleros serían reclutados en campos de refugiados palestinos. ^{[ 42 ]} Para 1969, esta población había crecido a 235.000 como resultado del crecimiento demográfico natural y la inmigración, incluidos los palestinos que huyeron o fueron expulsados ​​por Israel durante la guerra de 1967. ^{[ 43 ]} En vísperas de la invasión israelí de 1982, la población palestina en el Líbano era de 375.000. ^{[ 43 ]}

La Guerra de los Seis Días de 1967 estimuló el crecimiento de los fedayines (guerrillas) palestinos . ^{[ 42 ]} Después de 1967, el número de palestinos armados aumentó de 200 a 2000 y para 1968 había alcanzado los 15 000. ^{[ 42 ]}

La acción guerrillera palestina pretendía ser una guerra de liberación nacional para los palestinos. ^{[ 44 ]} En 1968, el objetivo de la OLP era establecer un único estado democrático en toda la Palestina histórica con igualdad de derechos para judíos, musulmanes y cristianos. ^{[ 45 ]} Fue por esta época cuando los palestinos comenzaron a realizar incursiones en Israel. Para 1977, el objetivo había evolucionado hacia el establecimiento de un estado palestino en Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza, junto a Israel. ^{[ 44 ] [ 46 ] [ 45 ]}

En 1970, tras el conflicto de Septiembre Negro , se produjo una gran afluencia de palestinos procedentes de Jordania hacia el Líbano . Esto generó un desequilibrio demográfico adicional en la sociedad libanesa y afectó a sus instituciones democráticas, establecidas previamente por el Pacto Nacional . ^{[ 47 ]}

By 1975, the refugees numbered more than 300,000 and the PLO in effect created an unofficial state-within-a-state, particularly in Southern Lebanon, which then played an important role in the Lebanese Civil War. There had been continual violence near the Lebanon-Israel border between Israel and the PLO, starting from 1968; this increased following the relocation of PLO bases to Lebanon after the civil war in Jordan.

The violence between Israel and the PLO peaked during Operation Litani in 1978, provoked by the Coastal Road Massacre which was carried out by Palestinian militants. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created after the incursion, following the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 in March 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and help the government of Lebanon restore its effective authority in the area.^[48]

As early as 1976, Israel had been assisting Lebanese Christian militias in their sporadic battles against the PLO.^[49] During Operation Litani in 1978, Israel established a security zone in southern Lebanon with mostly Christian inhabitants, in which they began to supply training and arms to Christian militias which would later form the South Lebanese Army.^[50] But Israel's main partner was to be the MaronitePhalange party, whose paramilitary was led by Bashir Gemayel, a rising figure in Lebanese politics.^[50] Gemayel's strategy during the early stages of the Lebanese Civil War was to provoke the Syrians into retaliatory attacks on Christians, such that Israel could not ignore.^[51]

En 1978, Menachem Begin declaró que Israel no permitiría un genocidio de cristianos libaneses, aunque rechazó la intervención directa. ^{[ 51 ]} Cientos de milicianos libaneses comenzaron a entrenarse en Israel, en la Escuela de Estado Mayor y Mando de las FDI. La relación entre Israel y los maronitas comenzó a transformarse en una alianza político-estratégica, y miembros del gobierno israelí, como Ariel Sharon, empezaron a concebir un plan para instalar un gobierno cristiano proisraelí en el Líbano, dado que se sabía que Bashir quería expulsar a la OLP y a todos los refugiados palestinos del país. ^{[ 52 ]}

De junio a diciembre de 1980, la Fuerza Provisional de las Naciones Unidas en el Líbano (UNIFIL) registró un aumento de las actividades en la zona fronteriza. No se registraron ataques de las fuerzas palestinas contra Israel, mientras que las incursiones de las Fuerzas de Defensa de Israel (FDI) a través de la línea de armisticio hacia el Líbano aumentaron notablemente, con la colocación de campos minados, el establecimiento de puestos de artillería y, en general, numerosas violaciones del espacio aéreo y las aguas territoriales libanesas. El gobierno libanés protestó formalmente ante el Consejo de Seguridad y la Asamblea General de la ONU en varias comunicaciones, alegando que Israel había violado la Resolución 425 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Durante el mismo período, Israel protestó por numerosos ataques de las fuerzas palestinas, ajenos a la zona fronteriza libanesa. ^{[ 53 ]}

En su informe sobre las actividades de la UNIFIL correspondientes al período comprendido entre el 12 de diciembre de 1980 y el 12 de junio de 1981, el Secretario General del Consejo de Seguridad observó que las infiltraciones de las fuerzas armadas palestinas en la zona fronteriza habían disminuido en comparación con los seis meses anteriores. ^{[ 54 ]} En efecto, la OLP había reconocido su posición vulnerable y evitado provocar abiertamente a Israel. ^{[ 55 ]} Por el contrario, las FDI habían lanzado diversos ataques contra territorio libanés, a menudo en apoyo de la milicia cristiana libanesa. Al hacerlo, Israel había violado la resolución 425 del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU en cientos de ocasiones [párrafo 58]. Cuando se pudo identificar al o los iniciadores de los ataques en el informe, en 15 casos los militantes palestinos fueron los responsables, mientras que en 23 ocasiones la Milicia y/o las FDI fueron los instigadores, siendo estas últimas también responsables del enfrentamiento más violento del período, ocurrido el 27 de abril [párrafo 52].

From 16 June to 10 December 1981,^[56] a relative quiet was reported continuing from 29 May 1981 until 10 July. This was broken when "Israeli aircraft resumed strikes against targets in southern Lebanon north of the UNIFIL area. (The Israeli strikes) led to exchanges of heavy firing between armed elements (Palestinians), on the one hand, and IDF and the de facto forces (Christian Militia) on the other. On 13 and 14 July, widespread Israeli air-strikes continued. Armed elements (Palestinians) fired into the enclave and northern Israel." Israeli-initiated attacks had led to rocket and artillery fire on northern Israel. This pattern continued in the coming days.

Israel renewed its air strikes in an attempt to trigger a war that would allow it to drive out the PLO and restore peace to the region.^[57] On 17 July, the Israel Air Force launched a massive attack on PLO buildings in downtown Beirut. "Perhaps as many as three hundred died, and eight hundred were wounded, the great majority of them civilians."^[58] The Israeli army also heavily targeted PLO positions in south Lebanon without success in suppressing Palestinian rocket launchers and guns.^[59]

As a result, thousands of Israeli citizens who lived near the Lebanese border headed south. There patterns of Israeli-initiated airstrikes and Palestinian retaliations with attacks on northern Israel are in contrast with the official Israeli version "A ceasefire declared in July 1981 was broken: the terrorists continued to carry out attacks against Israeli targets in Israel and abroad, and the threat to the northern settlements became unbearable."^[59]

On 24 July 1981, United States Undersecretary of State Philip Habib brokered a ceasefire badly needed by both parties,^[56] the best achievable result from negotiations via intermediaries, aimed at complying with the decisions of UN Security Council resolution 490. The process was complicated, requiring

shuttle diplomacy between Damascus, Jerusalem, and Beirut, United States. Philip Habib concluded a ceasefire across the Lebanon border between Israel and the PLO. Habib could not talk to the PLO directly because of Kissinger's directive, so he used a Saudi member of the royal family as mediator. The agreement was oral – nothing could be written down since Israel and the PLO did not recognize each other and refused to negotiate with each other – but they came up with a truce. ... Thus the border between Lebanon and Israel suddenly stabilized after over a decade of routine bombing.^[60]

Between July 1981 and June 1982, as a result of the Habib ceasefire, the Lebanese-Israeli border "enjoyed a state of calm unprecedented since 1968."^[37] But the 'calm' was tense. US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig filed a report with US President Ronald Reagan on Saturday 30 January 1982 that revealed Secretary Haig's fear that Israel might, at the slightest provocation, start a war against Lebanon.^[61]

The 'calm' lasted nine months. Then, on 21 April 1982, after a landmine killed an Israeli officer while he was visiting a South Lebanese Army gun emplacement in Taibe, Lebanon, the Israeli Air Force attacked the Palestinian-controlled coastal town of Damour, killing 23 people.^[62] Fisk reports further on this incident: "The Israelis did not say what the soldier was doing ... I discovered that he was visiting one of Haddad's artillery positions (Christian militia) and that the mine could have been lain [sic] as long ago as 1978, perhaps even by the Israelis themselves".

On 9 May 1982, Israeli aircraft again attacked targets in Lebanon. Later that same day, UNIFIL observed the firing of rockets from Palestinian positions in the Tyre region into northern Israel, but none of the projectiles hit Israeli towns^[63] – the gunners had been ordered to miss.^[58] Major-General Erskine (Ghana), Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported to the Secretary-General and the Security Council (S/14789, S/15194) that from August 1981 to May 1982, inclusive, there were 2096 violations of Lebanese airspace and 652 violations of Lebanese territorial waters.^[64][65] The freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel and UNTSO observers within the enclave remained restricted due to the actions of Amal and the South Lebanon Army under Major Saad Haddad's leadership with the backing of Israeli military forces.^[65]

Prior to establishing ceasefire in July 1981, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim noted: "After several weeks of relative quiet in the area, a new cycle of violence has begun and has, in the past week, steadily intensified." He further stated: "There have been heavy civilian casualties in Lebanon; there have been civilian casualties in Israel as well. I deeply deplore the extensive human suffering caused by these developments." The President of the U.N. Security Council, Ide Oumarou of Niger, expressed "deep concern at the extent of the loss of life and the scale of the destruction caused by the deplorable events that have been taking place for several days in Lebanon".^[66][67]

From the ceasefire, established in July 1981, until the start of the war, the Israeli government reported 270 militant attacks by the PLO in Israel, the occupied territories, and the Jordanian and Lebanese border (in addition to 20 attacks on Israeli interests abroad).^[68]

In Ariel Sharon's biography by his son, Gilad Sharon, the author referring to the Habib ceasefire, comments: "However, the agreement was explicit only regarding preventing terror from Lebanon, which is why my father encouraged the cabinet not to accept the offer as presented by the Americans."^[69]

The cease-fire, as both the PLO and the Americans saw it, did not include terror attacks stemming from Lebanon and carried out against Jews in Europe and other locales. In a meeting my father had with Alexander Haig and Philip Habib on 25 May 1982, Habib repeated what he had already said many times before: "Terrorist attacks against Israelis and Jews in Europe are not included in the cease-fire agreement.

Arafat pressured the radical factions to maintain the ceasefire because he did not wish to provoke the Israelis into an all-out attack. The PLO acceptance of the ceasefire had led to dissension even within Fatah itself. A faction sympathetic to Abu Nidal forced a military confrontation, with accompanying arrests and executions — an event unprecedented in PLO internal disputes'. Arafat even attempted to distance himself from Palestinian unrest on the West Bank to prevent an Israeli attack.^[70]

In contrast, Begin, Sharon and Eitan were searching for any excuse to neutralize their military opponents through a breach of the ceasefire. They believed that Arafat was buying time to build up his conventional forces. The Israeli interpretation of the conditions for the ceasefire placed responsibility for any act of Palestinian violence on Arafat's shoulders. It presumed that Arafat had complete control, not only over all factions within the PLO such as the rejectionist Popular Front of George Habash, but also over those outside such as Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council and Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front — General Command.^[70]

In Begin's eyes, the ceasefire was not geographically limited to the Lebanese border. He argued that if Palestinian terrorism struck internationally, then this too would be regarded as a breach of the ceasefire. Begin thus took a stand-off in a local battle as applying to the entire war anywhere in the Middle East or any incident internationally.^[70]

Eitan commented that there was no difference if a militant threw a grenade in Gaza or fired a shell at a Northern settlement — all such acts broke the ceasefire. Sharon similarly did not wish to draw distinctions between different Palestinian factions, since all blame had to be attached to the PLO. He dismissed attempts at more rational evaluation as masking the real issue. In a speech to a Young Herut conference in April 1982, he accused those who tried to take a more objective standpoint of erecting 'a protective wall around the PLO inside and outside Israel'.^[70]

Further support comes from George Ball, that the PLO had observed the ceasefire.^[71] Israel, he said, continued looking for the "internationally recognized provocation" that Secretary of State Alexander Haig said would be necessary to obtain American support for an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.^[72] Secretary Haig's critics have accused him of "greenlighting" the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in June 1982.^[73] Haig denies this and says he urged restraint.^[74] In the biography of ceasefire broker Philip Habib, Alexander Haig is cited as leaving the worst impression of all in the lead up to Israel's Lebanon invasion:

Haig queda así muy mal parado: no es un jugador de equipo, no es capaz de mantener informado al resto de la administración de lo que estaba sucediendo de antemano, no está dispuesto a decirle a nadie en la Casa Blanca por qué Sharon estaba tan confiada durante la invasión, espera que el enviado especial de Reagan fracasara en su misión y tiene poca idea de lo que requería la seguridad nacional de los Estados Unidos, que no era un enfrentamiento entre tanques israelíes y soviéticos en la carretera de Beirut a Damasco. ^{[ 75 ]}

La reacción estadounidense fue que no ejercerían ninguna presión indebida sobre Israel para que abandonara el Líbano, ya que la presencia israelí en el país podría ser un catalizador para que los diversos grupos libaneses unieran fuerzas contra las fuerzas sirias e israelíes. El análisis de Haig, con el que Ronald Reagan coincidió, fue que esta unión de los grupos libaneses permitiría al presidente Elias Sarkis reformar el gobierno central libanés y otorgar la ciudadanía libanesa a los refugiados palestinos. ^{[ 76 ]} Otra prueba de que Estados Unidos aprobó la invasión israelí proviene del veterano analista de la CIA, Charles Cogan, quien afirma haber estado presente en una reunión en el Pentágono en mayo de 1982 , durante la cual Sharon explicó al secretario de Defensa, Caspar Weinberger, "con gran detalle cómo los israelíes iban a invadir el Líbano... Weinberger simplemente se quedó sentado sin decir nada ". ^{[ 77 ]}

Según Avi Shlaim , el verdadero impulsor de la invasión israelí al Líbano fue el ministro de Defensa, Ariel Sharon. Uno de sus objetivos era la destrucción de la infraestructura militar de la OLP en el Líbano y su debilitamiento como organización política, para facilitar la anexión de Cisjordania por Israel. El segundo objetivo era el establecimiento del gobierno maronita en el Líbano, encabezado por Bashir Gemayel , y la firma del tratado de paz entre ambos países; el tercer objetivo era la expulsión del ejército sirio del Líbano. Asimismo, según Shlaim, con la finalización de la retirada israelí del Sinaí en marzo de 1982, en virtud del Tratado de Paz egipcio-israelí , el gobierno israelí liderado por el Likud endureció su postura hacia el mundo árabe y se volvió más agresivo. ^{[ 78 ]}

Según Zeev Maoz en Defendiendo Tierra Santa: Un análisis crítico de la seguridad nacional y la política exterior de Israel , los objetivos de la guerra fueron desarrollados principalmente por el entonces Ministro de Defensa Ariel Sharon y eran cuatro:

1. "Destruir la infraestructura de la OLP en el Líbano, incluyendo su sede en Beirut."
2. "Drive Syrian forces out of Lebanon."
3. "Install a Christian-dominated government in Lebanon, with Bashir Gemayel as President."
4. "Sign a peace treaty with the Lebanese government that would solidify the informal Israeli-Christian alliance and convert it into a binding agreement."^[79]

George Ball testified before the US Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee that Sharon's long-term strategy, as revealed in conversations, was one of "squeezing the Palestinians out of the West Bank . .allowing only enough of them to remain for work."^[80]

The military plan with the code name "Big Pines", prepared by IDF, envisaged invasion to Lebanon up to the highway Damascus-Beirut and linking with Maronite forces. It was first presented to Israeli cabinet on 20 December 1981 by Begin, but rejected by the majority of ministers. According to Avi Shlaim, Sharon and chief of staff Rafael Eitan, realizing that there was no chance in persuading the cabinet to approve a large-scale operation in Lebanon, adopted a different tactic and intended to implement "Operation Big Pines" in stages by manipulating enemy provocations and Israeli responses.^[81]

On 3 June 1982 Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov was shot and seriously wounded in London by militants belonging to the Iraqi-backed Abu Nidal militant organization. The attack was ordered by the Iraqi Intelligence Service.^[82][83][84] Following the attack, the assassins drove to the Iraqi embassy in London, where they deposited the weapon.^[85] In his memoirs, Sharon stated that the attack was "merely the spark that lit the fuse".^[86]

Israeli prime Minister Begin used this as the "internationally recognized provocation" necessary to invade Lebanon. The fact that the Abu Nidal organization was the longtime rival of PLO, that its head was condemned to death by the PLO court, and that the British police reported that PLO leaders were on the "hit list" of the attackers did not deter Begin. Iraq's motives for the assassination attempt may have been to punish Israel for its destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor in June 1981, and to provoke a war in Lebanon that Iraqi leaders calculated would be detrimental to the rival Ba'ath regime in Syria—whether Syria intervened to help the PLO or not!^[87]

En la reunión del Gabinete israelí al día siguiente, tanto Begin como Eitan restaron importancia a los informes de inteligencia que señalaban al probable culpable como el grupo Abu Nidal. Begin interrumpió a su propio asesor en materia de terrorismo, argumentando que todos los militantes palestinos eran miembros de la OLP, mientras que Eitan ridiculizó al personal de inteligencia por buscarle tres pies al gato y exigió atacar a la OLP. Sin embargo, Abu Nidal había roto con Arafat y la OLP en 1974 por un principio fundamental: que el movimiento nacional palestino adoptaría un enfoque gradual y fragmentado para asegurar un Estado palestino y emprender una vía política. La falta de comprensión de la diferencia entre los grupos palestinos y la total ignorancia de la política palestina por parte de una abrumadora mayoría de israelíes y judíos favorecieron a quienes no deseaban distinguir entre la OLP y el grupo Abu Nidal. Así, en lugar de una iniciativa para localizar al grupo Abu Nidal en Damasco o Bagdad, se activó el plan para invadir el Líbano. ^{[ 70 ]}

La OLP negó su complicidad en el ataque, pero Israel respondió con duros ataques aéreos y de artillería contra objetivos palestinos en el Líbano, incluidos los campamentos de la OLP. Sabra y el campamento de refugiados de Shatila fueron bombardeados durante cuatro horas, y el hospital local de Gaza fue alcanzado. Alrededor de 200 personas murieron durante estos ataques. ^{[ 88 ]} La OLP contraatacó lanzando cohetes contra el norte de Israel, causando daños considerables y algunas víctimas mortales. Según otra fuente, veinte aldeas fueron atacadas en Galilea y tres israelíes resultaron heridos. ^{[ 89 ]}

Según Shlaim, Yasser Arafat, que en aquel momento se encontraba en Arabia Saudí, comunicó a los estadounidenses, a través de los saudíes, su disposición a suspender los bombardeos transfronterizos. Sin embargo, el gobierno israelí ignoró este mensaje. El presidente Reagan también envió un mensaje a Begin instándolo a no ampliar el ataque. ^{[ 89 ]}

El 4 de junio, el gabinete israelí autorizó una invasión a gran escala. ^{[ 90 ] [ 91 ]}

Un documento del Mossad desclasificado en 2022 reveló que la planificación de la invasión comenzó a mediados de 1981 y que el líder cristiano libanés Pierre Gemayel fue informado de ello en enero de 1982. ^{[ 92 ]} Según el documento, la política de Israel hacia el Líbano fue dictada principalmente por los militares, más que por el gobierno. ^{[ 92 ]}

On 6 June 1982, Israeli forces under direction of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon launched a three-pronged invasion of southern Lebanon in "Operation Peace for Galilee". Roughly 60,000 troops and more than 800 tanks, heavily supported by aircraft, attack helicopters, artillery, and missile boats, crossed the Israel–Lebanon border in three areas. Simultaneously, Israeli armor, paratroopers, and naval commandos set sail in amphibious landing ships from Ashdod towards the Lebanese coast north of Sidon. Israel's publicly stated objective was to push PLO forces back 40 kilometers (25 mi) to the north.^[93]

The westernmost Israeli force was to advance up the coastal road to Tyre. Its mission was to bypass Tyre and destroy three PLO camps in the area, then move up the coast towards Sidon and Damour, while Israeli forces would simultaneously conduct an amphibious landing north of Sidon to cut off the retreat of PLO forces there. In the center, two divisions were to advance both north and south of the high ground overlooked by Beaufort Castle, which was being used as a PLO stronghold, and take the road junction at Nabatieh, while an elite reconnaissance battalion was to take the castle itself.^[93]

The two divisions were then to split, with one heading west to link up with the forces along the coast, and another towards Jezzine and from there along the right flank of Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley. The easternmost Israeli force, the largest of the three, advanced into the Bekaa Valley. Its mission was to prevent Syrian reinforcements from being sent and to stop Syrian forces from attempting to interfere with the operation on the coastal road.^[93]

The advance along the coastal road was preceded by heavy artillery bombardment and airstrikes, but quickly became bogged down and was soon behind schedule. The narrowness of the road forced a slow advance, and Israeli armor became stuck in a large traffic jam. Several armored vehicles were knocked out by PLO fighters with anti-tank weaponry hiding in three groves along the road. One of the lead battalions, which was supposed to bypass Tyre and establish a blocking position to the north of the city, made a wrong turn and found itself in the center of the city, where it was ambushed.^[93]

At eight in the evening the force crossed the Litani River and headed towards Sidon. In the central sector, the mission went as planned. The two Israeli divisions bypassed Beaufort Castle on both sides. Although an order to postpone the capture of Beaufort Castle was issued, it did not reach Israeli forces in time to prevent the operation, and Israeli troops of the Golani Brigade captured the castle in the fiercely-fought Battle of the Beaufort. The road junction at Nabatieh was also secured by the end of the first day.^[93]

Meanwhile, the easternmost force penetrated into the Bekaa Valley and bore down on the Syrian positions. One division bypassed Mount Hermon via a road bulldozed by Israeli military engineers and cleared the town of Hasbaiya before swinging right and advancing towards Rachaiya. Though Israeli forces halted in the floor of the valley, they were flanking Syrian forces from the east and west. The Syrians put up minimal resistance and conducted some harassing artillery fire. By the end of the first day, the operation had gone almost entirely according to plan, though the advance along the coastal road was behind schedule.^[93]

Despite the delays, the Israeli advance along the coastal road continued steadily. This advance was supported by heavy air attacks against PLO positions that included the use of cluster bombs. Israeli missile boats also employed 76mm cannons to destroy targets along the coast, firing 3,500 shells during ten days of fighting. Israeli armor continued to advance towards Sidon, while other Israeli infantry attacked the three Palestinian refugee camps in the area that were used as PLO bases: Rashidiya, Burj ash-Shamali, and al-Bass.^[94][37][93]

The camps were all crisscrossed with networks of bunkers, trenches, and firing positions. The Israelis took each camp section by section using the same method: warnings were blared by loudspeaker urging civilians to leave, before air and artillery bombardment commenced, followed by an infantry assault. Israeli infantry had to engage in fierce urban combat in narrow streets. The PLO defenders put up strong resistance and sometimes used civilians as human shields. It took four days of combat to secure Rashidiya and three days to secure the other two camps.^[94][37][93]

At the same time, an Israeli amphibious operation was conducted north of Sidon, beginning with a diversionary bombardment of targets away from the landing zone by missile boats and aircraft. Two groups of commandos from the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit then came ashore to probe enemy defenses and secure the landing site, one of which swam to the mouth of the Awali River and another which came ashore on the landing beach in rubber dinghies. After a brief gunbattle with armed Palestinians, the main landings began, with paratroopers coming ashore in rubber dinghies to establish a beachhead followed by three landing craft that unloaded troops and armor. Over the following days, the three landing ships moved between Israel and Lebanon, shuttling more troops and armor onto the beachhead.^[94][37][93]

The PLO response was limited to ineffective mortar fire, while Israeli missile boats and aircraft attacked Palestinian positions in response. In total, about 2,400 soldiers and 400 tanks and armored personnel carriers were landed. From the beach, these forces advanced on Sidon, supported by naval gunfire from missile boats. At the same time, Israeli forces in the central sector advanced towards Jezzine while those in the eastern sector remained in place, but began setting up heavy artillery positions that put Syrian SAM units in artillery range.^[94][37][93]

Meanwhile, Israeli forces advancing along the coastal road reached the outskirts of Sidon, but were delayed by heavy resistance in the main streets and the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp on the southeastern edge of the city, and after an attempt by paratroopers to capture the city center and secure the south–north route through the city failed, the city was bypassed via a detour through the hills to the east. After linking up with the forces that had landed north of Sidon, while another force of paratroopers and armor with heavy air and artillery support advanced through central Sidon and cleared a south–north route through the city in fierce fighting. Another Israeli division passed through the city to link up with the forces north of Sidon.^[37]

En el centro, la mayoría de las fuerzas israelíes que avanzaban hacia Jezzine rodearon la ciudad para continuar su avance hacia la carretera principal de la zona, dejando una fuerza de bloqueo a la que pronto se unió una brigada blindada. Se produjeron combates en Jezzine entre las fuerzas israelíes y las sirias que controlaban la ciudad. En la batalla de Jezzine , las fuerzas israelíes, compuestas por dos batallones de tanques apoyados por una compañía de reconocimiento y un pelotón de ingenieros, tomaron Jezzine en una feroz batalla que duró todo el día contra un batallón sirio, y luego repelieron un feroz contraataque de decenas de comandos sirios durante la noche en un combate que se prolongó hasta el amanecer. Mientras tanto, las fuerzas israelíes continuaron avanzando por el flanco derecho de los sirios.

Las fuerzas israelíes que avanzaban por la costa también completaron la captura de Sidón. Paracaidistas atacaron la Kasbah mientras una fuerza combinada de infantería y tanques de la Brigada Golani atacaba Ain al-Hilweh. La Kasbah fue asegurada en tres días; los paracaidistas avanzaron con cautela y lograron tomarla sin sufrir bajas. Sin embargo, los combates en Ain al-Hilweh resultaron ser algunos de los más feroces de toda la guerra. El campamento estaba fuertemente fortificado y defendido por combatientes de la OLP y fundamentalistas islámicos. ^{[ 95 ]}

Los defensores lucharon ferozmente por cada callejón y casa, y los civiles que querían rendirse fueron fusilados por los fundamentalistas. El avance israelí fue lento y contó con el apoyo de un intenso bombardeo aéreo y de artillería. Las FDI emplearon sus tácticas habituales de instar a los civiles a evacuar mediante altavoces antes de atacar una zona. La caída del campamento duró aproximadamente ocho días, y la batalla culminó con una última resistencia de los defensores en la mezquita del campamento, que fue dinamitada por las FDI. ^{[ 95 ]}

En un esfuerzo por establecer la superioridad aérea y una mayor libertad de acción, la Fuerza Aérea Israelí lanzó la Operación Mole Cricket 19 el 9 de junio. Durante el transcurso de la operación, la Fuerza Aérea Israelí logró una victoria decisiva sobre los sirios, derribando 29 aviones sirios y destruyendo 17 baterías de misiles antiaéreos sirios, empleando métodos de guerra electrónica para confundir e interferir los radares sirios. ^{[ 17 ]} Las únicas pérdidas conocidas de los israelíes fueron un UAV derribado y dos aviones de combate dañados. Esa misma noche, un ataque aéreo israelí destruyó una brigada blindada siria que se desplazaba hacia el sur desde Baalbek , y al día siguiente la Fuerza Aérea Israelí atacó y destruyó seis baterías de misiles tierra-aire sirios más. La fuerza israelí más oriental, que había permanecido estacionaria, reanudó su avance por el valle de Bekaa. ^{[ 93 ]}

In the center, Israeli forces were ambushed by the Syrians as they approached Ain Zhalta, and were pinned down by Syrian forces firing from superior positions. The Israelis were bogged down, and an infantry battalion was sent in by helicopter to reinforce them. The town was only captured after a two-day armored and infantry battle. The battle cost the Israelis 11 killed and 4 tanks, while the Syrians lost approximately 100 killed and 35 tanks. After Ain Zhalta fell, the Israelis advanced to the town of Ain Dara, which overlooked the Beirut-Damascus highway, and captured the heights overlooking the town.^[17]

Along the road to Ain Dara, the Israelis encountered Syrian tank and commando units, and found themselves bogged down as the Syrians took advantage of the terrain. The Israelis called in air support, and Israeli attack helicopters that took advantage of ravines to fly in low beneath their targets to gain an element of surprise proved particularly effective against Syrian tanks. After a daylong battle, the Israelis had surrounded Ain Dara and were in a position to strike on the highway.^[17]

On 10 June 1982, the Israeli air force mistook a column of IDF Nahal Brigade forces for a Syrian commando unit. An IAF F-4 Phantom attacked the Battalion 931, advancing in open APCs in south-eastern Lebanon with cluster ammunition. The unit suffered 24 fatalities and 108 wounded, with a further 30 soldiers shell-shocked.^[96]

In the east, Israeli forces advanced along four main routes towards Joub Jannine, along both sides of the Qaraoun reservoir. The Syrians resisted fiercely. Syrian infantrymen armed with anti-tank weapons staged ambushes against Israeli tanks, and Syrian Gazelle helicopters armed with HOT missiles proved effective against Israeli armor. However, the Israelis managed to capture the valley floor, and the Syrians retreated. The Israelis captured Rachaiya, advanced through Kfar Quoq, and took the outskirts of Yanta. Joub Jannine also fell to the Israelis. The extent of Israeli advances ensured that Syrian reinforcements were blocked from deploying west of the Qaraoun reservoir.^[17]

An Israeli armored battalion then probed past Joub Jannine to the town of Sultan Yacoub, and was ambushed by Syrian forces lying in wait. In the Battle of Sultan Yacoub, the Israelis fought fiercely to extricate themselves, and called in reinforcements and artillery fire to cover the withdrawal. After six hours, the Israelis managed to retreat, having lost 10 tanks and 3 armored personnel carriers. In addition, another major air battle erupted in which the Israeli Air Force shot down 25 Syrian jets and 4 helicopters.^[17]

To the west, as IDF troops mopped up remaining resistance in Tyre and Sidon, the Israeli advance on Beirut continued, and Syrian tank and commando units were then deployed south of Beirut to reinforce the PLO. When the Israelis reached the Beirut suburb of Kafr Sill, they met a joint Syrian-PLO force for the first time, and fought a difficult battle to take it. The IDF temporarily halted its advance in the western sector at Kafr Sill.^[17]

On 11 June, Israel and Syria announced that they had agreed to a cease-fire at noon, which would not include the PLO. The cease-fire was to come into effect at noon. Just before the cease-fire was to take effect, the Syrians moved a column of T-72 tanks so as to position it against Israeli forces in the valley. Israeli infantry teams armed with BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missiles ambushed the Syrian column, destroying 11 tanks. Another air battle also occurred, with the Israelis shooting down 18 more Syrian jets.^[97]

The Israeli advance on Beirut pressed forward in the west, reaching Khalde on 11 June. Six miles south of Beirut, the town was the last PLO position in front of Beirut Airport. The PLO fighters, led by Abdullah Siyam, fought a rearguard action which held up the Israeli advance for six days. Siyam was killed in the fighting.^[98] The Israelis, who stood on the outskirts of Beirut, advanced towards the airport, and engaged in frequent combat with PLO and Syrian units as Israeli warplanes continued to bomb PLO positions in Beirut.^[17]

The PLO's situation gradually grew worse as the Israeli advance gained ground, threatening to trap the PLO and a Syrian brigade deployed with them in the city. With the Israelis advancing on the south and the eastern sector of Beirut held by Lebanese Christian forces, the only way out was on the Beirut-Damascus highway, and the Israelis were building up forces at Ain Dara in the eastern sector, which were in a position to strike at the highway and block any PLO attempt to escape.^[17]

On 12 June, the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire was extended to the PLO. As the Israeli advance halted, the Israelis turned their attention to the zone they already occupied in southern Lebanon, and began a policy to root out any PLO remnants. Israeli troops began searches for arms caches, and suspected PLO members were systematically rounded up and screened, and taken to a detention camp on the Amoun Heights.^[17]

El 13 de junio, menos de doce horas después de que entrara en vigor el alto el fuego entre Israel y la OLP, este se rompió y estallaron intensos combates en los alrededores de Khalde. Mientras los combates arreciaban, una unidad blindada de las FDI atacó hacia el noreste, intentando rodear Khalde y avanzar hacia Baabda , que dominaba el aeropuerto y podía utilizarse como otro punto estratégico para cortar la carretera Beirut-Damasco. Para el 14 de junio, las fuerzas sirias se estaban desplegando en Khalde. Unidades sirias en Beirut y tres batallones de comandos armados con armamento antitanque tomaron posiciones defensivas al suroeste del aeropuerto para bloquear cualquier intento israelí de capturarlo. ^{[ 17 ]}

Los israelíes intentaron flanquear estas defensas desviándose de la carretera que pasaba por Shuweifat, subiendo por un camino estrecho, empinado y sinuoso hacia Baabda, pero fueron emboscados por un batallón de comandos sirios. Los sirios atacaron a los blindados israelíes con granadas propulsadas por cohete y misiles antitanque a corta distancia. La infantería israelí desmontó y se enfrentó a los sirios. Se produjo una feroz lucha, con los israelíes solicitando apoyo de artillería a muy corta distancia. Los israelíes avanzaron sin descanso, y después de catorce horas de intenso combate que se extendió por Ain Aanoub y Souq el-Gharb, rompieron las posiciones sirias y entraron en Baabda. ^{[ 17 ]}

Las FDI enviaron inmediatamente refuerzos a la columna en Baabda para que pudiera continuar sus operaciones. Desde Baabda, las fuerzas israelíes se dividieron en tres columnas: una cruzó la carretera y entró en la zona montañosa al noreste, otra giró hacia el oeste y tomó posiciones en las escarpadas colinas al oeste de Beirut, y la tercera se dirigió hacia Kahale, más adelante en la carretera. Al sur, las FDI expulsaron a las fuerzas de la OLP de Shuweifat, pero no se produjeron grandes batallas. Los israelíes habían cortado la carretera Beirut-Damasco, aislando a todas las fuerzas de la OLP y de Siria en la ciudad. ^{[ 17 ]}

El 15 de junio, Israel ofreció libre paso a todas las fuerzas sirias en Beirut a cambio de que se retiraran de la ciudad hacia el valle de Bekaa, al este. Sin embargo, el gobierno sirio se negó y envió refuerzos a sus unidades a lo largo de la carretera y al norte de la misma, cerca de Beirut. Los israelíes se enfrentaron a posiciones fortificadas sirias reforzadas con blindados y artillería a lo largo de toda la carretera. No obstante, entre el 16 y el 22 de junio, los combates se limitaron a duelos de artillería y enfrentamientos armados menores entre fuerzas israelíes y sirias, mientras ambos bandos reforzaban sus tropas. ^{[ 17 ]}

As the two sides prepared for combat, the IDF deemed capturing the Beirut–Damascus highway to be of critical importance. With the Syrians in control of most of the highway, occupying the towns along the highway and to the north, the Israelis could not prevent Syrian and PLO forces from escaping or launch further operations into Beirut without risking a Syrian flanking attack, and the Israelis also wanted a clear transit to Christian-held eastern Beirut.^[17]

On 22 June, the IDF launched an operation to capture the highway. The Israeli Air Force flew highly effective missions against Syrian positions and vehicles, with Israeli pilots reporting 130 enemy vehicles destroyed in a single air attack alone. Israeli long-range artillery targeted Syrian strongpoints to the north. Israeli armored forces with artillery support attacked Syrian positions along the highway, with the objective of driving them from the highway all the way back to the edge of the Bekaa Valley.^[17]

With air and artillery support mostly limited to targets north of the highway, the fighting was fierce, especially to the south. By the end of the day, Israel accepted an American request for a cease-fire and halted its offensive, but the cease-fire collapsed the following day and the fighting resumed. As the Israelis pushed forward, and managed to trap a large Syrian force, Syrian defenses began to collapse. For the first time in the war, Syrian troops began to break and run. At Aley, which was defended by Iranian volunteers sent to fight for the PLO, the Israelis encountered fierce resistance.^[17]

The Israelis managed to push to the eastern Bekaa Valley, and on 24 June, began to shell the outskirts of Chtaura, which was at the northern mouth of the Bekaa Valley and served as headquarters of all Syrian forces there. It was also the last major obstacle before the Syrian border, as well as Syria's capital Damascus itself. The Israelis managed to reach the mountain pass near the village of Dahr el-Baidar, which was the last obstacle before Cthaura. The Syrians fought fiercely to hold the pass, and the Israeli advance halted, with the Israelis holding their ground and harassing the Syrians with artillery fire.^[17]

By 25 June, with the remaining Syrian positions on and north of the highway no longer tenable, the Syrians withdrew. The Israelis allowed the withdrawal to occur but conducted artillery harassment and continued to shell the outskirts of Chtaura. The Syrians attempted to deploy a SAM battery in the Bekaa Valley at midnight, but Israeli intelligence detected this, and the battery was destroyed in an Israeli air attack. By the end of the day, a cease-fire was announced. The Israelis stopped at their present positions.^[17]

The Siege of Beirut had begun on 14 June 1982: Israeli forces had completed the encirclement of the city the previous day. The Israelis chose to keep the city under siege rather than forcibly capture it, as they were unwilling to accept the heavy casualties that the heavy street fighting required to capture the city would have resulted in. Israeli forces bombarded targets within Beirut from land, sea, and air, and attempted to assassinate Palestinian leaders through airstrikes. The Israeli Navy maintained a blockade on the port of Beirut with a ring of missile boats and patrol boats supported by submarines.^[99]

The siege lasted until August, when an agreement was reached in August 1982. More than 14,000 PLO combatants evacuated the country in August and September, supervised by the Multinational Force in Lebanon, an international peacekeeping force with troops from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Italy. About 6,500 Fatah fighters relocated from Beirut to Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, both North and South Yemen, Greece, and Tunisia—the latter of which became the new PLO headquarters.^[100]

Israel withdrew its forces from west Beirut on 29 September, officially ending Operation Peace for Galilee. Philip Habib, Ronald Reagan's envoy to Lebanon, provided an understanding (i.e., assurance) to the PLO that the Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps would not be harmed. However, increased hostilities against the US resulted in the April 1983 United States Embassy bombing. In response, the US brokered the May 17 Agreement, in an attempt to stall hostilities between Israel and Lebanon. However, this agreement eventually failed to take shape, and hostilities continued. These attacks were attributed to Iranian-backed Islamist guerrillas. Following this incident, international peacekeeping forces were withdrawn from Lebanon.

Tras la retirada de la OLP y las fuerzas de paz internacionales, los militantes islamistas comenzaron a lanzar ataques guerrilleros contra las fuerzas israelíes. Los atentados suicidas fueron una táctica particularmente frecuente; el más grave fue el atentado contra el cuartel general de Tiro , que devastó en dos ocasiones el cuartel general de las FDI en Tiro y causó la muerte de 103 soldados israelíes, policías fronterizos y agentes del Shin Bet , así como de entre 49 y 56 libaneses. Posteriormente, las FDI se retiraron de las montañas del Shouf, pero continuaron ocupando el Líbano al sur del río Awali .

Un número creciente de milicias islámicas comenzó a operar en el sur del Líbano, lanzando ataques guerrilleros contra posiciones israelíes y milicias libanesas proisraelíes. Las fuerzas israelíes respondieron con frecuencia reforzando las medidas de seguridad y realizando ataques aéreos contra posiciones militantes, y las bajas en ambos bandos aumentaron progresivamente. En el vacío dejado por la erradicación de la OLP, los militantes islámicos desorganizados del sur del Líbano comenzaron a consolidarse. El emergente Hezbolá , que pronto se convertiría en la milicia islámica predominante, evolucionó durante este período. Sin embargo, los expertos discrepan sobre cuándo Hezbolá llegó a ser considerado una entidad independiente. Con el tiempo, varios miembros de grupos chiíes se asimilaron gradualmente a la organización, como miembros de la Yihad Islámica, la Organización de los Oprimidos en la Tierra y la Organización de Justicia Revolucionaria.

En febrero de 1985, Israel se retiró de Sidón y la entregó al ejército libanés, pero sufrió ataques: 15 israelíes murieron y 105 resultaron heridos durante la retirada. Decenas de milicianos libaneses proisraelíes también fueron asesinados. Desde mediados de febrero hasta mediados de marzo, los israelíes sufrieron 18 muertos y 35 heridos. El 11 de marzo, las fuerzas israelíes asaltaron la ciudad de Zrariyah , matando a 40 combatientes de Amal y capturando un gran arsenal de armas. El 9 de abril, una joven chiíta estrelló un coche bomba contra un convoy de las FDI, y al día siguiente, un soldado murió a causa de una mina terrestre. Durante ese mismo período, las fuerzas israelíes mataron a 80 guerrilleros libaneses en cinco semanas. Otros 1800 chiítas fueron hechos prisioneros.

Israel se retiró del valle de Bekaa el 24 de abril y de Tiro el 29. En junio de 1985, las Fuerzas de Defensa de Israel (FDI) se retiraron unilateralmente a una zona de seguridad en el sur del Líbano junto con su principal aliado libanés, el Ejército del Sur del Líbano , completando la retirada de sus tropas a la zona de seguridad el 5 de junio. ^{[ 101 ]}

Aunque esto se consideró el fin de la guerra, el conflicto continuaría. Hezbolá siguió luchando contra las Fuerzas de Defensa de Israel (FDI) y el Ejército del Sur del Líbano (ELS) en el conflicto del sur del Líbano hasta la retirada definitiva de Israel del país en el año 2000.

During the course of combat operations, the Israeli Air Force conducted successful ground attack missions against Syrian and PLO targets, with Israeli attack helicopters inflicting heavy losses on Syrian armor. Israeli jets shot down between 82^[102] and 86 Syrian aircraft in aerial combat, without losses.^[103][104] A single Israeli A-4 Skyhawk and two helicopters were shot down by anti-aircraft fire and SAM missiles.^{[102][103][104]} This was the largest aerial combat battle of the jet age with over 150 fighters from both sides engaged. Syrian claims of aerial victories were met with skepticism even from their Soviet allies.^[105]

The Soviets were so shaken by the staggering losses sustained by their allies that they dispatched the deputy head of their air defense force to Syria to examine how the Israelis had been so dominant.^[106] The Israeli Air Force also performed ground attacks, notably destroying the majority of Syrian anti-aircraft batteries stationed in Lebanon. AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships were employed against Syrian armour and fortifications. IAF Cobras destroyed dozens of Syrian Armored fighting vehicles, including some of the modern Soviet T-72main battle tanks.^[107]

The war also witnessed the Israeli MerkavaMBT make its first combat debut, facing Syrian T-72 tanks. During these engagements, the Israelis claimed that the Merkava proved superior to the T-72, destroying a number of them without sustaining a single loss to T-72 fire.^[107]

Former IAF commander, David Ivri would later recall a meeting with a high-ranking member of the Warsaw Pact, in which he was told that the dominance of Israeli and U.S. technology and tactics during the war was one of the factors that changed Soviet mind-set, leading to Glasnost and ultimately, the fall of the Soviet Union.^[106][108] However, defense analysts and the Syrians claimed the opposite, saying that their T-72s were highly effective and that none were lost.^[109]

Los tanques T-72 de la 2.ª División Blindada Siria no solo detuvieron el avance de una brigada blindada israelí en Rashaya el 10 de junio, sino que también la hicieron retroceder. Contabilizaron la destrucción de 33 tanques y la captura de un M60 Patton , que fue enviado a Damasco y posteriormente transportado a Moscú. Los tanques sirios lograron un éxito similar contra los blindados israelíes en Ain Zhalta y Sultan Yacoub durante los combates del 8 al 10 de junio, conteniendo su avance para capturar la carretera Beirut-Damasco. ^{[ 110 ]}

El 14 de septiembre de 1982, Bachir Gemayel , el recién elegido presidente del Líbano, fue asesinado por Habib Shartouni del Partido Social Nacionalista Sirio . ^{[ 111 ]} Las fuerzas israelíes ocuparon el oeste de Beirut al día siguiente. En ese momento, la Milicia Cristiana Libanesa, también conocida como los falangistas , estaba aliada con Israel. ^{[ 112 ]} El mando israelí autorizó la entrada de una fuerza de aproximadamente 150 combatientes falangistas en Sabra y el campo de refugiados de Shatila. Shatila había sido anteriormente uno de los tres principales campos de entrenamiento de la OLP para militantes extranjeros y el principal campo de entrenamiento para militantes europeos; ^{[ 113 ]} los israelíes sostenían que entre 2000 y 3000 terroristas permanecían en los campos, pero no estaban dispuestos a arriesgar la vida de más soldados después de que el ejército libanés se negara repetidamente a "desalojarlos". ^{[ 114 ]}

Entre 460 ^{[ 115 ] [ 116 ]} y 3500 civiles, en su mayoría palestinos y chiítas libaneses, fueron masacrados por los falangistas, quienes sufrieron tan solo dos bajas. El fiscal jefe del ejército libanés investigó los asesinatos y contabilizó 460 muertos, la inteligencia israelí estimó entre 700 y 800 muertos, y la Media Luna Roja Palestina afirmó que hubo 2000 muertos. Se emitieron 1200 certificados de defunción a quienes presentaron tres testigos que afirmaban que un familiar había desaparecido durante la masacre. ^{[ 115 ]} Casi todas las víctimas eran hombres. ^{[ 115 ] [ 116 ]}

Las tropas israelíes rodearon los campamentos con tanques y puestos de control, vigilando las entradas y salidas. ^{[ 112 ]} La investigación israelí de la Comisión de Investigación Kahan concluyó que Ariel Sharon tenía "responsabilidad personal" por no haber impedido la masacre y por no haber actuado una vez que tuvo conocimiento de ella. La Comisión recomendó su destitución como Ministro de Defensa y que nunca ocupara un cargo en ningún gobierno israelí futuro. Sharon inicialmente ignoró el llamado a renunciar, pero tras la muerte de un manifestante pacifista, dimitió como Ministro de Defensa de Israel, permaneciendo en el gabinete de Begin como Ministro sin cartera.

La guerra del Líbano de 1982 fue inicialmente una guerra convencional hasta la expulsión de la OLP de Beirut. ^{[ 117 ]} Tanto Israel como Siria limitaron la guerra al aislar los combates, impidiendo que se convirtiera en una guerra total. ^{[ 117 ] [ 118 ]} Las fuerzas israelíes eran numéricamente superiores, lo que les permitió mantener la iniciativa y el factor sorpresa. El ejército sirio desplegó seis divisiones y 500 aeronaves, ^{[ 117 ]} mientras que Israel utilizó cinco divisiones y dos brigadas, además de 600 aeronaves. ^{[ 117 ] [ 119 ]} Numerosas otras facciones participaron en el conflicto. ^{[ 117 ]}

Las fuerzas de las FDI sumaban 78.000 hombres, 1.240 tanques y 1.500 vehículos blindados de transporte de personal. Las tropas de las FDI estaban desplegadas en cinco divisiones y dos unidades reforzadas del tamaño de una brigada. ^{[ 120 ]} Las FDI mantenían fuerzas adicionales en los Altos del Golán como reserva de área. ^{[ 117 ]} Las fuerzas de las FDI estaban divididas en tres ejes principales de avance llamados sectores: ^{[ 117 ] [ 121 ]}

• Sector costero (desde Rosh Hanikra hacia el norte hasta Tiro , Sidón , Damour y Beirut). Las fuerzas incluían la División 91 con tres brigadas, entre ellas la 211.ª y la Brigada Golani . La 35.ª Brigada Paracaidista y el 50.º Batallón Paracaidista Na'hal se unieron a la división según fue necesario. La Armada israelí proporcionó interdicción naval, apoyo de fuego costero y desembarcó una brigada mixta de la División 96 en la desembocadura del río Awali, cerca de Sidón. Comandos navales israelíes habían desembarcado allí previamente. ^{[ 117 ] [ 121 ]}
• Sector Central (desde el Castillo ^de Beaufort hasta Nabatiyeh ): Jezzine era el objetivo principal y luego Sidón para enlazar con las fuerzas costeras. Las fuerzas de las FDI incluían las Divisiones 36 y 162. ^{[ 117} ]
• Sector oriental (desde Rachaiya y Hasbaiya a través del valle de Bekaa alrededor del lago Qaraoun ): las fuerzas de las FDI incluían las Divisiones 90 y 252, la Fuerza Vardi y la Fuerza de Maniobras Especiales, compuesta por dos brigadas de infantería y paracaidistas entrenados para operaciones antitanque. Estas fuerzas se utilizaron principalmente para contener a los sirios, con órdenes de no iniciar combates contra ellos. ^{[ 117 ] [ 121 ]}

• Frente Libanés : una coalición de partidos mayoritariamente cristianos formada en 1976. Las fuerzas combinadas del Frente Libanés sumaban alrededor de 30 000 combatientes, hombres y mujeres, de los cuales unos 17 000 eran regulares. Las Fuerzas Libanesas estaban oficialmente alineadas con Israel en la guerra, pero tuvieron un papel menor en los combates. ^{[ 120 ]} Estas tropas pertenecían principalmente al partido Kataeb , pero también incluían hombres de milicias de derecha más pequeñas, como el Ejército del Líbano Libre de Saad Haddad , ^{[ 122 ]} al-Tanzim y Guardianes de los Cedros . ^{[ 123 ] [ 124 ]}
• Ejército del Sur del Líbano (SLA), fundado en 1979, actuó como representante de Israel en el sur del Líbano y luchó contra la OLP y Hezbolá . El SLA estaba compuesto por un 50 % de cristianos, un 30 % de chiítas y un 20 % de drusos y sunitas.

El ejército sirio tenía más de 30 000 soldados desplegados en Líbano en junio de 1982. ^{[ 117 ] [ 125 ]} La mayor concentración se encontraba en el valle de Bekaa, donde se ubicaba la 1.ª División Blindada, compuesta por la 58.ª Brigada Mecanizada y las 76.ª y 91.ª Brigadas Blindadas. La 62.ª Brigada Blindada Independiente y diez batallones de comandos también estaban asignados a la división. Siria desplegó alrededor de 400 tanques en el valle de Bekaa. Asimismo, se desplegaron 19 baterías de misiles tierra-aire, incluyendo SA6, en el valle de Bekaa. ^{[ 117 ]}

En Beirut y las montañas del Shouf se encontraban la 85.ª Brigada de Infantería, el Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) , As-Sa'iqa y 20 batallones de comandos. Siria desplegó alrededor de 200 tanques en esta zona. Su misión principal era proteger la autopista Beirut-Damasco, que era la principal línea de suministro de Siria en la región. ^{[ 117 ]}

Las fuerzas de la Organización para la Liberación de Palestina continuaron creciendo en el Líbano, con un personal militar a tiempo completo que ascendía a unos 15.000 fedayines , aunque solo 6.000 de ellos —incluidos 4.500 regulares— estaban desplegados en el sur. Estaban armados con 80 tanques viejos, muchos de ellos ya inoperativos, y con entre 100 y 200 piezas de artillería. Según los analistas israelíes Schiff y Ya'ari (1984), la OLP cuadruplicó con creces su artillería, pasando de 80 cañones y lanzacohetes en julio de 1981 a 250 en junio de 1982. ^{[ 126 ]} Los mismos autores también se refieren a las estimaciones de la inteligencia israelí sobre el número de combatientes de la OLP en el sur del Líbano, que asciende a 6.000.

divididos en tres concentraciones; unos 1.500 al sur del río Litani en el llamado Triángulo de Hierro (entre las aldeas de Kana, Dir Amas y Juya), Tiro y sus campos de refugiados circundantes; otros 2.500 de la Brigada Kastel en tres distritos entre el Litani y una línea que va desde Sidón hasta el noreste de Nabatiye; y una tercera gran concentración de unos 1.500 a 2.000 hombres de la Brigada Karameh en el este, en las laderas del monte Hermón. ^{[ 127 ]}

PLO primary forces consisted of three conventional brigades – each of 2,000 to 2,500 men – and of seven artillery battalions.^[128] Each brigade comprised contingents of the many PLO factions. The Yarmouk Brigade was stationed along the coastal strip while the Kastel Brigade was in the south. The Karameh Brigade was stationed on the eastern slopes of Mount Hermon in the area called Fatahland.

The PLO had around 15,000 to 18,000 fighters deployed as follows:^[117]

• 6,000 in the Beirut, Ba'abda and Damour area
• 1,500 in Sidon
• 1,000 between Sidon and Tyre
• 1,500 in Tyre
• 1,000 deployed from Nabatiyeh to Beaufort Castle
• 2,000 in Fatahland
• around 1,000 in the UNIFIL Zone

Heavy weapons consisted of about 60 T-34, T-54 and T-55 tanks (most of them dug in as pillboxes), up to 250 130mm and 155 mm artillery, many BM21Katyusha multiple-rocket launchers plus heavy mortars.^[129]

Palestinian groups of the radical Rejectionist Front joined forces with the mainstream PLO.^[120]

These groups included:

• Arab Liberation Front (ALF), a Palestinian group affiliated with Iraqi-led Ba'ath Party with an estimated 2,500 fighters in total
• As-Sa'iqa ("Thunderbolt"), a Palestinian group affiliated with Syrian-led Ba'ath Party with an estimated 4,000 fighters in total
• Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) with an estimated 2,500 fighters in total
• Fatah-Revolutionary Council
• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) with an estimated 2,000 fighters in total
• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) with an estimated 2,000 fighters in total
• Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) with an estimated 5,000 fighters in total
• Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) with an estimated 2,200 fighters in total

Left wing parties joined forces with the PLO in what came to be known as the "joint forces".

• Al-Mourabitoun , un partido nasserista secular , contaba con una milicia de unos 3500 combatientes conocidos por llevar cascos soviéticos pintados de rojo con la inscripción "al-Mourabitoun" en árabe en la parte delantera . ^{[ 117 ]} Lucharon junto a la OLP y las fuerzas conjuntas en la zona de Beirut hasta el alto el fuego, tras el cual adquirieron gran cantidad de material de desecho de la OLP, como tanques y lanzacohetes. Contaron con el apoyo principal de Libia y Siria. ^{[ 117 ]}
• Partido Comunista Libanés – principal partido comunista del Líbano, encabezado por George Hawi ; miembros del partido se alistaron en las "fuerzas conjuntas" durante la invasión inicial.
• La Organización de Acción Comunista en el Líbano (CAO , por sus siglas en inglés), un partido comunista encabezado por Mohsen Ibrahim, activo principalmente en el sur del Líbano , llevó a cabo operaciones guerrilleras contra las guarniciones israelíes tras la invasión.
• En aquel entonces, el Partido de los Trabajadores del Kurdistán (PKK) tenía campos de entrenamiento en el Líbano, donde recibía apoyo de Siria y la OLP. Durante la invasión israelí, todas las unidades del PKK recibieron la orden de combatir a las fuerzas israelíes. Un total de 11 combatientes del PKK murieron en el conflicto. ^{[ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ]}
• El Partido de Acción Socialista Árabe , un partido comunista encabezado por Hussein Hamdan, activo principalmente en el sur del Líbano, llevó a cabo operaciones guerrilleras contra las guarniciones israelíes tras la invasión.
• El Frente de Resistencia Nacional Libanés , una alianza formada el 16 de septiembre de 1982 por George Hawi del LCP, Mohsen Ibrahim de la OCAL y Hussein Hamdan de la ASAP contra la ocupación israelí, contaba con una fuerza total de unos 30.000 combatientes, hombres y mujeres, y fue el sucesor del Movimiento Nacional Libanés .

Las fuerzas musulmanas eran en su mayoría organizaciones chiítas que unieron fuerzas con la OLP, más importante, durante la invasión inicial, pero que operaron de forma independiente hacia finales de 1982:

• Amal Movement – Shia movement. Amal's fragmented nature was corroborated by the difference decisions in the Southern Lebanon and Beirut. The alienation by Palestinian and Leftist factions caused Amal fighters in the south to assume a neutral position and watch as Israeli tanks rolled by. This was contrasted at Ouzai, Ghobeiry and Chyah, where Amal fighters mounted some of the most spirited and aggressive defensive actions against the invading forces.^[130] During the initial invasion, the PLO and Amal were effectively the only major forces resisting the Israeli thrust northwards, temporarily halting them at Khaldeh for 6 days.^[131] A no man's land was marked at the Beirut Airport, where hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese Shia militants were killed defending the airport.^[131][120]
• Islamic Students Union – an Islamic group which later formed the core of Hezbollah, its members took part in battles of Khalde, the airport and the Museum front in June–September 1982.^[131]Mustafa Badreddine was part of the group.
• Pasdaran – In July 1982 Iran dispatched an expeditionary force of Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon, ostensibly to fight the Israeli invaders.^[120] The approximately 1,500 Pasdaran established their headquarters in the Syrian-controlled Beqaa Valley where they conducted guerrilla training and disbursed military material and money for the newly-formed Islamist groups including Hezbollah.^[120]
• Islamic Amal – Hussein al-Musawi, a former Amal lieutenant, split from Amal and set up his own faction. Musawi entered into an alliance with the Revolutionary Guard and received training and money from them, as Islamic Amal quickly grew to around 1,000 fighters.^[120]
• Hezbollah – a Shia resistance faction which formed following the initial invasion in 1982, and set on fighting Israeli presence and western influence in Lebanon. The group substantially swelled by 1984 and claimed responsibility for most of the operations conducted against Israeli and SLA forces between 1984 and 2000.^[132]
• Other Shia groups included the Imam HusseinFedayeen, Islamic Dawa Party in Lebanon, and the notorious Islamic Jihad Organization reportedly headed by Imad Mughniyyah, which likely served as an early alias of Hezbollah.^[120]

On 19 March 1978, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL, was created by the United Nations, with the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 426, to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon which Israel had invaded five days prior, restore international peace and security, and help the Government of Lebanon restore its effective authority in the area. The first UNIFIL troops were deployed in the area on 23 March 1978. These troops were reassigned from other UN peacekeeping operations in the area, namely the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force Zone. During the 1982 Lebanon War, UN positions were overrun, primarily by the South Lebanon Army forces under Saad Haddad.^[133]

Estimates of numbers of the casualties in the conflict vary widely.^[134]

By the end of the first week, 14 June 1982, International Red Cross and Lebanese police figures said that 9,583 had died and 16,608 injured. By the end of the second week, they said up to 14,000 people died and 20,000 were injured, mostly civilians.^[135]

During the Siege of Beirut, by late August 1982, Lebanese sources put the death toll in Beirut at 6,776. This figure included victims of the 4 June 1982, bombing, which occurred two days before the operation officially started. Lebanese police and international doctors serving in Beirut put the number of civilian casualties at about 80%.^[136] According to American military analyst Richard Gabriel, all factions in the conflicts agree that between 4,000 and 5,000 civilians died during the siege caused by military activity of all sides. He states that most of the observers that were present on the ground and other relevant sources in Lebanon agree that estimates of 8,000–10,000 are too high.^[17]

Accurate numbers of total casualties are hard to estimate, due to "[t]he chaos of warfare, the destruction of city neighborhoods and refugee camps, the haste with which bodies were buried in mass graves and the absence of impartial agencies".^[137] Many officials in Beirut, including those of the International Red Cross, claimed that the number of deaths were extremely difficult to estimate correctly. At least one official from a relief organization claimed that in the South about 80% of deaths were civilian and only 20% military.^[21]

In early September 1982, the independent Beirut newspaper An Nahar published an estimate of deaths from hospital and police records covering the period from 6 June to 31 August 1982.^[21] It claimed that 17,285 people were killed: 5,515 people, both military and civilian, in the Beirut area; and 2,513 civilians, as well as 9,797 military forces, including PLO and Syrians, outside of the Beirut area.^[138]

The Lebanese authorities gave a figure of 19,085 killed and 30,000 wounded; in Beirut alone 6,775 died, 84% of them civilians. In southern Lebanon, around 20% of those dead were civilians.^[139][140] They do not include the estimated 800–3,500 killed in the Sabra and Shatila massacre.^[21]

Richard Gabriel estimated that roughly 2,400 PLO fighters were killed during the war, of whom about 1,400 were killed throughout southern Lebanon and another 1,000 killed during the Siege of Beirut. Gabriel also estimated that between 5,000 and 8,000 civilians died during the war. Some later estimates have put the total figure at 18–19,000 killed and more than 30,000 wounded, most of them civilians. 80% of villages in South Lebanon were damaged, with some completely destroyed.^{[17][141][142][143][144]} The Israeli government maintained that about 1,000 Palestinian fighters and 800 Lebanese civilians died during the invasion, excluding the siege of Beirut.^[18][145]Anthony Tucker-Jones estimated that about 1,500 PLO fighters were killed. Kenneth Pollack estimated that 1,200 Syrian soldiers were killed and about 3,000 wounded during the war.^[20]

According to Israeli figures, Israeli losses in Operation Peace for Galilee were 368 dead and 2,383 wounded, from 6 June until 10 October. The highest ranking IDF casualty of the war was Brigadier General Yekutiel Adam, who was Deputy Chief of Staff of the IDF and had been appointed to be the next Director-General of the Mossad. He was killed by a Palestinian fighter while seeking protection in a house in Dawha, near Damour, during a mortar attack. Other Israeli fatalities included one Colonel, two Lieutenant Colonels; 19 Majors, 28 Captains, 46 Lieutenants, 132 Sergeants, 90 Corporals, and 49 Privates.^[146] According to Kenneth Pollack, Israeli losses in action against the Syrians were 195 dead and 872 wounded. 130 Israeli tanks were destroyed or damaged by the Syrians, as were 175 APCs.^[20]

The IDF also listed six soldiers as Missing in action in the Battle of Sultan Yacoub. Two prisoners and the bodies of another two were later returned to Israel but two soldiers remain missing.^[147]

Palestinian factions captured 11 IDF soldiers during the war, including one of the soldiers missing from Sultan Yacoub, an Israeli Air Force pilot in the Beaufort battle, a soldier during the Siege of Beirut and eight soldiers in the raid on an IDF observation post in Bhamdoun. All eleven prisoners were subsequently released in prisoner exchanges.

The IDF's total casualties in Lebanon from the start of Operation Peace for Galilee in June 1982 to the withdrawal to the security zone in June 1985 amounted 654 killed and 3,887 wounded.^[148][149]

The IDF continued to occupy a substantial part of Lebanon even after the withdrawal to security zone in June 1985. Resistance continued and IDF losses continued to mount. By the time IDF withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000 the total number of IDF fatalities had reached 1,216 killed since June 1982.^{[150][151][152]}

Israeli civilian casualties from cross-border shelling numbered 9–10 killed and at least 248 wounded between June 1982 and 1999.^[153]

En septiembre de 1982, la OLP retiró la mayor parte de sus fuerzas del Líbano. Con la ayuda de Estados Unidos, Israel y el Líbano alcanzaron un acuerdo en mayo de 1983 que sentó las bases para la retirada de las fuerzas israelíes del Líbano, permitiéndoles patrullar una "zona de seguridad" junto con el ejército libanés .

Los instrumentos de ratificación nunca se intercambiaron y, en marzo de 1984, bajo la presión de Siria, Líbano canceló el acuerdo.

En enero de 1985, Israel comenzó a retirar la mayor parte de sus tropas, dejando una pequeña fuerza residual israelí y una milicia apoyada por Israel, el Ejército del Sur del Líbano, en el sur del país, dentro de una " zona de seguridad " que Israel consideraba una barrera necesaria contra los ataques a su territorio septentrional. La retirada israelí a la zona de seguridad finalizó en junio de 1985. Israel se retiró completamente del Líbano en el año 2000.

El vacío político resultante de la retirada israelí de 1985 conduciría finalmente a la ocupación siria de facto del Líbano. Siria obtendría mucho más poder sobre el Líbano del que tenía antes de 1982, ^{[ 37 ]} pero dejaría de estar alineada con la OLP. En la Guerra de los Campos que siguió a la retirada israelí, Siria luchó contra sus antiguos aliados palestinos.

Tras la decisión de Arafat en junio de 1982, en septiembre de ese mismo año, la OLP había retirado la mayor parte de sus fuerzas del oeste de Beirut. Siria apoyó a las fuerzas de la OLP anti-Arafat de Abu Musa en el valle de Beka desde mayo de 1983. Cuando Arafat criticó duramente al gobierno sirio por bloquear los suministros de la OLP en junio de 1983, el gobierno sirio lo declaró persona non grata el 24 de junio de 1983. ^{[ 154 ]}

Con la retirada de la dirección de la OLP de Trípoli en diciembre de 1983, se produjo un acercamiento entre Egipto y la OLP, lo cual fue considerado alentador por la administración Reagan, pero condenado por el gobierno israelí. ^{[ 155 ]}

Ariel Sharon requested permission for a military operation that would only go 25 miles into Lebanon, and would only be for 2–3 days. On this basis, nearly the entire Knesset voted in favor of going to war.^[156] Only Hadash opposed the war, and even submitted a no-confidence motion against the Israeli government. Hadash Knesset member Meir Vilner said in the Knesset plenary session that: "The government is leading Israel to an abyss. It is doing something that in the course of time might lead to crying for generations". In response, they were condemned, and calls were heard, among others from the editor of Yediot Ahronoth, to prosecute them for treason. Left-wing Knesset members, including Shulamit Aloni and Yossi Sarid, were absent from the plenary for the vote. Even the Labor faction voted in support. By mid January 1983 Rabin was saying that the Israeli attempt to impose a peace agreement on Lebanon by the use of force was a "mistake" based upon an "illusion".^[157]

Heavy Israeli casualties, alleged disinformation of Israeli government leaders and the Israeli public by Israeli military, as well as political advocates of the campaign and lack of clear goals led to increasing disquiet among Israelis. This culminated in a large protest rally in Tel Aviv on 25 September 1982, organized by the Peace Now movement, following the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre. Organizers claimed 400,000 people participated in the rally, and it became known as the "400,000 rally". Other estimates put the figure much lower, maybe reaching 100,000 Israelis but including thousands of reserve soldiers back from Lebanon.^[158][159]

The Israeli-Maronite alliance dissolved, and Sharon's goal of installing a pro-Israel Christian government in Beirut was not accomplished.^[160] 850,000 Christians emigrated out of Lebanon during the Civil War, most of them permanently.^[161]

The withdrawal of the IDF from central Lebanon in the summer of 1983 was followed by one of the bloodiest phases of the Lebanese war, where the Christian Militia (the Lebanese Forces) was left alone to defend the "Mountain" area which comprised the Aley and Chouf districts against a coalition of DruzePSP, PLO remnants, Syrian Army, Lebanese Communist, and Syrian Social National Party. This heavily impacted the civilian population from both sides, with more than 5,000 killed from both sides. The Mountain War ended after the Christian forces and civilians withdrew to the town of Deir el Kamar, where they were besieged for 3 months before all hostilities ceased and they were transported to East Beirut.

The invasion led to the switching of sides of Amal Movement, which used to fight against the PLO prior to the invasion. The invasion is also popularly held to be the major catalyst for the creation of the Iranian and Syrian supported Hezbollah organization, which by 1991 was the sole armed militia in Lebanon not supported by Israel and by 2000 had completely replaced the vanquished PLO in Southern Lebanon.

According to Abraham Rabinovich, the complete dominance of U.S. and Israeli technology and tactics over those of the Eastern Bloc was a factor that hastened the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.^[106][108] However, this was not the first confrontation in which Soviet weaponry had been outmatched by American weaponry. In many of the Cold War conflicts the Americans and their allies had superior technology. Nonetheless, the gap between the First World and Second World weaponry was more apparent in the 1980s and weighed more heavily on Second World leaders.

One of the lingering consequences of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was the creation of Hezbollah.^[162]

In 2000, when Ehud Barak was Israeli Prime Minister, Israel withdrew from the security zone to behind the Blue Line. Lebanon and Hezbollah continue to claim a small area called Shebaa Farms as Lebanese territory, but Israel insists that it is captured Syrian territory with the same status as the Golan Heights. The United Nations has not determined the final status of Shebaa Farms but has determined that Israel has complied with UNSC resolution 425. The UN Secretary-General had concluded that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425 of 1978, bringing closure to the 1982 invasion as far as the UN was concerned.^[163]

Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon led to pressure on the Syrians to withdraw their occupation forces and this pressure intensified after the assassination of the popular Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. On 26 April 2005 the Syrian occupation forces withdrew from Lebanon.^[164]

• The invasion removed PLO presence from Southern Lebanon and the Syrian military was weakened by combat losses, especially in the air. However, the removal of the PLO also paved the way for the rise of other militant groups, particularly Hezbollah.
• The failure of the larger Israeli objectives of resolving the conflict in Lebanon with a peace treaty.^[165]
• The Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction estimated the cost of the damage from the invasion at 7,622,774,000 Lebanese pounds, equivalent to US$2 billion at the time.^[166]
• Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden said in a videotape, released on the eve of the 2004 U.S. presidential elections, that he was inspired to attack the buildings of the United States in the September 11 attacks by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in which towers and buildings in Beirut were destroyed in the siege of the capital.^[167]
• Egypt recalled its ambassador from Israel—the most serious diplomatic rupture since the Camp David Accords. The move, prompted by Israel’s role in renewed fighting and the Beirut massacre, did not amount to a full break in relations.^[168]

On 16 December 1982, the United Nations General Assembly condemned the Sabra and Shatila massacre and declared it to be an act of genocide.^[169] The voting record^{[170][171][172]} on section D of Resolution 37/123, which "resolves that the massacre was an act of genocide", was: yes: 123; no: 0; abstentions: 22; non-voting: 12. The abstentions were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Ivory Coast, Papua New Guinea, Barbados and Dominican Republic. Some delegates disputed the claim that the massacre constituted genocide.

In 1982, an international commission investigated into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon. Chairman was Seán MacBride, the other members were Richard A. Falk, Kader Asmal, Brian Bercusson, Géraud de la Pradelle, and Stefan Wild. The commission's report^[173] concluded that "the government of Israel has committed acts of aggression contrary to international law", that the government of Israel had no valid reasons under international law for its invasion of Lebanon, and that the Israeli authorities or forces were directly or indirectly responsible for the massacres and killings, which have been reported to have been carried out by Lebanese militiamen in Sabra and the Shatila refugee camp in the Beirut area between 16 and 18 September.^[173]

Following a four-month investigation, on 8 February 1983, the Kahan Commission submitted its report, which was released to the public by spokesman Bezalel Gordon simultaneously in Hebrew and English. It concluded that direct responsibility rested with the Gemayel Phalangists led by Fadi Frem, and that no Israelis were deemed directly responsible, although Israel was held to be indirectly responsible:

The decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps was taken without consideration of the danger – which the makers and executors of the decision were obligated to foresee as probable – the Phalangists would commit massacres and pogroms against the inhabitants of the camps, and without an examination of the means for preventing this danger.

Similarly, it is clear from the course of events that when the reports began to arrive about the actions of the Phalangists in the camps, no proper heed was taken of these reports, the correct conclusions were not drawn from them, and no energetic and immediate action were taken to restrain the Phalangists and put a stop to their actions.

Several films depict events from the 1982 war:

• Cup Final (1991)
• Beaufort (2007)
• Waltz with Bashir (2008)
• Lebanon (2009)
• 1982 (2019)

• 1978 South Lebanon conflict
• 2006 Lebanon War
• 2024 Israeli invasion of Lebanon
• Israel-Lebanon relations
• Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon
• List of extrajudicial killings and political violence in Lebanon
• Multinational Force in Lebanon
• Operation Accountability
• Operation Grapes of Wrath
• Operation Tipped Kettle (US–Israeli government operation transferring weapons seized by Israeli forces from the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon to the Nicaraguan Contras.)
• International Day of Innocent Children Victims of Aggression

General:

• List of modern conflicts in the Middle East

• Chomsky, Noam (1983). The Fateful Triangle: the United States, Israel and the Palestinians. South End Press. ISBN 978-0-89608-187-1.
• Cobban, H. (1984). The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-27216-2.
• Fisk, Robert (2001). Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-280130-2.
• Friedman, Thomas (2006). From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York: Anchor Books. ISBN 978-0-385-41372-5.
• Herzog, Chaim; Gazit, Shlomo (2005). The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. Vintage Books. p. 560. ISBN 978-1-4000-7963-6.
• Maoz, Zeev (2006). Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0-472-11540-2.
• Meier, Daniel (2016). Shaping Lebanon's borderlands: armed resistance and international intervention in South Lebanon. Library of modern Middle East studies. London: I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-78453-253-6.
• Morris, Benny (1999). Righteous Victims. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. p. 768. ISBN 978-0-679-42120-7.
• Rabinovich, Abraham (2004). The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East. Schocken Books. ISBN 978-0-8052-1124-5.
• Reagan, Ronald (2007). Douglas Brinkley (ed.). The Reagan Diaries. Harper Collins. ISBN 978-0-06-087600-5.
• Sayigh, Y. (1999). Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-829643-0.
• Schiff, Ze'ev; Ya'ari, Ehud (1984). Israel's Lebanon War. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. p. 35. ISBN 978-0-671-47991-6.
• Seale, Patrick (1989). Asad: The Struggle for Syria. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-06667-0.
• Shlaim, Avi (1999). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab world. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-04816-2.
• Shlaim, Avi (2007). Lion of Jordan; The life of King Hussein in War and Peace. Allen Lane. ISBN 978-0-7139-9777-4.
• Bryce Walker & the editors of Time-Life books (1983). Fighting Jets: The Epic of Flight. Time Life Books. ISBN 978-0-8094-3362-9.

• Barzilai, Gad (1996). Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East. New York University Press. ISBN 978-0-7914-2944-0.
• Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28716-6.
• Brzoska, M.; Pearson, F. S. (1994). Arms and Warfare: Escalation, De-Escalation, and Negotiation. University of South Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0-87249-982-9.
• Cooper, Tom (July–August 2002). "'Floggers" in Action: Early MiG-23s in Operational Service". Air Enthusiast. No. 100. pp. 56–67. ISSN 0143-5450.
• Gilbert, Martin (1998). Israel: A History. London: Black Swan. ISBN 978-0-688-12362-8.
• Harkabi, Y. (1989). Israel's Fateful Hour. New York, NY: Harper & Row. ISBN 978-0-06-091613-8.
• Penslar, Derek J. (2007). Israel in History; The Jewish state in comparative perspective. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-40036-7.
• Sela, Avraham, ed. (2002). "Arab-Israeli Conflict". The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. New York: Continuum. ISBN 978-0-8264-1413-7.

• Lebanese Civil War 1982
• A detailed account of 1982 Lebanon War – From Ariel Sharon's biography
• 1978 Israel – Lebanon Conflict by Ynetnews
• Ex-spymaster: First Lebanon War was Mossad success, despite Sabra and Chatila By Nachik Navot, Haaretz