Articulo de referencia

Raj británico

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El Raj británico ( / ˈ r ɑː / RAHJ ; del indostaní rāj , 'reinado', 'gobierno' o 'gobierno') [ 11 ] fue el período de gobierno de la Corona británica en el subcontinente indio , [ 12 ] que duró desde 1858 hasta 1947. [ 13 ] También se le llama gobierno de la Corona en la India , [ 14 ] o gobierno directo en la India . [ 15 ] La región bajo control británico se llamaba comúnmente India en el uso contemporáneo e incluía áreas administradas directamente por el Reino Unido , que se llamaban colectivamente India británica , y áreas gobernadas por gobernantes indígenas, pero bajo la supremacía británica , llamadas estados principescos . La región a veces se llamaba Imperio indio , aunque no oficialmente. [ 16 ] Como India , fue miembro fundador de la Sociedad de Naciones y miembro fundador de las Naciones Unidas en San Francisco en 1945 . [ 17 ] India fue un estado participante en los Juegos Olímpicos de Verano en 1900 , 1920 , 1928 , 1932 y 1936 .

This system of governance was instituted on 28 June 1858, when, after the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the rule of the East India Company was transferred to the Crown in the person of Queen Victoria[18] (who, in 1876, was proclaimed Empress of India). It lasted until 1947 when the British Raj was partitioned into two sovereign dominion states: the Union of India (later the Republic of India) and Dominion of Pakistan (later the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and People's Republic of Bangladesh in the 1971 Proclamation of Bangladeshi Independence). At the inception of the Raj in 1858, Lower Burma was already a part of British India; Upper Burma was added in 1886, and the resulting union, Burma, was administered as an autonomous province until 1937, when it became a separate British colony, gaining its independence in 1948. It was renamed Myanmar in 1989. The Chief Commissioner's Province of Aden was also part of British India at the inception of the British Raj and became a separate colony known as Aden Colony in 1937 as well.

Geographical extent

The British Raj extended over almost all present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, except for small holdings by other European nations such as Goa (Portugal) and Pondicherry (France).[19] This area is very diverse, containing the Himalayan mountains, fertile floodplains, the Indo-Gangetic Plain, a long coastline, tropical dry forests, arid uplands, and the Thar Desert.[20] In addition, at various times, it included Aden (from 1858 to 1937),[21]Lower Burma (from 1858 to 1937), Upper Burma (from 1886 to 1937), British Somaliland (briefly from 1884 to 1898), and the Straits Settlements (briefly from 1858 to 1867). Burma was separated from India and directly administered by the British Crown from 1937 until its independence in 1948. To the west, from the early 20th century, the Trucial States of the Persian Gulf showed signs of more close-knit association with the government of the British Raj,[22] which was analogous to that of the princely states.[23]

Among other countries in the region, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), which referred to the coastal regions and northern part of the island at that time, was ceded to Britain in 1802 under the Treaty of Amiens. These coastal regions were temporarily administered under Madras Presidency between 1793 and 1798,[24] but, for later periods, the British governors reported to London, and it was not part of the Raj. The kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan, having fought wars with the British, subsequently signed treaties with them and were recognised by the British as independent states.[25][26] The Kingdom of Sikkim was established as a princely state after the Anglo-Sikkimese Treaty of 1861; however, the issue of sovereignty was left undefined.[27] The Maldive Islands were a British protectorate from 1887 to 1965 but not part of British India.[28]

History

1858–1868: Rebellion aftermath, critiques, and responses

Aunque la Rebelión India de 1857 sacudió la empresa británica en la India, no la descarriló. Hasta 1857, los británicos, especialmente bajo el mando de Lord Dalhousie , habían estado construyendo apresuradamente una India que imaginaban a la par de la propia Gran Bretaña en la calidad y fortaleza de sus instituciones económicas y sociales. Después de la rebelión, se volvieron más cautelosos. Se dedicó mucha reflexión a las causas de la rebelión y se extrajeron tres lecciones principales. Primero, a nivel práctico, se consideró necesaria una mayor comunicación y camaradería entre británicos e indios, no solo entre los oficiales del ejército británico y su personal indio, sino también en la vida civil. [ 29 ] El ejército indio fue completamente reorganizado: las unidades compuestas por musulmanes y brahmanes de las Provincias Unidas de Agra y Oudh , que habían formado el núcleo de la rebelión, fueron disueltas. Se formaron nuevos regimientos, como los sijs y los baluchis, compuestos por indios que, a juicio británico, habían demostrado firmeza. A partir de entonces, el ejército indio permaneció sin cambios en su organización hasta 1947. [ 30 ] El censo de 1861 reveló que la población inglesa en la India era de 125.945. De estos, solo unos 41.862 eran civiles en comparación con unos 84.083 oficiales y soldados europeos del ejército. [ 31 ] En 1880, el ejército indio permanente estaba compuesto por 66.000 soldados británicos, 130.000 nativos y 350.000 soldados en los ejércitos de los principados. [ 32 ] [ 33 ]

En segundo lugar, también se consideró que tanto los príncipes como los grandes terratenientes, al no unirse a la rebelión, habían demostrado ser, en palabras de Lord Canning, «rompeolas en la tormenta». [ 29 ] Ellos también fueron recompensados ​​en el nuevo Raj británico al ser integrados al sistema político británico-indio y al tener garantizados sus territorios. [ 34 ] Al mismo tiempo, se consideró que los campesinos, en cuyo beneficio se habían emprendido las grandes reformas agrarias de las Provincias Unidas, habían mostrado deslealtad al luchar, en muchos casos, por sus antiguos terratenientes contra los británicos. En consecuencia, no se implementaron más reformas agrarias durante los siguientes 90 años: Bengala y Bihar debían seguir siendo dominios de grandes propietarios (a diferencia del Punjab y Uttar Pradesh ). [ 35 ]

En tercer lugar, los británicos se sentían desencantados con la reacción india al cambio social. Hasta la rebelión, habían impulsado con entusiasmo reformas sociales, como la prohibición del sati por Lord William Bentinck . [ 36 ] Ahora se consideraba que las tradiciones y costumbres en la India eran demasiado fuertes y rígidas para cambiarlas fácilmente; en consecuencia, no se realizaron más intervenciones sociales británicas, especialmente en asuntos relacionados con la religión, [ 37 ] incluso cuando los británicos tenían una opinión muy firme sobre el tema (como en el caso del nuevo matrimonio de niñas hindúes viudas). [ 36 ] Este sentimiento se ejemplificó aún más en la Proclamación de la Reina Victoria publicada inmediatamente después de la rebelión. La proclamación declaraba que «Renunciamos por igual a nuestro derecho y deseo de imponer nuestras convicciones a cualquiera de nuestros súbditos», [ 38 ] demostrando el compromiso oficial británico de abstenerse de la intervención social en la India.

1858–1880: Ferrocarriles, canales, Código de Hambruna

In the second half of the 19th century, both the direct administration of India by the British crown and the technological change ushered in by the industrial revolution had the effect of closely intertwining the economies of India and Great Britain.[39] In fact, many of the major changes in transport and communications (that are typically associated with Crown Rule of India) had already begun before the Mutiny. Since Dalhousie had embraced the technological change then rampant in Great Britain, India too saw the rapid development of all those technologies. Railways, roads, canals, and bridges were rapidly built in India, and telegraph links were equally rapidly established so that raw materials, such as cotton, from India's hinterland, could be transported more efficiently to ports, such as Bombay, for subsequent export to England.[40] Likewise, finished goods from England were transported back for sale in the burgeoning Indian markets.[41] Unlike Britain, where the market risks for the infrastructure development were borne by private investors, in India, it was the taxpayers—primarily farmers and farm-labourers—who endured the risks, which, in the end, amounted to £50 million.[42] Despite these costs, very little skilled employment was created for Indians. By 1920, with the fourth largest railway network in the world and a history of 60 years of its construction, only ten per cent of the "superior posts" in the Indian Railways were held by Indians.[43]

The rush of technology was also changing the agricultural economy in India: by the last decade of the 19th century, a large fraction of some raw materials—not only cotton but also some food-grains—were being exported to faraway markets.[44] Many small farmers, dependent on the whims of those markets, lost land, animals, and equipment to money-lenders.[44] The latter half of the 19th century also saw an increase in the number of large-scale famines in India. Although famines were not new to the subcontinent, these were particularly severe, cumulatively causing deaths in the tens of millions.[44] Many critics, both British and Indian, laid the blame at the doorsteps of the lumbering colonial administrations.[44] There were also salutary effects: commercial cropping, especially in the newly canalled Punjab, led to increased food production for internal consumption.[45] The railway network provided critical famine relief,[46] notably reduced the cost of moving goods,[46] and helped nascent Indian-owned industry.[45] After the Great Famine of 1876–1878, the Indian Famine Commission report was issued in 1880, and the Indian Famine Codes, the earliest famine scales and programmes for famine prevention, were instituted.[47] In one form or other, they would be implemented worldwide by the United Nations and the Food and Agricultural Organisation well into the 1970s.[48]

1880s–1890s: middle class, Indian National Congress

By 1880, a new middle class had arisen in India and spread thinly across the country. Moreover, there was a growing solidarity among its members, created by the "joint stimuli of encouragement and irritation".[49] The encouragement felt by this class came from its success in education and its ability to avail itself of the benefits of that education such as employment in the Indian Civil Service. It came too from Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 in which she had declared, "We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligation of duty which bind us to all our other subjects."[50] Indians were especially encouraged when Canada was granted dominion status in 1867 and established an autonomous democratic constitution.[50] Lastly, the encouragement came from the work of contemporaneous Oriental scholars like Monier Monier-Williams and Max Müller, who in their works had been presenting ancient India as a great civilization. Irritation, on the other hand, came not just from incidents of racial discrimination at the hands of the British in India but also from governmental actions like the use of Indian troops in imperial campaigns (e.g., in the Second Anglo-Afghan War) and the attempts to control the vernacular press (e.g., in the Vernacular Press Act of 1878).[51]

It was, however, Viceroy Lord Ripon's partial reversal of the Ilbert Bill (1883), a legislative measure that had proposed putting Indian judges in the Bengal Presidency on equal footing with British ones, that transformed the discontent into political action.[52] On 28 December 1885, professionals and intellectuals from this middle-class—many educated at the new British-founded universities in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, and familiar with the ideas of British political philosophers, especially the utilitarians assembled in Bombay—founded the Indian National Congress. The 70 men elected Womesh Chunder Bonerjee as the first president. The membership consisted of a Westernized elite, and no effort was made at this time to broaden the base.

During its first 20 years, the Congress primarily debated British policy toward India. Its debates created a new Indian outlook that held Great Britain responsible for draining India of its wealth. Britain did this, the nationalists claimed, by unfair trade, by the restraint on indigenous Indian industry, and by the use of Indian taxes to pay the high salaries of the British civil servants in India.[53]

Thomas Baring served as Viceroy of India 1872–1876. Baring's major accomplishments came as an energetic reformer who was dedicated to upgrading the quality of government in the British Raj. He began large scale famine relief, reduced taxes, and overcame bureaucratic obstacles in an effort to reduce both starvation and widespread social unrest. Although appointed by a Liberal government, his policies were much the same as viceroys appointed by Conservative governments.[54]

Social reform was in the air by the 1880s. For example, Pandita Ramabai, poet, Sanskrit scholar, and a champion of the emancipation of Indian women, took up the cause of widow remarriage, especially of Brahmin widows, later converted to Christianity.[55] By 1900, reform movements had taken root within the Indian National Congress. Congress member Gopal Krishna Gokhale founded the Servants of India Society, which lobbied for legislative reform (e.g., for a law to permit the remarriage of Hindu child widows) and whose members took vows of poverty, and worked among the untouchable community.[56]

By 1905, a deep gulf opened between the moderates, led by Gokhale, who downplayed public agitation, and the new "extremists" who not only advocated agitation but also regarded the pursuit of social reform as a distraction from nationalism. Prominent among the extremists was Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who attempted to mobilise Indians by appealing to an explicitly Hindu political identity, displayed, for example, in the annual public Ganapati festivals that he inaugurated in western India.[57]

1870s–1906: Muslim social movements, Muslim League

La abrumadora, aunque predominantemente hindú, protesta contra la partición de Bengala y el temor a las reformas que favorecían a la mayoría hindú, llevó a la élite musulmana de la India a reunirse con el nuevo virrey, Lord Minto, en 1906 y a solicitar circunscripciones electorales separadas para los musulmanes. [ 41 ] Al mismo tiempo, exigieron una representación legislativa proporcional que reflejara tanto su condición de antiguos gobernantes como su historial de cooperación con los británicos. Esto condujo, en diciembre de 1906, a la fundación de la Liga Musulmana de Toda la India en Dacca . Aunque Curzon, para entonces, había dimitido de su cargo por una disputa con su jefe militar, Lord Kitchener , y había regresado a Inglaterra, la Liga apoyaba su plan de partición. [ 58 ] La posición de la élite musulmana, que se reflejó en la posición de la Liga, se había cristalizado gradualmente durante las tres décadas anteriores, comenzando con las revelaciones del Censo de la India británica en 1871, que por primera vez había estimado las poblaciones en regiones de mayoría musulmana [ 58 ] (por su parte, el deseo de Curzon de ganarse a los musulmanes de Bengala Oriental había surgido de las inquietudes británicas desde el censo de 1871 —y a la luz de la historia de los musulmanes que lucharon contra ellos en el Motín de 1857 y la Segunda Guerra Anglo-Afgana— sobre los musulmanes indios que se rebelaban contra la Corona). En las tres décadas siguientes, los líderes musulmanes de todo el norte de la India habían experimentado intermitentemente la animosidad pública de algunos de los nuevos grupos políticos y sociales hindúes. [ 58 ] El Arya Samaj , por ejemplo, no solo había apoyado a las Sociedades de Protección de las Vacas en su agitación, [ 59 ] sino que también, consternado por las cifras de musulmanes del Censo de 1871, organizó eventos de "reconversión" con el propósito de dar la bienvenida a los musulmanes de nuevo al seno hindú. [ 58 ] En 1905, cuando Tilak y Lajpat Rai intentaron ascender a puestos de liderazgo en el Congreso, y el propio Congreso se unió en torno al simbolismo de Kali, los temores de los musulmanes aumentaron. [ 60 ] Muchos musulmanes no pasaron por alto, por ejemplo, que el grito de guerra "Bande Mataram" había aparecido por primera vez en la novela Anand Math , en la que los hindúes habían luchado contra sus opresores musulmanes. [ 60 ] Por último, la élite musulmana, y entre ellos el Nawab de Dacca , Khwaja Salimullah , quien organizó la primera reunión de la Liga en su mansión en Shahbag, was aware that a new province with a Muslim majority would directly benefit Muslims aspiring to political power.[60]

The first steps were taken toward self-government in British India in the late 19th century with the appointment of Indian counsellors to advise the British viceroy and the establishment of provincial councils with Indian members; the British subsequently widened participation in legislative councils with the Indian Councils Act 1892. Municipal Corporations and District Boards were created for local administration; they included elected Indian members.

The Indian Councils Act 1909, known as the Morley-Minto Reforms (John Morley was the secretary of state for India, and Minto was viceroy)—gave Indians limited roles in the central and provincial legislatures. Upper-class Indians, rich landowners and businessmen were favoured. The Muslim community was made a separate electorate and granted double representation. The goals were quite conservative but they did advance the elective principle.[61]

The partition of Bengal was rescinded in 1911 and announced at the Delhi Durbar at which King George V came in person and was crowned Emperor of India. He announced the capital would be moved from Calcutta to Delhi. This period saw an increase in the activities of revolutionary groups, which included Bengal's Anushilan Samiti and the Punjab's Ghadar Party. However, the British authorities were able to crush violent rebels swiftly, partly because the mainstream of educated Indian politicians opposed violent revolution.[62]

1905–1911: Partition of Bengal, Swadeshi, violence

The viceroy, Lord Curzon (1899–1905), was unusually energetic in pursuit of efficiency and reform.[63] His agenda included the creation of the North-West Frontier Province; small changes in the civil services; speeding up the operations of the secretariat; setting up a gold standard to ensure a stable currency; creation of a Railway Board; irrigation reform; reduction of peasant debts; lowering the cost of telegrams; archaeological research and the preservation of antiquities; improvements in the universities; police reforms; upgrading the roles of the Native States; a new Commerce and Industry Department; promotion of industry; revised land revenue policies; lowering taxes; setting up agricultural banks; creating an Agricultural Department; sponsoring agricultural research; establishing an Imperial Library; creating an Imperial Cadet Corps; new famine codes; and, indeed, reducing the smoke nuisance in Calcutta.[64]

Trouble emerged for Curzon when he divided the largest administrative subdivision in British India, the Bengal Province, into the Muslim-majority province of Eastern Bengal and Assam and the Hindu-majority province of West Bengal (present-day Indian states of West Bengal, Bihar, and Odisha). Curzon's act, the Partition of Bengal, had been contemplated by various colonial administrations since the time of Lord William Bentinck but was never acted upon. Though some considered it administratively felicitous, it was communally charged. It sowed the seeds of division among Indians in Bengal, transforming nationalist politics as nothing else before it. The Hindu elite of Bengal, among them many who owned land in East Bengal that was leased out to Muslim peasants, protested fervidly.[65]

Following the Partition of Bengal, which was a strategy set out by Lord Curzon to weaken the nationalist movement, Tilak encouraged the Swadeshi movement and the Boycott movement.[66] The movement consisted of the boycott of foreign goods and also the social boycott of any Indian who used foreign goods. The Swadeshi movement consisted of the usage of natively produced goods. Once foreign goods were boycotted, there was a gap which had to be filled by the production of those goods in India itself. Bal Gangadhar Tilak said that the Swadeshi and Boycott movements are two sides of the same coin. The large Bengali Hindu middle-class (the Bhadralok), upset at the prospect of Bengalis being outnumbered in the new Bengal province by Biharis and Oriyas, felt that Curzon's act was punishment for their political assertiveness. The pervasive protests against Curzon's decision took the form predominantly of the Swadeshi ("buy Indian") campaign led by two-time Congress president, Surendranath Banerjee, and involved boycott of British goods.[67]

The rallying cry for both types of protest was the slogan Bande Mataram ("Hail to the Mother"), which invoked a mother goddess, who stood variously for Bengal, India, and the Hindu goddess Kali. Sri Aurobindo never went beyond the law when he edited the Bande Mataram magazine; it preached independence but within the bounds of peace as far as possible. Its goal was Passive Resistance.[68] The unrest spread from Calcutta to the surrounding regions of Bengal when students returned home to their villages and towns. Some joined local political youth clubs emerging in Bengal at the time, some engaged in robberies to fund arms, and even attempted to take the lives of Raj officials. However, the conspiracies generally failed in the face of intense police work.[69] The Swadeshi boycott movement cut imports of British textiles by 25%. The swadeshi cloth, although more expensive and somewhat less comfortable than its Lancashire competitor, was worn as a mark of national pride by people all over India.[70]

1914–1918: First World War, Lucknow Pact, Home Rule leagues

The First World War would prove to be a watershed in the imperial relationship between Britain and India. Shortly before the outbreak of war, the Government of India had indicated that they could furnish two divisions plus a cavalry brigade, with a further division in case of emergency.[71] Some 1.4 million Indian and British soldiers of the British Indian Army took part in the war, primarily in Iraq and the Middle East. Their participation had a wider cultural fallout as news spread of how bravely soldiers fought and died alongside British soldiers, as well as soldiers from dominions like Canada and Australia.[72] India's international profile rose during the 1920s, as it became a founding member of the League of Nations in 1920 and participated, under the name "Les Indes Anglaises" (British India), in the 1920 Summer Olympics in Antwerp.[73] Back in India, especially among the leaders of the Indian National Congress, the war led to calls for greater self-government for Indians.[72]

At the onset of World War I, the reassignment of most of the British army in India to Europe and Mesopotamia, had led the previous viceroy, Lord Harding, to worry about the "risks involved in denuding India of troops".[72]Revolutionary violence had already been a concern in British India; consequently, in 1915, to strengthen its powers during what it saw was a time of increased vulnerability, the Government of India passed the Defence of India Act 1915, which allowed it to intern politically dangerous dissidents without due process, and added to the power it already had under the Indian Press Act, 1910 to imprison journalists without trial and to censor the press.[74] It was under the Defence of India act that the Ali brothers were imprisoned in 1916, and Annie Besant, a European woman, and ordinarily more problematic to imprison, was arrested in 1917.[74] Now, as constitutional reform began to be discussed in earnest, the British began to consider how new moderate Indians could be brought into the fold of constitutional politics and, simultaneously, how the hand of established constitutionalists could be strengthened. However, since the Government of India wanted to ensure against any sabotage of the reform process by extremists, and since its reform plan was devised during a time when extremist violence had ebbed as a result of increased governmental control, it also began to consider how some of its wartime powers could be extended into peacetime.[74]

After the 1906 split between the moderates and the extremists in the Indian National Congress, organised political activity by the Congress had remained fragmented until 1914, when Bal Gangadhar Tilak was released from prison and began to sound out other Congress leaders about possible reunification. That, however, had to wait until the demise of Tilak's principal moderate opponents, Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Pherozeshah Mehta, in 1915, whereupon an agreement was reached for Tilak's ousted group to re-enter the Congress.[72] In the 1916 Lucknow session of the Congress, Tilak's supporters were able to push through a more radical resolution which asked for the British to declare that it was their "aim and intention ... to confer self-government on India at an early date".[72] Soon, other such rumblings began to appear in public pronouncements: in 1917, in the Imperial Legislative Council, Madan Mohan Malaviya spoke of the expectations the war had generated in India, "I venture to say that the war has put the clock ... fifty years forward ... (The) reforms after the war will have to be such, ... as will satisfy the aspirations of her (India's) people to take their legitimate part in the administration of their own country."[72]

The 1916 Lucknow Session of the Congress was also the venue of an unanticipated mutual effort by the Congress and the Muslim League, the occasion for which was provided by the wartime partnership between Germany and Turkey. Since the Turkish Sultan, or Khalifah, had also sporadically claimed guardianship of the Islamic holy sites of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, and since the British and their allies were now in conflict with Turkey, doubts began to increase among some Indian Muslims about the "religious neutrality" of the British, doubts that had already surfaced as a result of the reunification of Bengal in 1911, a decision that was seen as ill-disposed to Muslims.[75] In the Lucknow Pact, the League joined the Congress in the proposal for greater self-government that was campaigned for by Tilak and his supporters; in return, the Congress accepted separate electorates for Muslims in the provincial legislatures as well as the Imperial Legislative Council. In 1916, the Muslim League had anywhere between 500 and 800 members and did not yet have the wider following among Indian Muslims that it enjoyed in later years; in the League itself, the pact did not have unanimous backing, having largely been negotiated by a group of "Young Party" Muslims from the United Provinces (UP), most prominently, two brothers Mohammad and Shaukat Ali, who had embraced the Pan-Islamic cause;[75] however, it did have the support of a young lawyer from Bombay, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was later to rise to leadership roles in both the League and the Indian independence movement. In later years, as the full ramifications of the pact unfolded, it was seen as benefiting the Muslim minority élites of provinces like UP and Bihar more than the Muslim majorities of Punjab and Bengal; nonetheless, at the time, the "Lucknow Pact" was an important milestone in nationalistic agitation and was seen as such by the British.[75]

During 1916, two Home Rule Leagues were founded within the Indian National Congress by Tilak and Annie Besant, respectively, to promote Home Rule among Indians, and also to elevate the stature of the founders within the Congress itself.[76] Besant, for her part, was also keen to demonstrate the superiority of this new form of organised agitation, which had achieved some success in the Irish home rule movement, over the political violence that had intermittently plagued the subcontinent during the years 1907–1914.[76] The two Leagues focused their attention on complementary geographical regions: Tilak's in western India, in the southern Bombay presidency, and Besant's in the rest of the country, but especially in the Madras Presidency and in regions like Sind and Gujarat that had hitherto been considered politically dormant by the Congress.[76] Both leagues rapidly acquired new members—approximately thirty thousand each in a little over a year—and began to publish inexpensive newspapers. Their propaganda also turned to posters, pamphlets, and political-religious songs, and later to mass meetings, which not only attracted greater numbers than in earlier Congress sessions, but also entirely new social groups such as non-Brahmins, traders, farmers, students, and lower-level government workers.[76] Although they did not achieve the magnitude or character of a nationwide mass movement, the Home Rule leagues both deepened and widened organised political agitation for self-rule in India. The British authorities reacted by imposing restrictions on the Leagues, including shutting out students from meetings and banning the two leaders from travelling to certain provinces.[76]

1915–1918: return of Gandhi

Mahatma Gandhi (seated in carriage, on the right, eyes downcast, with black flat-top hat) receiving a big welcome in Karachi in 1916 after his return to India from South Africa
Gandhi at the time of the Kheda Satyagraha, 1918

The year 1915 also saw the return of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi to India. Already known in India as a result of his civil liberties protests on behalf of the Indians in South Africa, Gandhi followed the advice of his mentor Gopal Krishna Gokhale and chose not to make any public pronouncements during the first year of his return, but instead spent the year travelling, observing the country at first hand, and writing.[77] Earlier, during his South Africa sojourn, Gandhi, a lawyer by profession, had represented an Indian community, which, although small, was sufficiently diverse to be a microcosm of India itself. In tackling the challenge of holding this community together and simultaneously confronting the colonial authority, he had created a technique of non-violent resistance, which he labelled Satyagraha (or Striving for Truth).[78] For Gandhi, Satyagraha was different from "passive resistance", by then a familiar technique of social protest, which he regarded as a practical strategy adopted by the weak in the face of superior force; Satyagraha, on the other hand, was for him the "last resort of those strong enough in their commitment to truth to undergo suffering in its cause".[78]Ahimsa or "non-violence", which formed the underpinning of Satyagraha, came to represent the twin pillar, with Truth, of Gandhi's unorthodox religious outlook on life.[78] During the years 1907–1914, Gandhi tested the technique of Satyagraha in a number of protests on behalf of the Indian community in South Africa against the unjust racial laws.[78]

Also, during his time in South Africa, in his essay, Hind Swaraj, (1909), Gandhi formulated his vision of Swaraj, or "self-rule" for India based on three vital ingredients: solidarity between Indians of different faiths, but most of all between Hindus and Muslims; the removal of untouchability from Indian society; and the exercise of swadeshi—the boycott of manufactured foreign goods and the revival of Indian cottage industry.[77] The first two, he felt, were essential for India to be an egalitarian and tolerant society, one befitting the principles of Truth and Ahimsa, while the last, by making Indians more self-reliant, would break the cycle of dependence that was perpetuating not only the direction and tenor of the British rule in India, but also the British commitment to it.[77] At least until 1920, the British presence itself was not a stumbling block in Gandhi's conception of swaraj; rather, it was the inability of Indians to create a modern society.[77]

Gandhi hizo su debut político en la India en 1917 en el distrito de Champaran , en Bihar , cerca de la frontera con Nepal, donde fue invitado por un grupo de campesinos arrendatarios descontentos que, durante muchos años, habían sido obligados a plantar índigo (para tintes) en una parte de sus tierras y luego venderlo a precios inferiores a los del mercado a los plantadores británicos que les habían arrendado la tierra. [ 79 ] A su llegada al distrito, Gandhi se unió a otros agitadores, incluido un joven líder del Congreso, Rajendra Prasad , de Bihar, quien se convertiría en un fiel partidario de Gandhi y desempeñaría un papel destacado en el movimiento de independencia de la India. Cuando las autoridades británicas locales le ordenaron a Gandhi que se marchara, se negó por motivos morales, estableciendo su negativa como una forma de Satyagraha individual . Pronto, bajo la presión del virrey en Delhi, quien estaba ansioso por mantener la paz interna en tiempos de guerra, el gobierno provincial revocó la orden de expulsión de Gandhi y posteriormente accedió a una investigación oficial del caso. Aunque los plantadores británicos finalmente cedieron, no se convencieron de la causa de los campesinos y, por lo tanto, no se logró el resultado óptimo de la Satyagraha que Gandhi había esperado; de igual manera, los propios campesinos, aunque complacidos con la resolución, respondieron con poco entusiasmo a los proyectos simultáneos de empoderamiento rural y educación que Gandhi había inaugurado en consonancia con su ideal de swaraj . Al año siguiente, Gandhi lanzó dos Satyagrahas más, ambas en su Gujarat natal : una en el distrito rural de Kaira, donde los campesinos propietarios de tierras protestaban por el aumento de los impuestos sobre la tierra, y la otra en la ciudad de Ahmedabad , donde los trabajadores de una fábrica textil de propiedad india estaban angustiados por sus bajos salarios. La satyagraha en Ahmedabad consistió en que Gandhi ayunara y apoyara a los trabajadores en una huelga, lo que finalmente condujo a un acuerdo. En Kaira, en cambio, si bien la causa de los campesinos recibió publicidad gracias a la presencia de Gandhi, el satyagraha en sí, que consistía en la decisión colectiva de los campesinos de retener el pago, no tuvo éxito inmediato, ya que las autoridades británicas se negaron a ceder. La agitación en Kaira le granjeó a Gandhi otro lugarteniente de por vida en Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel , quien había organizado a los campesinos y que también desempeñaría un papel de liderazgo en el movimiento de independencia de la India. [ 80 ]

1916–1919: Reformas Montagu–Chelmsford

Montagu
Edwin Montagu , secretario de Estado para la India, cuyo informe dio lugar a la Ley del Gobierno de la India de 1919 , también conocida como las Reformas Montford o las Reformas Montagu-Chelmsford.
Chelmsford
Lord Chelmsford, viceroy of India, who cautioned the British Government to be more responsive to Indian public opinion

In 1916, in the face of new strength demonstrated by the nationalists with the signing of the Lucknow Pact and the founding of the Home Rule leagues, and the realisation, after the disaster in the Mesopotamian campaign, that the war would likely last longer, the new viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, cautioned that the Government of India needed to be more responsive to Indian opinion.[81] Towards the end of the year, after discussions with the government in London, he suggested that the British demonstrate their good faith—in light of the Indian war role—through a number of public actions, including awards of titles and honours to princes, granting of commissions in the army to Indians, and removal of the much-reviled cotton excise duty, but, most importantly, an announcement of Britain's future plans for India and an indication of some concrete steps. After more discussion, in August 1917, the new Liberal secretary of state for India, Edwin Montagu, announced the British aim of "increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire".[81] Although the plan envisioned limited self-government at first only in the provinces—with India emphatically within the British Empire—it represented the first British proposal for any form of representative government in a non-white colony.

Montagu and Chelmsford presented their report in July 1918 after a long fact-finding trip through India the previous winter.[82] After more discussion by the government and parliament in Britain, and another tour by the Franchise and Functions Committee for the purpose of identifying who among the Indian population could vote in future elections, the Government of India Act 1919 (also known as the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms) was passed in December 1919.[82] The new Act enlarged both the provincial and Imperial legislative councils and repealed the Government of India's recourse to the "official majority" in unfavourable votes.[82] Although departments like defence, foreign affairs, criminal law, communications, and income-tax were retained by the Viceroy and the central government in New Delhi, other departments like public health, education, land-revenue, local self-government were transferred to the provinces.[82] The provinces themselves were now to be administered under a new diarchical system, whereby some areas like education, agriculture, infrastructure development, and local self-government became the preserve of Indian ministers and legislatures, and ultimately the Indian electorates, while others like irrigation, land-revenue, police, prisons, and control of media remained within the purview of the British governor and his executive council.[82] The new Act also made it easier for Indians to be admitted into the civil services and the army officer corps.

A greater number of Indians were now enfranchised, although, for voting at the national level, they constituted only 10% of the total adult male population, many of whom were still illiterate.[82] In the provincial legislatures, the British continued to exercise some control by setting aside seats for special interests they considered cooperative or useful. In particular, rural candidates, generally sympathetic to British rule and less confrontational, were assigned more seats than their urban counterparts.[82] Seats were also reserved for non-Brahmins, landowners, businessmen, and college graduates. The principal of "communal representation", an integral part of the Minto–Morley Reforms, and more recently of the Congress-Muslim League Lucknow Pact, was reaffirmed, with seats being reserved for Muslims, Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, and domiciled Europeans, in both provincial and Imperial legislative councils.[82] The Montagu–Chelmsford reforms offered Indians the most significant opportunity yet for exercising legislative power, especially at the provincial level; however, that opportunity was also restricted by the still limited number of eligible voters, by the small budgets available to provincial legislatures, and by the presence of rural and special interest seats that were seen as instruments of British control.[82] Its scope was unsatisfactory to the Indian political leadership, famously expressed by Annie Besant as something "unworthy of England to offer and India to accept".[83]

1917–1919: Rowlatt Act

Sidney Rowlatt, the British judge under whose chairmanship the Rowlatt Committee recommended stricter anti-sedition laws

In 1917, as Montagu and Chelmsford were compiling their report, a committee chaired by a British judge, Sidney Rowlatt, and was tasked with investigating "revolutionary conspiracies", with the unstated goal of extending the government's wartime powers.[81] The Rowlatt Committee comprised four British and two Indian members, including Sir Basil Scott and Diwan Bahadur Sir C. V. Kumaraswami Sastri, the present and future Chief Justices of the High Court of Bombay and the High Court of Madras. It presented its report in July 1918 and identified three regions of conspiratorial insurgency: Bengal, the Bombay presidency, and the Punjab.[81] To combat subversive acts in these regions, the committee unanimously recommended that the government use emergency powers akin to its wartime authority, which included the ability to try cases of sedition by a panel of three judges and without juries, exaction of securities from suspects, governmental overseeing of residences of suspects,[81] and the power for provincial governments to detain suspects without trial.[84]

Headlines about the Rowlatt Bills (1919) from a nationalist newspaper in India. Although all non-official Indians on the Legislative Council voted against the Rowlatt Bills, the government was able to force their passage by using its majority.[84]

With the end of World War I, there was also a change in the economic climate. By the end of 1919, 1.5 million Indians had served in the armed services in either combatant or non-combatant roles, and India had provided £146 million in revenue for the war.[85] The increased taxes coupled with disruptions in both domestic and international trade had the effect of approximately doubling the index of overall prices in India between 1914 and 1920.[85] Returning war veterans, especially in the Punjab, created a growing unemployment crisis,[86] and post-war inflation led to food riots in Bombay, Madras, and Bengal provinces,[86] a situation that was made only worse by the failure of the 1918–19 monsoon and by profiteering and speculation.[85] The global influenza epidemic and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 added to the general jitters; the former among the population already experiencing economic woes,[86] and the latter among government officials, fearing a similar revolution in India.[87]

To combat what it saw as a coming crisis, the government now drafted the Rowlatt committee's recommendations into two Rowlatt Bills.[84] Although the bills were authorised for legislative consideration by Edwin Montagu, they were done so unwillingly, with the accompanying declaration, "I loathe the suggestion at first sight of preserving the Defence of India Act in peacetime to such an extent as Rowlatt and his friends think necessary."[81] In the ensuing discussion and vote in the Imperial Legislative Council, all Indian members voiced opposition to the bills. The Government of India was, nevertheless, able to use of its "official majority" to ensure passage of the bills early in 1919.[81] However, what it passed, in deference to the Indian opposition, was a lesser version of the first bill, which now allowed extrajudicial powers, but for a period of exactly three years and for the prosecution solely of "anarchical and revolutionary movements", dropping entirely the second bill involving modification the Indian Penal Code.[81] Even so, when it was passed, the new Rowlatt Act aroused widespread indignation throughout India, and brought Gandhi to the forefront of the nationalist movement.[84]

1919–1929: Jallianwala, non-cooperation

The Jallianwala Bagh massacre or "Amritsar massacre", took place in the Jallianwala Bagh public garden in the predominantly Sikh northern city of Amritsar. After days of unrest Brigadier-General Reginald E.H. Dyer forbade public meetings and on Sunday 13 April 1919 fifty British Indian Army soldiers commanded by Dyer began shooting at an unarmed gathering of thousands of men, women, and children without warning. Casualty estimates vary widely, with the Government of India reporting 379 dead, with 1,100 wounded.[88] The Indian National Congress estimated three times the number of dead. Dyer was removed from duty but he became a celebrated hero in Britain among people with connections to the Raj.[89] Historians consider the episode was a decisive step towards the end of British rule in India.[90]

In 1920, after the British government refused to back down, Gandhi began his campaign of non-cooperation, prompting many Indians to return British awards and honours, to resign from the civil services, and to again boycott British goods. In addition, Gandhi reorganised the Congress, transforming it into a mass movement and opening its membership to even the poorest Indians. Although Gandhi halted the non-cooperation movement in 1922 after the violent incident at Chauri Chaura, the movement revived again, in the mid-1920s.

The visit, in 1928, of the British Simon Commission, charged with instituting constitutional reform in India, resulted in widespread protests throughout the country.[91] Earlier, in 1925, non-violent protests of the Congress had resumed too, this time in Gujarat, and led by Patel, who organised farmers to refuse payment of increased land taxes; the success of this protest, the Bardoli Satyagraha, brought Gandhi back into the fold of active politics.[91]

At its annual session in Lahore, the Indian National Congress, under the presidency of Jawaharlal Nehru, issued a demand for Purna Swaraj (Hindustani language: "complete independence"), or Purna Swarajya. The declaration was drafted by the Congress Working Committee, which included Gandhi, Nehru, Patel, and Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari. Gandhi subsequently led an expanded movement of civil disobedience, culminating in 1930 with the Salt Satyagraha, in which thousands of Indians defied the tax on salt, by marching to the sea and making their own salt by evaporating seawater. Although, many, including Gandhi, were arrested, the British government eventually gave in, and in 1931 Gandhi travelled to London to negotiate new reform at the Round Table Conferences.

Government of India Act, 1935

In local terms, British control rested on the Indian Civil Service (ICS), but it faced growing difficulties. Fewer and fewer young men in Britain were interested in joining, and the continuing distrust of Indians resulted in a declining base in terms of quality and quantity. By 1945 Indians were numerically dominant in the ICS and at issue was divided loyalty between the Empire and independence.[92] The finances of the Raj depended on land taxes, and these became problematic in the 1930s. Epstein argues that after 1919 it became harder and harder to collect the land revenue. The Raj's suppression of civil disobedience after 1934 temporarily increased the power of the revenue agents but after 1937 they were forced by the new Congress-controlled provincial governments to hand back confiscated land. Again the outbreak of war strengthened them, in the face of the Quit India movement the revenue collectors had to rely on military force and by 1946–47 direct British control was rapidly disappearing in much of the countryside.[93]

En 1935, tras las Conferencias de la Mesa Redonda, el Parlamento aprobó la Ley del Gobierno de la India de 1935 , que autorizaba el establecimiento de asambleas legislativas independientes en todas las provincias de la India británica, la creación de un gobierno central que incorporara tanto las provincias británicas como los estados principescos, y la protección de las minorías musulmanas. La futura Constitución de la India independiente se basó en esta ley. [ 94 ] Sin embargo, dividía al electorado en 19 categorías religiosas y sociales, por ejemplo, musulmanes, sijs, cristianos indios, clases oprimidas, terratenientes, comerciantes e industriales, europeos, angloindios, etc., cada una de las cuales tenía representación separada en las Asambleas Legislativas Provinciales. Un votante solo podía votar por candidatos de su propia categoría.

La Ley de 1935 preveía una mayor autonomía para las provincias indias, con el objetivo de apaciguar el sentimiento nacionalista. La ley establecía un parlamento nacional y un poder ejecutivo bajo la jurisdicción del gobierno británico, pero los gobernantes de los estados principescos lograron bloquear su implementación. Estos estados permanecieron bajo el control absoluto de sus gobernantes hereditarios, sin un gobierno popular. Para prepararse para las elecciones, el Congreso aumentó su base de afiliados de 473.000 en 1935 a 4,5  millones en 1939. [ 95 ]

En las elecciones de 1937, el Congreso obtuvo la victoria en siete de las once provincias de la India británica. [ 96 ] En estas provincias se formaron gobiernos del Congreso con amplios poderes. El amplio apoyo popular al Congreso Nacional Indio sorprendió a los funcionarios del Raj, quienes anteriormente lo habían considerado un pequeño grupo elitista. [ 97 ] En 1937, los británicos separaron la provincia de Birmania de la India británica y otorgaron a la colonia una nueva constitución que establecía una asamblea totalmente elegida, con muchos poderes concedidos a los birmanos; sin embargo, esto resultó ser un tema divisivo, una estratagema para excluir a los birmanos de cualquier reforma india posterior. [ 98 ]

1939–1945: Segunda Guerra Mundial

Con el estallido de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en 1939, el virrey, Lord Linlithgow , declaró la guerra en nombre de la India sin consultar a los líderes indios, lo que provocó la dimisión de los ministerios provinciales del Congreso en señal de protesta. La Liga Musulmana, por el contrario, apoyó a Gran Bretaña en el esfuerzo bélico y mantuvo el control del gobierno en tres provincias importantes: Bengala, Sind y el Punjab. [ 18 ]

Si bien la Liga Musulmana había sido un pequeño grupo de élite en 1927 con solo 1300  miembros, creció rápidamente una vez que se convirtió en una organización que llegaba a las masas, alcanzando 500 000  miembros en Bengala en 1944, 200 000 en Punjab y cientos de miles en otros lugares. [ 99 ] Jinnah ahora estaba bien posicionado para negociar con los británicos desde una posición de poder. [ 100 ] Jinnah advirtió repetidamente que los musulmanes serían tratados injustamente en una India independiente dominada por el Congreso. El 24 de marzo de 1940 en Lahore, la Liga aprobó la « Resolución de Lahore », exigiendo que «las áreas en las que los musulmanes son numéricamente mayoría, como en las zonas noroccidental y oriental de la India, se agrupen para constituir estados independientes en los que las unidades constituyentes sean autónomas y soberanas». [ 101 ] Aunque había otros políticos musulmanes nacionales importantes como el líder del Congreso Ab'ul Kalam Azad , y políticos musulmanes regionales influyentes como AK Fazlul Huq del Partido Krishak Praja de izquierda en Bengala, Fazl-i-Hussain del Partido Unionista de Punjab dominado por los terratenientes , y Abd al-Ghaffar Khan de los Khudai Khidmatgar (popularmente, "camisas rojas") pro-Congreso en la Provincia de la Frontera Noroeste , [ 102 ] los británicos, durante los siguientes seis años, considerarían cada vez más a la Liga como el principal representante de la India musulmana.

El Congreso era laico y se oponía firmemente a la existencia de cualquier estado religioso. [ 99 ] Insistía en que existía una unidad natural en la India y culpaba repetidamente a los británicos de las tácticas de «divide y vencerás», basadas en incitar a los musulmanes a considerarse ajenos a los hindúes. Jinnah rechazó la noción de una India unida y enfatizó que las comunidades religiosas eran más fundamentales que un nacionalismo artificial. Proclamó la Teoría de las Dos Naciones , [ 103 ] declarando en Lahore el 23 de marzo de 1940:

[Islam and Hinduism] are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality ... The Hindu and Muslim belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature [sic]. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different ... To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.[104]

While the regular Indian army in 1939 included about 220,000 native troops, it expanded tenfold during the war,[105] and small naval and air force units were created. Over two million Indians volunteered for military service in the British Army. They played a major role in numerous campaigns, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. Casualties were moderate (in terms of the world war), with 24,000 killed; 64,000 wounded; 12,000 missing (probably dead), and 60,000 captured at Singapore in 1942.[106]

London paid most of the cost of the Indian Army, which had the effect of erasing India's national debt; it ended the war with a surplus of £1,300 million. In addition, heavy British spending on munitions produced in India (such as uniforms, rifles, machine-guns, field artillery, and ammunition) led to a rapid expansion of industrial output, such as textiles (up 16%), steel (up 18%), and chemicals (up 30%). Small warships were built, and an aircraft factory opened in Bangalore. The railway system, with 700,000 employees, was taxed to the limit as demand for transportation soared.[107]

The British government sent the Cripps mission in 1942 to secure Indian nationalists' co-operation in the war effort in exchange for a promise of independence as soon as the war ended. Top officials in Britain, most notably Prime Minister Winston Churchill, did not support the Cripps Mission and negotiations with the Congress soon broke down.[108]

Congress launched the Quit India Movement in July 1942 demanding the immediate withdrawal of the British from India or face nationwide civil disobedience. On 8 August the Raj arrested all national, provincial and local Congress leaders, holding tens of thousands of them until 1945. The country erupted in violent demonstrations led by students and later by peasant political groups, especially in Eastern United Provinces, Bihar, and western Bengal. The large wartime British Army presence crushed the movement in a little more than six weeks;[109] nonetheless, a portion of the movement formed for a time an underground provisional government on the border with Nepal.[109] In other parts of India, the movement was less spontaneous and the protest less intensive; however, it lasted sporadically into the summer of 1943.[110]

Earlier, Subhas Chandra Bose, who had been a leader of the younger, radical, wing of the Indian National Congress in the late 1920s and 1930s, had risen to become Congress President from 1938 to 1939.[111] However, he was ousted from the Congress in 1939 following differences with the high command,[112] and subsequently placed under house arrest by the British before escaping from India in early 1941.[113] He turned to Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan for help in gaining India's independence by force.[114] With Japanese support, he organised the Indian National Army, composed largely of Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army who had been captured by the Japanese in the Battle of Singapore. As the war turned against them, the Japanese came to support a number of puppet and provisional governments in the captured regions, including those in Burma, the Philippines and Vietnam, and in addition, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, presided by Bose.[114]

Bose's effort, however, was short-lived. In mid-1944 the British Army first halted and then reversed the Japanese U-Go offensive, beginning the successful part of the Burma Campaign. Bose's Indian National Army largely disintegrated during the subsequent fighting in Burma, with its remaining elements surrendering with the recapture of Singapore in September 1945. Bose died in August from third degree burns received after attempting to escape in an overloaded Japanese plane which crashed in Taiwan,[115][116] which many Indians believe did not happen.[117][118] Although Bose was unsuccessful, he roused patriotic feelings in India.[119]

1946–1947: Independence, partition

In January 1946, a number of mutinies broke out in the armed services, starting with that of RAF servicemen frustrated with their slow repatriation to Britain.[120] The mutinies came to a head with mutiny of the Royal Indian Navy in Bombay in February 1946, followed by others in Calcutta, Madras, and Karachi. Although the mutinies were rapidly suppressed, they had the effect of spurring the new Labour government in Britain to action, and leading to the Cabinet Mission to India led by the secretary of state for India, Lord Pethick Lawrence, and including Sir Stafford Cripps, who had visited four years before.[120]

Also in early 1946, new elections were called in India. Earlier, at the end of the war in 1945, the colonial government had announced the public trial of three senior officers of Bose's defeated Indian National Army who stood accused of treason. Now as the trials began, the Congress leadership, although ambivalent towards the INA, chose to defend the accused officers.[121] The subsequent convictions of the officers, the public outcry against the convictions, and the eventual remission of the sentences, created positive propaganda for the Congress, which only helped in the party's subsequent electoral victories in eight of the eleven provinces.[122] The negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim League, however, stumbled over the issue of the partition. Jinnah proclaimed 16 August 1946, Direct Action Day, with the stated goal of highlighting, peacefully, the demand for a Muslim homeland in British India. The following day Hindu-Muslim riots broke out in Calcutta and quickly spread throughout British India. Although the Government of India and the Congress were both shaken by the course of events, in September, a Congress-led interim government was installed, with Jawaharlal Nehru as united India's prime minister.[123]

Later that year, the British Exchequer exhausted by the recently concluded World War II, and the Labour government conscious that it had neither the mandate at home, the international support, nor the reliability of native forces for continuing to control an increasingly restless British India,[124][125] decided to end British rule of India, and in early 1947 Britain announced its intention of transferring power no later than June 1948.[18]

As independence approached, the violence between Hindus and Muslims in the provinces of Punjab and Bengal continued unabated. With the British army unprepared for the potential for increased violence, the new viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, advanced the date for the transfer of power, allowing less than six months for a mutually agreed plan for independence.[126][18] With the partition of India, the end of the British rule in India in August 1947 saw the creation of two separate states of India and Pakistan.[127]

On 15 August 1947, the new Dominion of Pakistan (later Islamic Republic of Pakistan), with Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the governor-general; and the Dominion of India, (later Republic of India) with Jawaharlal Nehru as the prime minister, and the viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, staying on as its first governor-general came into being; with official ceremonies taking place in Karachi on 14 August and New Delhi on 15 August. This was done so that Mountbatten could attend both ceremonies.[128]

The great majority of Indians remained in place with independence, but in border areas millions of people (Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu) relocated across the newly drawn borders. In Punjab, where the new border lines divided the Sikh regions in half, there was much bloodshed; in Bengal and Bihar, where Gandhi's presence assuaged communal tempers, the violence was more limited. In all, somewhere between 250,000 and 500,000 people on both sides of the new borders, among both the refugee and resident populations of the three faiths, died in the violence.[129]

Timeline of major events, legislation, and public works

British India and the princely states

India during the British Raj was made up of two types of territory: British India and the Native States (or Princely States).[141] In its Interpretation Act 1889, the British Parliament adopted the following definitions in Section 18:

(4.) La expresión "India británica" significará todos los territorios y lugares dentro de los dominios de Su Majestad que en ese momento son gobernados por Su Majestad a través del Gobernador General de la India o a través de cualquier gobernador u otro funcionario subordinado al Gobernador General de la India.

(5.) La expresión «India» significará la India británica junto con cualquier territorio de cualquier príncipe o jefe nativo bajo la soberanía de Su Majestad ejercida a través del Gobernador General de la India, o a través de cualquier gobernador u otro funcionario subordinado al Gobernador General de la India. [ 1 ]

En general, el término «India británica» se ha utilizado (y aún se utiliza) para referirse también a las regiones bajo el dominio de la Compañía Británica de las Indias Orientales en la India desde 1600 hasta 1858. [ 142 ] El término también se ha utilizado para referirse a los «británicos en la India». [ 143 ]

Los términos «Imperio Indio» e «Imperio de la India» (al igual que el término «Imperio Británico») no se utilizaban en la legislación. La monarca era conocida oficialmente como Emperatriz o Emperador de la India, y este término se empleaba con frecuencia en los Discursos de la Reina y los Discursos de Prorrogación de la Reina Victoria. Además, en 1878 se creó una orden de caballería , la Muy Eminente Orden del Imperio Indio .

La soberanía sobre 175 estados principescos, algunos de los más grandes e importantes, era ejercida (en nombre de la Corona británica ) por el gobierno central de la India británica bajo el virrey ; los aproximadamente 500 estados restantes dependían de los gobiernos provinciales de la India británica bajo un gobernador, teniente gobernador o comisionado jefe (según el caso). [ 144 ] Una clara distinción entre «dominio» y «soberanía» la proporcionaba la jurisdicción de los tribunales: el derecho de la India británica se basaba en las leyes aprobadas por el Parlamento británico y en las facultades legislativas que dichas leyes conferían a los diversos gobiernos de la India británica, tanto centrales como locales; en cambio, los tribunales de los estados principescos existían bajo la autoridad de los respectivos gobernantes de esos estados. [ 144 ]

Provincias principales

A principios del siglo XX, la India británica estaba formada por ocho  provincias que eran administradas por un gobernador o un vicegobernador.

Durante la partición de Bengala (1905-1913), se creó la nueva provincia de Bengala Oriental y Assam como vicegobernación. En 1911, Bengala Oriental se reunificó con Bengala, y las nuevas provincias del este quedaron conformadas como: Assam, Bengala, Bihar y Orissa . [ 145 ]

provincias menores

Además, había algunas provincias menores que eran administradas por un comisionado jefe: [ 146 ]

Princely states

A Princely State, also called a Native State or an Indian State, was a British vassal state in India with an indigenous nominal Indian ruler, subject to a subsidiary alliance.[147] There were 565 princely states when India and Pakistan became independent from Britain in August 1947. The princely states did not form a part of British India (i.e. the presidencies and provinces), as they were not directly under British rule. The larger ones had treaties with Britain that specified which rights the princes had; in the smaller ones the princes had few rights. Within the princely states external affairs, defence and most communications were under British control. The British also exercised a general influence over the states' internal politics, in part through the granting or withholding of recognition of individual rulers. Although there were nearly 600 princely states, the great majority were very small and contracted out the business of government to the British. Some two hundred of the states had an area of less than 25 square kilometres (10 square miles).[147] The last vestige of the Mughal Empire in Delhi which was under Company authority prior to the advent of British Raj was finally abolished and seized by the Crown in the aftermath of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 for its support to the rebellion.[148][149]

The princely states were grouped into agencies and residencies.

Organisation

Sir Charles Wood (1800–1885) was President of the Board of Control of the East India Company from 1852 to 1855; he shaped British education policy in India, and was Secretary of State for India from 1859 to 1866.

Following the Indian Rebellion of 1857 (usually called the Indian Mutiny by the British), the Government of India Act 1858 made changes in the governance of India at three levels:

  1. in the imperial government in London,
  2. in the central government in Calcutta, and
  3. in the provincial governments in the presidencies (and later in the provinces).[150]

In London, it provided for a cabinet-level Secretary of State for India and a fifteen-member Council of India, whose members were required, as one prerequisite of membership, to have spent at least ten years in India and to have done so no more than ten years before.[151] Although the secretary of state formulated the policy instructions to be communicated to India, he was required in most instances to consult the Council, but especially so in matters relating to spending of Indian revenues. The Act envisaged a system of "double government" in which the Council ideally served both as a check on excesses in imperial policy-making and as a body of up-to-date expertise on India. However, the secretary of state also had special emergency powers that allowed him to make unilateral decisions, and, in reality, the Council's expertise was sometimes outdated.[152] From 1858 until 1947, twenty-seven individuals served as Secretary of State for India and directed the India Office; these included: Sir Charles Wood (1859–1866), the Marquess of Salisbury (1874–1878; later British prime minister), John Morley (1905–1910; initiator of the Minto–Morley Reforms), E. S. Montagu (1917–1922; an architect of the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms), and Frederick Pethick-Lawrence (1945–1947; head of the 1946 Cabinet Mission to India). The size of the Advisory Council was reduced over the next half-century, but its powers remained unchanged. In 1907, for the first time, two Indians were appointed to the Council.[153] They were K.G. Gupta and Syed Hussain Bilgrami.

Lord Canning, the last Governor-General of India under Company rule and the first viceroy of India under Crown rule
Lord Salisbury was Secretary of State for India from 1874 to 1878

In Calcutta, the governor-general remained head of the Government of India and now was more commonly called the viceroy on account of his secondary role as the Crown's representative to the nominally sovereign princely states; he was, however, now responsible to the secretary of state in London and through him to Parliament. A system of "double government" had already been in place during the Company's rule in India from the time of Pitt's India Act of 1784. The governor-general in the capital, Calcutta, and the governor in a subordinate presidency (Madras or Bombay) was each required to consult his advisory council; executive orders in Calcutta, for example, were issued in the name of "Governor-General-in-Council" (i.e. the Governor-General with the advice of the Council). The Company's system of "double government" had its critics, since, from the time of the system's inception, there had been intermittent feuding between the governor-general and his Council; still, the Act of 1858 made no major changes in governance.[153] However, in the years immediately thereafter, which were also the years of post-rebellion reconstruction, Viceroy Lord Canning found the collective decision making of the Council to be too time-consuming for the pressing tasks ahead, so he requested the "portfolio system" of an Executive Council in which the business of each government department (the "portfolio") was assigned to and became the responsibility of a single council member.[153] Routine departmental decisions were made exclusively by the member, but important decisions required the consent of the governor-general and, in the absence of such consent, required discussion by the entire Executive Council. This innovation in Indian governance was promulgated in the Indian Councils Act 1861.

If the Government of India needed to enact new laws, the Councils Act allowed for a Legislative Council—an expansion of the Executive Council by up to twelve additional members, each appointed to a two-year term—with half the members consisting of British officials of the government (termed official) and allowed to vote, and the other half, comprising Indians and domiciled Britons in India (termed non-official) and serving only in an advisory capacity.[154] All laws enacted by Legislative Councils in India, whether by the Imperial Legislative Council in Calcutta or by the provincial ones in Madras and Bombay, required the final assent of the secretary of state in London; this prompted Sir Charles Wood, the second secretary of state, to describe the Government of India as "a despotism controlled from home".[153] Moreover, although the appointment of Indians to the Legislative Council was a response to calls after the 1857 rebellion, most notably by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, for more consultation with Indians, the Indians so appointed were from the landed aristocracy, often chosen for their loyalty, and far from representative.[155] Even so, the "... tiny advances in the practice of representative government were intended to provide safety valves for the expression of public opinion, which had been so badly misjudged before the rebellion".[156] Indian affairs now also came to be more closely examined in the British Parliament and more widely discussed in the British press.[157]

With the promulgation of the Government of India Act 1935, the Council of India was abolished with effect from 1 April 1937 and a modified system of government enacted. The secretary of state for India represented the Government of India in the UK. He was assisted by a body of advisers numbering from 8–12 individuals, at least half of whom were required to have held office in India for a minimum of 10 years, and had not relinquished office earlier than two years prior to their appointment as advisers to the secretary of state.[158]

El virrey y gobernador general de la India, designado por la Corona, ocupaba el cargo generalmente durante cinco años, aunque no existía un mandato fijo, y recibía un salario anual de 250.800 rupias (18.810 libras esterlinas). [ 158 ] [ 159 ] Dirigía el Consejo Ejecutivo del Virrey, cada uno de cuyos miembros era responsable de un departamento de la administración central. A partir del 1 de abril de 1937, el cargo de Gobernador General en Consejo, que el virrey y el gobernador general ocupaban simultáneamente en calidad de representante de la Corona en las relaciones con los estados principescos de la India, fue reemplazado por la designación de "Representante de Su Majestad para el Ejercicio de las Funciones de la Corona en sus Relaciones con los Estados de la India", o el "Representante de la Corona". El Consejo Ejecutivo se amplió considerablemente durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y en 1947 estaba compuesto por 14  miembros ( secretarios ), cada uno de los cuales ganaba un salario de 66.000 rupias (4.950 libras esterlinas).

Hasta 1946, el virrey ostentaba la cartera de Asuntos Exteriores y Relaciones con la Commonwealth, además de dirigir el Departamento Político en su calidad de representante de la Corona. Cada departamento estaba dirigido por un secretario , a excepción del Departamento de Ferrocarriles, que estaba dirigido por un Comisionado Jefe de Ferrocarriles bajo la tutela de un secretario. [ 160 ]

El virrey y gobernador general también presidía la Legislatura bicameral de la India, compuesta por una cámara alta (el Consejo de Estado) y una cámara baja (la Asamblea Legislativa). El virrey presidía el Consejo de Estado, mientras que la Asamblea Legislativa, inaugurada en 1921, estaba presidida por un presidente electo (designado por el virrey entre 1921 y 1925). El Consejo de Estado estaba integrado por 58  miembros (32  electos y 26  designados), mientras que la Asamblea Legislativa contaba con 141  miembros (26  funcionarios designados, 13  otros designados y 102  electos). El Consejo de Estado tenía mandatos de cinco años y la Asamblea Legislativa de tres, si bien cualquiera de las dos podía ser disuelta anticipadamente por el virrey. La Legislatura de la India estaba facultada para legislar para todas las personas residentes en la India británica, incluidos todos los súbditos británicos residentes en la India, y para todos los súbditos indios británicos residentes fuera de la India. Con el consentimiento del Rey-Emperador y después de que se hubieran presentado copias de una ley propuesta a ambas cámaras del Parlamento británico, el Virrey podía anular la decisión legislativa y promulgar directamente cualquier medida que considerara de interés para la India británica o sus residentes si surgía la necesidad. [ 160 ]

Effective from 1 April 1936, the Government of India Act created the new provinces of Sind (separated from the Bombay Presidency) and Orissa (separated from the Province of Bihar and Orissa). Burma and Aden became separate Crown Colonies under the Act from 1 April 1937, thereby ceasing to be part of the Indian Empire. From 1937 onwards, British India was divided into 17 administrations: the three Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Bengal, and the 14 provinces of the United Provinces, Punjab, Bihar, the Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Orissa, Sind, British Baluchistan, Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Panth Piploda. The Presidencies and the first eight provinces were each under a governor, while the latter six provinces were each under a chief commissioner. The viceroy directly governed the chief commissioner provinces through each respective chief commissioner, while the Presidencies and the provinces under governors were allowed greater autonomy under the Government of India Act.[161] Each Presidency or province headed by a governor had either a provincial bicameral legislature (in the Presidencies, the United Provinces, Bihar and Assam) or a unicameral legislature (in the Punjab, Central Provinces and Berar, NWFP, Orissa and Sind). The governor of each presidency or province represented the Crown in his capacity, and was assisted by a ministers appointed from the members of each provincial legislature. Each provincial legislature had a life of five years, barring any special circumstances such as wartime conditions. All bills passed by the provincial legislature were either signed or rejected by the governor, who could also issue proclamations or promulgate ordinances while the legislature was in recess, as the need arose.[162]

Each province or presidency comprised a number of divisions, each headed by a commissioner and subdivided into districts, which were the basic administrative units and each headed by a district magistrate, collector or deputy commissioner; in 1947, British India comprised 230 districts.[162]

Economy

One Mohur depicting Queen Victoria (1862)

All three sectors of the economy—agriculture, manufacturing, and services—accelerated in the postcolonial India. In agriculture a huge increase in production took place in the 1870s. The most important difference between colonial and postcolonial India was the use of land surplus with productivity-led growth by using high-yielding variety seeds, chemical fertilizers and more intensive application of water. All these three inputs were subsidised by the state.[163] The result was, on average, no long-term change in per capita income levels, though cost of living had grown higher. Agriculture was still dominant, with most peasants at the subsistence level. Extensive irrigation systems were built, providing an impetus for switching to cash crops for export and for raw materials for Indian industry, especially jute, cotton, sugarcane, coffee and tea.[164] India's global share of GDP fell drastically from above 20% to less than 5% in the colonial period.[165] Historians have been bitterly divided on issues of economic history, with the Nationalist school (following Nehru) arguing that India was poorer at the end of British rule than at the beginning and that impoverishment occurred because of the British.[166]

Mike Davis writes that much of the economic activity in British India was for the benefit of the British economy and was carried out relentlessly through repressive British imperial policies and with negative repercussions for the Indian population. This is reified in India's large exports of wheat to Britain: despite a major famine that claimed between 6 and 10 million lives in the late 1870s, these exports remained unchecked. A colonial government committed to laissez-faire economics refused to interfere with these exports or provide any relief.[167]

Industry

With the end of the state-granted monopoly of the East India Trading Company in 1813, the importation into India of British manufactured goods, including finished textiles, increased dramatically, from approximately 1 million yards of cotton cloth in 1814 to 13 million in 1820, 995 million in 1870, to 2050 million by 1890. The British imposed "free trade" on India, while continental Europe and the United States erected stiff tariff barriers ranging from 30% to 70% on the importation of cotton yarn or prohibited it entirely. As a result of the less expensive imports from more industrialized Britain, India's most significant industrial sector, textile production, shrank, such that by 1870–1880 Indian producers were manufacturing only 25%–45% of local consumption. Deindustrialization of India's iron industry was even more extensive during this period.[168]

Jamsetji Tata (1839–1904) began his industrial career in 1877 with the Central India Spinning, Weaving, and Manufacturing Company in Bombay. While other Indian mills produced cheap coarse yarn (and later cloth) using local short-staple cotton and cheap machinery imported from Britain, Tata did much better by importing expensive longer-stapled cotton from Egypt and buying more complex ring-spindle machinery from the United States to spin finer yarn that could compete with imports from Britain.[169]

In the 1890s, he launched plans to move into heavy industry using Indian funding. The Raj did not provide capital, but, aware of Britain's declining position against the US and Germany in the steel industry, it wanted steel mills in India. It promised to purchase any surplus steel Tata could not otherwise sell.[170] The Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO), now headed by his son Dorabji Tata (1859–1932), began constructing its plant at Jamshedpur in Bihar in 1908, using American technology, not British.[171] According to The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, TISCO became the leading iron and steel producer in India, and "a symbol of Indian technical skill, managerial competence, and entrepreneurial flair".[169] The Tata family, like most of India's big businessmen, were Indian nationalists but did not trust the Congress because it seemed too aggressively hostile to the Raj, too socialist, and too supportive of trade unions.[172]

Railways

The railway network of India in 1871, all major cities, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, as well as Delhi, are connected.
The railway network of India in 1909, when it was the fourth largest railway network in the world
"The most magnificent railway station in the world", says the caption of the stereographic tourist picture of Victoria Terminus, Bombay, which was completed in 1888.

British India built a modern railway system in the late 19th century, which was the fourth largest in the world. At first the railways were privately owned and operated. They were run by British administrators, engineers and craftsmen. At first, only the unskilled workers were Indians.[173]

The East India Company (and later the colonial government) encouraged new railway companies backed by private investors under a scheme that would provide land and guarantee an annual return of up to 5% during the initial years of operation. The companies were to build and operate the lines under a 99-year lease, with the government having the option to buy them earlier.[174] Two new railway companies, the Great Indian Peninsular Railway (GIPR) and the East Indian Railway Company (EIR) began to construct and operate lines near Bombay and Calcutta in 1853–54. The first passenger railway line in North India, between Allahabad and Kanpur, opened in 1859. Eventually, five British companies came to own all railway business in India,[175] and operated under a profit maximization scheme.[176] Further, there was no government regulation of these companies.[175]

In 1854, Governor-General Lord Dalhousie formulated a plan to construct a network of trunk lines connecting the principal regions of India. Encouraged by the government guarantees, investment flowed in and a series of new rail companies was established, leading to rapid expansion of the rail system in India.[177] Soon several large princely states built their own rail systems and the network spread to the regions that became the modern-day states of Assam, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. The route mileage of this network increased from 1,349 to 25,495 kilometres (838 to 15,842 mi) between 1860 and 1890, mostly radiating inland from the three major port cities of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta.[178]

After the Sepoy Rebellion in 1857, and subsequent Crown rule over India, the railways were seen as a strategic defence of the European population, allowing the military to move quickly to subdue native unrest and protect Britons.[179] The railway thus served as a tool of the colonial government to control India as they were "an essential strategic, defensive, subjugators and administrative 'tool'" for the Imperial Project.[180]

Most of the railway construction was done by Indian companies supervised by British engineers.[181] The system was heavily built, using a broad gauge, sturdy tracks and strong bridges. By 1900 India had a full range of rail services with diverse ownership and management, operating on broad, metre and narrow gauge networks. In 1900, the government took over the GIPR network, while the company continued to manage it.[181] During the First World War, the railways were used to transport troops and grain to the ports of Bombay and Karachi en route to Britain, Mesopotamia, and East Africa. With shipments of equipment and parts from Britain curtailed, maintenance became much more difficult; critical workers entered the army; workshops were converted to making munitions; the locomotives, rolling stock, and track of some entire lines were shipped to the Middle East. The railways could barely keep up with the increased demand.[182] By the end of the war, the railways had deteriorated for lack of maintenance and were not profitable. In 1923, both GIPR and EIR were nationalised.[183][184]

Headrick shows that until the 1930s, both the Raj lines and the private companies hired only European supervisors, civil engineers, and even operating personnel, such as locomotive engineers. The hard physical labour was left to the Indians. The colonial government was chiefly concerned with the welfare of European workers, and any Indian deaths were "either ignored or merely mentioned as a cold statistical figure."[185][186] The government's Stores Policy required that bids on railway contracts be made to the India Office in London, shutting out most Indian firms.[184] The railway companies purchased most of their hardware and parts in Britain. There were railway maintenance workshops in India, but they were rarely allowed to manufacture or repair locomotives.[187]

Tras la independencia en 1947, cuarenta y dos sistemas ferroviarios independientes, incluidas treinta y dos líneas propiedad de los antiguos estados principescos indios, se fusionaron para formar una única unidad nacionalizada denominada Ferrocarriles Indios .

India ofrece un ejemplo de cómo el Imperio Británico invirtió su dinero y experiencia en un sistema muy bien construido, diseñado con fines militares (tras la Rebelión de 1857), con la esperanza de que estimulara la industria. El sistema estaba sobredimensionado y era demasiado caro para el escaso volumen de tráfico de mercancías que transportaba. Christensen (1996), quien analizó el propósito colonial, las necesidades locales, el capital, el servicio y los intereses públicos y privados, concluyó que convertir los ferrocarriles en una entidad estatal obstaculizó su éxito, ya que los gastos ferroviarios debían someterse al mismo proceso presupuestario, lento y político, que el resto de los gastos estatales. Por lo tanto, los costes ferroviarios no podían ajustarse a las necesidades actuales de los ferrocarriles ni de sus pasajeros. [ 188 ]

Riego

El Raj británico invirtió fuertemente en infraestructura, incluyendo canales y sistemas de irrigación. [ 189 ] El Canal del Ganges alcanzaba los 560 kilómetros (350 millas) desde Haridwar hasta Cawnpore (ahora Kanpur) y abastecía miles de kilómetros de canales de distribución. Para 1900, el Raj tenía el sistema de irrigación más grande del mundo. Un caso de éxito fue Assam, una selva en 1840 que para 1900 tenía 1.600.000 hectáreas (4.000.000 de acres) cultivadas, especialmente en plantaciones de té. En total, la cantidad de tierra irrigada se multiplicó por ocho. El historiador David Gilmour dice: [ 190 ]

En la década de 1870, los campesinos de los distritos irrigados por el canal del Ganges estaban visiblemente mejor alimentados, alojados y vestidos que antes; a finales de siglo, la nueva red de canales en el Punjab había generado un campesinado aún más próspero en la región.

Impacto económico del Raj

Historians continue to debate whether the long-term intention of British rule was to accelerate the economic development of India, or to distort and delay it. In 1780, the conservative British politician Edmund Burke raised the issue of India's position: he vehemently attacked the East India Company, claiming that Warren Hastings and other top officials had ruined the Indian economy and society. Indian historian Rajat Kanta Ray (1998) continues this line of attack, saying the new economy brought by the British in the 18th century was a form of "plunder" and a catastrophe for the traditional economy of the Mughal Empire.[191] Ray accuses the British of depleting the food and money stocks and of imposing high taxes that helped cause the terrible Bengal famine of 1770, which killed a third of the people of Bengal.[192]

P. J. Marshall shows that recent scholarship has reinterpreted the view that the prosperity of the formerly benign Mughal rule gave way to poverty and anarchy.[193] He argues the British takeover did not make any sharp break with the past, which largely delegated control to regional Mughal rulers and sustained a generally prosperous economy for the rest of the 18th century. Marshall notes the British went into partnership with Indian bankers and raised revenue through local tax administrators and kept the old Mughal rates of taxation.

The East India Company inherited an onerous taxation system that took one-third of the produce of Indian cultivators.[191] Instead of the Indian nationalist account of the British as alien aggressors, seizing power by brute force and impoverishing all of India, Marshall presents the interpretation (supported by many scholars in India and the West) that the British were not in full control but instead were players in what was primarily an Indian play and in which their rise to power depended upon excellent co-operation with Indian elites.[193] Marshall admits that much of his interpretation is still highly controversial among many historians.[194]

Demography

The 1921 census of British India shows 69 million Muslims and 217 million Hindus out of a total population of 316 million.

La población del territorio que se convirtió en el Raj británico era de 100  millones en 1600 y se mantuvo prácticamente constante hasta el siglo XIX. La población del Raj alcanzó los 255  millones según el primer censo realizado en la India en 1881. [ 195 ] [ 196 ] [ 197 ] [ 198 ]

Los estudios sobre la población de la India desde 1881 se han centrado en temas como la población total, las tasas de natalidad y mortalidad, las tasas de crecimiento, la distribución geográfica, la alfabetización, la división entre zonas rurales y urbanas, las ciudades de un  millón de habitantes y las tres ciudades con poblaciones superiores a ocho  millones: Delhi , Gran Bombay y Calcuta . [ 199 ]

Las tasas de mortalidad disminuyeron en el período 1920-1945, principalmente debido a la inmunización biológica. Otros factores incluyeron el aumento de los ingresos y mejores condiciones de vida, una mejor nutrición, un entorno más seguro y limpio, y mejores políticas de salud pública y atención médica. [ 200 ]

El grave hacinamiento en las ciudades causó importantes problemas de salud pública, como se señala en un informe oficial de 1938: [ 201 ]

En las zonas urbanas e industriales, la escasez de espacio, el alto valor del suelo y la necesidad de que el trabajador viva cerca de su lugar de trabajo contribuyen a intensificar la congestión y el hacinamiento. En los centros más concurridos, las casas se construyen muy juntas, con los aleros rozándose, y con frecuencia espalda con espalda. El espacio es tan valioso que, en lugar de calles y avenidas, los callejones sinuosos constituyen el único acceso a las viviendas. El abandono del saneamiento se evidencia a menudo en montones de basura en descomposición y charcos de aguas residuales, mientras que la ausencia de letrinas agrava la contaminación general del aire y del suelo.

Hambrunas, epidemias y salud pública

Durante el Raj británico, la India experimentó un gran número de hambrunas importantes , incluyendo la Gran Hambruna de 1876-1878 , en la que perecieron entre 6,1  millones y 10,39 millones de indios [ 202 ] y la hambruna india de 1899-1900 , en la que perecieron entre 1,25 millones y 10 millones de indios. [ 203 ] 

Niño que murió de hambre durante la hambruna de Bengala de 1943.

La primera pandemia de cólera comenzó en Bengala y luego se extendió por toda la India hacia 1820. Diez  mil soldados británicos e innumerables indios murieron durante esta pandemia . Las muertes estimadas en la India entre 1817 y 1860 superaron los 15 millones. Otros 23 millones murieron entre 1865 y 1917. [ 204 ] La tercera pandemia de peste que comenzó en China a mediados del siglo XIX, finalmente se extendió a todos los continentes habitados y mató a 10 millones de indios solo en la India. [ 205 ] Waldemar Haffkine , quien trabajó principalmente en la India, se convirtió en el primer microbiólogo en desarrollar y distribuir vacunas contra el cólera y la peste bubónica. En 1925, el Laboratorio de la Peste en Bombay pasó a llamarse Instituto Haffkine .  

Las fiebres figuraban entre las principales causas de muerte en la India en el siglo XIX. [ 206 ] El británico Sir Ronald Ross , que trabajaba en el Hospital General de la Presidencia en Calcuta , demostró finalmente en 1898 que los mosquitos transmiten la malaria , durante una misión en el Deccan, en Secunderabad, donde el Centro de Enfermedades Tropicales y Transmisibles ahora lleva su nombre. [ 207 ]

En 1881 había alrededor de 120.000 pacientes de lepra . El gobierno central aprobó la Ley de Leprosos de 1898 , que proporcionaba disposiciones legales para el confinamiento forzoso de personas con lepra en la India. [ 208 ] Bajo la dirección de Mountstuart Elphinstone se lanzó un programa para propagar la vacunación contra la viruela . [ 209 ] La vacunación masiva en la India resultó en una disminución importante de la mortalidad por viruela a finales del siglo XIX. [ 210 ] En 1849, casi el 13% de todas las muertes en Calcuta se debieron a la viruela . [ 211 ] Entre 1868 y 1907, hubo aproximadamente 4,7  millones de muertes por viruela. [ 212 ]

Sir Robert Grant centró su atención en establecer una institución sistemática en Bombay para impartir conocimientos médicos a los nativos. [ 213 ] En 1860, el Grant Medical College se convirtió en uno de los cuatro colegios reconocidos para impartir cursos que conducían a títulos (junto con el Elphinstone College , el Deccan College y el Government Law College de Bombay ). [ 193 ]

Educación

La Universidad de Lucknow , fundada por los británicos en 1867.
La Universidad de Calcuta , fundada en 1857, es una de las tres universidades estatales modernas más antiguas de la India.

Las universidades de Calcuta, Bombay y Madrás se establecieron en 1857, justo antes de la Rebelión. Para 1890, unos 60.000 indios se habían matriculado, principalmente en humanidades o derecho. Alrededor de un tercio ingresó en la administración pública y otro tercio se convirtió en abogado. El resultado fue una burocracia estatal profesional muy bien educada. Para 1887, de los 21.000 nombramientos de nivel medio en la administración pública, el 45% estaban ocupados por hindúes, el 7% por musulmanes, el 19% por euroasiáticos (padre europeo y madre india) y el 29% por europeos. De los 1000 puestos de alto nivel en la administración pública, casi todos estaban ocupados por británicos, generalmente con un título de Oxford o Cambridge . [ 214 ] El gobierno, a menudo trabajando con filántropos locales, abrió 186  universidades y centros de educación superior para 1911; matricularon a 36.000 estudiantes (más del 90% hombres). Para 1939, el número de instituciones se había duplicado y la matrícula alcanzó los 145.000 alumnos. El plan de estudios seguía los estándares clásicos británicos, similares a los establecidos por Oxford y Cambridge, y hacía hincapié en la literatura inglesa y la historia europea. Sin embargo, en la década de 1920, el alumnado se había convertido en un foco de nacionalismo indio. [ 215 ]

Véase también

Notas

  1. Una cuasi federación de presidencias y provincias gobernadas directamente por la Corona británica a través del Virrey y Gobernador General de la India.
  2. Gobernado por gobernantes indios, bajo la soberanía de la Corona británica ejercida a través del Virrey de la India)
  3. Simla era la capital de verano del Gobierno de la India británica , no del Raj británico, es decir, del Imperio británico de la India, que incluía los Estados principescos . [ 3 ]
  4. The proclamation for New Delhi to be the capital was made in 1911, but the city was inaugurated as the capital of the Raj in February 1931.
  5. English was the language of the courts and government.
  6. Urdu was also given official status in large parts of northern India, as were vernaculars elsewhere.[4][5][6][7][8][9]
  7. Outside northern India, the local vernaculars were used as official language in the lower courts and in government offices.[8]
  8. Queen (1858–1876), Queen-Empress (1876–1901), and King-Emperor (1901–1947)
  9. Seated l. to r. are: Jiddhu Krisnamurthi, Besant, and Charles Webster Leadbeater.
  10. The only other emperor during this period, Edward VIII (reigned January to December 1936), did not issue any Indian currency under his name.

References

  1. 12Interpretation Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63), s. 18.
  2. "Calcutta (Kalikata)", The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. IX, Published under the Authority of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908, p. 260, archived from the original on 24 May 2022, retrieved 24 May 2022, —Capital of the Indian Empire, situated in 22° 34' N and 88° 22' E, on the east or left bank of the Hooghly river, within the Twenty-four Parganas District, Bengal
  3. "Simla Town", The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. XXII, Published under the Authority of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908, p. 260, archived from the original on 24 May 2022, retrieved 24 May 2022, —Head-quarters of Simla District, Punjab, and the summer capital of the Government of India, situated on a transverse spur of the Central Himālayan system system, in 31° 6' N and 77° 10' E, at a mean elevation above sea-level of 7,084 feet.
  4. Lelyveld, David (1993). " Colonial Knowledge and the Fate of Hindustani" . Comparative Studies in Society and History . 35 (4): 665– 682. doi : 10.1017/S0010417500018661 . ISSN 0010-4175 . JSTOR 179178. S2CID 144180838. Archivado del original el 8 de abril de 2023. Recuperado el 8 de abril de 2023. Las gramáticas y diccionarios anteriores permitieron al gobierno británico reemplazar el persa con lenguas vernáculas en los niveles inferiores de la administración judicial y de ingresos en 1837, es decir, estandarizar e indexar la terminología para uso oficial y proporcionar su traducción al idioma de la máxima autoridad gobernante, el inglés. Para estos fines, el indostaní se equiparó con el urdu, en contraposición a cualquier dialecto del hindi definido geográficamente, y se le otorgó estatus oficial en gran parte del norte de la India. Escrito en alfabeto persa, con un vocabulario predominantemente persa y, a través del persa, árabe, el urdu se encontraba en la posición más cercana a la situación anterior y era fácilmente accesible para el mismo personal. Tras esta transformación oficial, el gobierno británico comenzó a realizar sus primeros esfuerzos significativos en favor de la educación en lenguas vernáculas.   
  5. Dalby, Andrew (2004) [1998]. «Hindi». Diccionario de lenguas: La referencia definitiva a más de 400 lenguas . A & C Black Publishers. pág. 248. ISBN  978-0-7136-7841-3En el gobierno del norte de la India, el persa era el idioma dominante . Bajo el Raj británico, el persa acabó declinando, pero, dado que la administración seguía siendo mayoritariamente musulmana, el papel del persa no lo asumió el hindi, sino el urdu, conocido por los británicos como indostaní. Fue solo cuando la mayoría hindú de la India empezó a imponerse que el hindi alcanzó su máximo esplendor.
  6. Vejdani, Farzin (2015), Making History in Iran: Education, Nationalism, and Print Culture , Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 24–25 , ISBN  978-0-8047-9153-3Aunque los idiomas oficiales de la administración en la India cambiaron del persa al inglés y al urdu en 1837, el persa se siguió enseñando y leyendo allí hasta principios del siglo XX.
  7. Everaert, Christine (2010), Tracing the Boundaries between Hindi and Urdu , Leiden and Boston: BRILL, pp. 253– 254, ISBN  978-90-04-17731-4No fue hasta 1837 que el persa perdió su posición como idioma oficial de la India en favor del urdu y del inglés en los niveles superiores de la administración.
  8. 12Dhir, Krishna S. (2022). The Wonder That Is Urdu. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. p. 138. ISBN 978-81-208-4301-1. The British used the Urdu language to effect a shift from the prior emphasis on the Persian language. In 1837, the British East India Company adopted Urdu in place of Persian as the co-official language in India, along with English. In the law courts in Bengal and the North-West Provinces and Oudh (modern day Uttar Pradesh) a highly technical form of Urdu was used in the Nastaliq script, by both Muslims and Hindus. The same was the case in the government offices. In the various other regions of India, local vernaculars were used as official language in the lower courts and in government offices. ... In certain parts South Asia, Urdu was written in several scripts. Kaithi was a popular script used for both Urdu and Hindi. By 1880, Kaithi was used as court language in Bihar. However, in 1881, Hindi in Devanagari script replaced Urdu in the Nastaliq script in Bihar. In Panjab, Urdu was written in Nastaliq, Devanagari, Kaithi, and Gurumukhi. In April 1900, the colonial government of the North-West Provinces and Oudh granted equal official status to both, Devanagari and Nastaliq scripts. However, Nastaliq remained the dominant script. During the 1920s, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi deplored the controversy and the evolving divergence between Urdu and Hindi, exhorting the remerging of the two languages as Hindustani. However, Urdu continued to draw from Persian, Arabic, and Chagtai, while Hindi did the same from Sanskrit. Eventually, the controversy resulted in the loss of the official status of the Urdu language.
  9. Bayly, C. A. (1988). Indian Society and the making of the British Empire. New Cambridge History of India series. Cambridge University Press. p. 122. ISBN 0-521-25092-7. The use of Persian was abolished in official correspondence (1835); the government's weight was thrown behind English-medium education and Thomas Babington Macaulay's Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure (drafted 1841–2, but not completed until the 1860s) sought to impose a rational, Western legal system on the amalgam of Muslim, Hindu and English law which had been haphazardly administered in British courts. The fruits of the Bentinck era were significant. But they were only of general importance in so far as they went with the grain of social changes which were already gathering pace in India. The Bombay and Calcutta intelligentsia were taking to English education well before the Education Minute of 1836. Flowery Persian was already giving way in north India to the fluid and demotic Urdu. As for changes in the legal system, they were only implemented after the Rebellion of 1857 when communications improved and more substantial sums of money were made available for education.
  10. W.W.M. Yeatts (1946). Census of India 1941 Vol I. Delhi: Manager of Publications. p. 57.
    • "Raj, the". The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. 2005. ISBN 978-0-19-860981-0. Raj, the: British sovereignty in India before 1947 (also called, the British Raj). The word is from Hindi rāj 'reign'.
    • "RAJ definition and meaning". Collins Online Dictionary. raj: (often cap; in India) rule, esp. the British rule prior to 1947.
    • Hirst, Jacqueline Suthren; Zavros, John (2011), Religious Traditions in Modern South Asia, London and New York: Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-44787-4, archived from the original on 23 September 2023, retrieved 24 May 2022, As the (Mughal) empire began to decline in the mid-eighteenth century, some of these regional administrations assumed a greater degree of power. Amongst these ... was the East India Company, a British trading company established by Royal Charter of Elizabeth I of England in 1600. The Company gradually expanded its influence in South Asia, in the first instance through coastal trading posts at Surat, Madras and Calcutta. (The British) expanded their influence, winning political control of Bengal and Bihar after the Battle of Plassey in 1757. From here, the Company expanded its influence dramatically across the subcontinent. By 1857, it had direct control over much of the region. The great rebellion of that year, however, demonstrated the limitations of this commercial company's ability to administer these vast territories, and in 1858 the Company was effectively nationalized, with the British Crown assuming administrative control. Hence began the period known as the British Raj, which ended in 1947 with the partition of the subcontinent into the independent nation-states of India and Pakistan.
    • Salomone, Rosemary (2022), The Rise of English: Global Politics and the Power of Language, Oxford University Press, p. 236, ISBN 978-0-19-062561-0, archived from the original on 23 September 2023, retrieved 24 May 2022, Between 1858, when the British East India Company transferred power to British Crown rule (the "British Raj"), and 1947, when India gained independence, English gradually developed into the language of government and education. It allowed the Raj to maintain control by creating an elite gentry schooled in British mores, primed to participate in public life, and loyal to the Crown.
    • Vanderven, Elizabeth (2019), "National Education Systems: Asia", in Rury, John L.; Tamura, Eileen H. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Education, Oxford University Press, pp. 213–227, 222, ISBN 978-0-19-934003-3, archived from the original on 23 September 2023, retrieved 24 May 2022, During the British East India Company's domination of the Indian subcontinent (1757–1858) and the subsequent British Raj (1858–1947), it was Western-style education that came to be promoted by many as the base upon which a national and uniform education system should be built.
    • Lapidus, Ira M. (2014), A History of Islamic Societies (3 ed.), Cambridge University Press, p. 393, ISBN 978-0-521-51430-9, retrieved 24 May 2022, Table 14. Muslim India: outline chronologyMughal Empire ... 1526–1858 Akbar I ... 1556–1605 Aurengzeb ... 1658–1707 British victory at Plassey ... 1757 Britain becomes paramount power ... 1818British Raj ... 1858–1947
    • Steinback, Susie L. (2012), Understanding the Victorians: Politics, Culture and Society in Nineteenth-Century Britain, London and New York: Routledge, p. 68, ISBN 978-0-415-77408-6, archived from the original on 23 September 2023, retrieved 24 May 2022, The rebellion was put down by the end of 1858. The British government passed the Government of India Act, and began direct Crown rule. This era was referred to as the British Raj (though in practice much remained the same).
    • Ahmed, Omar (2015), Studying Indian Cinema, Auteur (now an imprint of Liverpool University Press), p. 221, ISBN 978-1-80034-738-0, archived from the original on 23 September 2023, retrieved 24 May 2022, The film opens with what is a lengthy prologue, contextualising the time and place through a detailed voice-over by Amitabh Bachchan. We are told that the year is 1893. This is significant as it was the height of the British Raj, a period of crown rule lasting from 1858 to 1947.
    • Wright, Edmund (2015), A Dictionary of World History, Oxford University Press, p. 537, ISBN 978-0-19-968569-1, More than 500 Indian kingdoms and principalities [...] existed during the 'British Raj' period (1858–1947) The rule is also called Crown rule in India
    • Fair, C. Christine (2014), Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War, Oxford University Press, p. 61, ISBN 978-0-19-989270-9, [...] by 1909 the Government of India, reflecting on 50 years of Crown rule after the rebellion, could boast that [...]
    • Glanville, Luke (2013), Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History, University of Chicago Press, p. 120, ISBN 978-0-226-07708-6, archived from the original on 23 September 2023, retrieved 23 August 2020 Quote: "Mill, who was himself employed by the British East India company from the age of seventeen until the British government assumed direct rule over India in 1858."
    • Pykett, Lyn (2006), Wilkie Collins , Oxford World's Classics: Authors in Context, Oxford University Press, p.  160, ISBN 978-0-19-284034-9En parte , el Motín fue una reacción contra esta convulsión de la sociedad tradicional india. Tras un año de luchas, la represión del Motín fue seguida por la disolución de la Compañía Británica de las Indias Orientales, el exilio del emperador depuesto y el establecimiento del Raj británico, así como el dominio directo del subcontinente indio por parte de los británicos.
    • Lowe, Lisa (2015), Las intimidades de cuatro continentes , Duke University Press, pág.  71, ISBN 978-0-8223-7564-7El dominio de la Compañía en la India duró efectivamente desde la Batalla de Plassey en 1757 hasta 1858, cuando, tras la Rebelión India de 1857, la Corona británica asumió el dominio colonial directo de la India en el nuevo Raj británico.
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  • Moore, Robin J. (2001a), "Imperial India, 1858–1914", in Porter, Andrew N. (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. III, Oxford University Press, pp. 422–446, ISBN 978-0-19-924678-6
  • Moore, Robin J. "India in the 1940s", in Robin Winks, ed. Oxford History of the British Empire: Historiography, (2001b), pp. 231–242.
  • Nehru, Jawaharlal (1946), Discovery of India, Delhi: Oxford University Press
  • Porter, Andrew, ed. (2001), Oxford History of the British Empire: Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press. pp. 800, ISBN 978-0-19-924678-6
  • Raghavan, Srinath. India's War: World War II and the Making of Modern South Asia (2016). wide-ranging scholarly survey excerptArchived 23 September 2023 at the Wayback Machine
  • Rai, Lajpat (2008), England's Debt to India: A Historical Narrative of Britain's Fiscal Policy in India, BiblioBazaar, LLC, pp. 263–281, ISBN 978-0-559-80001-6
  • Raja, Masood Ashraf (2010), Constructing Pakistan: Foundational Texts and the Rise of Muslim National Identity, 1857–1947, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-547811-2
  • Ramusack, Barbara (2004), The Indian Princes and their States (The New Cambridge History of India), Cambridge University Press. pp. 324, ISBN 978-0-521-03989-5
  • Read, Anthony, and David Fisher; The Proudest Day: India's Long Road to Independence (W. W. Norton, 1999) Archive.org, borrowable
  • Riddick, John F. The History of British India: A Chronology (2006) excerptArchived 23 September 2023 at the Wayback Machine
  • Riddick, John F. Who Was Who in British India (1998); 5000 entries excerpt.
  • Satya, Laxman D. (2008). "British Imperial Railways in Nineteenth Century South Asia". Economic and Political Weekly. 43 (47): 69–77. ISSN 0012-9976. JSTOR 40278213.
  • Shaikh, Farzana (1989), Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860–1947, Cambridge University Press. pp. 272., ISBN 978-0-521-36328-0.
  • Talbot, Ian; Singh, Gurharpal, eds. (1999), Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent, Oxford University Press. pp. 420, ISBN 978-0-19-579051-1.
  • Thatcher, Mary. Respected Memsahibs: an Anthology (Hardinge Simpole, 2008).
  • Tinker, Hugh (October 1968), "India in the First World War and after", Journal of Contemporary History, 3 (4, 1918–19: From War to Peace): 89–107, doi:10.1177/002200946800300407, JSTOR 259853, S2CID 150456443.
  • Voigt, Johannes. India in The Second World War (1988).
  • Wolpert, Stanley A. (2007), "India: British Imperial Power 1858–1947 (Indian nationalism and the British response, 1885–1920; Prelude to Independence, 1920–1947)", Encyclopædia Britannica, archived from the original on 7 June 2008, retrieved 2 June 2022.
  • Wolpert, Stanley A. Jinnah of Pakistan (2005).
  • Wolpert, Stanley A. Tilak and Gokhale: revolution and reform in the making of modern India (1962) full text online.

Economic and social history

  • Anstey, Vera. The economic development of India (4th ed. 1952), 677 pp. thorough scholarly coverage; focus on 20th century down to 1939.
  • Ballhatchet, Kenneth. Race, Sex, and Class under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes and Policies and Their Critics, 1793–1905 (1980).
  • Chaudhary, Latika, et al. eds. A New Economic History of Colonial India (2015).
  • Derbyshire, I. D. (1987), "Economic Change and the Railways in North India, 1860–1914", Population Studies, 21 (3): 521–545, doi:10.1017/s0026749x00009197, JSTOR 312641, S2CID 146480332
  • Chaudhuri, Nupur. "Imperialism and Gender" in Encyclopedia of European Social History, edited by Peter N. Stearns, (vol. 1, 2001), pp. 515–521. online emphasis on Raj.
  • Dutt, Romesh C. The Economic History of India under early British Rule (1901); The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age (1906) online
  • Gupta, Charu, ed. Gendering Colonial India: Reforms, Print, Caste and Communalism (2012)
  • Hyam, Ronald. Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience (1990).
  • Kumar, Dharma; Desai, Meghnad (1983), The Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-22802-2, archived from the original on 23 September 2023, retrieved 15 September 2018
  • Lockwood, David. The Indian Bourgeoisie: A Political History of the Indian Capitalist Class in the Early Twentieth Century (I.B. Tauris, 2012) 315 pages; focus on Indian entrepreneurs who benefited from the Raj, but ultimately sided with the Indian National Congress.
  • O'Dell, Benjamin D. (2014). "Beyond Bengal: Gender, Education, and the Writing of Colonial Indian History". Victorian Literature and Culture. 42 (3): 535–551. doi:10.1017/S1060150314000138. S2CID 96476257.
  • Roy, Tirthankar (Summer 2002), "Economic History and Modern India: Redefining the Link", The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (3): 109–130, doi:10.1257/089533002760278749, JSTOR 3216953
  • Sarkar, J. (2013, reprint). Economics of British India ... 3rd ed. Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar & Sons.
  • Simmons, Colin (1985), "'De-Industrialization', Industrialization and the Indian Economy, c. 1850–1947", Modern Asian Studies, 19 (3): 593–622, doi:10.1017/s0026749x00007745, JSTOR 312453, S2CID 144581168
  • Sinha, Mrinalini. Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century (1995).
  • Strobel, Margaret. European Women and the Second British Empire (1991).
  • Tirthankar, Roy (2014), "Financing the Raj: the City of London and colonial India 1858–1940", Business History, 56 (6): 1024–1026, doi:10.1080/00076791.2013.828424, S2CID 153716644
  • Tomlinson, Brian Roger (1993), The Economy of Modern India, 1860–1970, New Cambridge History of India, vol. III.3, Cambridge University Press, p. 109, ISBN 978-0-521-36230-6
  • Tomlinson, Brian Roger (October 1975), "India and the British Empire, 1880–1935", Indian Economic and Social History Review, 12 (4): 337–380, doi:10.1177/001946467501200401, S2CID 144217855

Historiography and memory

  • Andrews, C.F. (2017). India and the Simon Report. Routledge reprint of 1930 first edition. p. 11. ISBN 978-1-315-44498-7.
  • Durant, Will (2011, reprint). The case for India. New York: Simon and Schuster.
  • Ellis, Catriona (2009). "Education for All: Reassessing the Historiography of Education in Colonial India". History Compass. 7 (2): 363–375. doi:10.1111/j.1478-0542.2008.00564.x.
  • Gilmartin, David (2015). "The Historiography of India's Partition: Between Civilization and Modernity". The Journal of Asian Studies. 74 (1): 23–41. doi:10.1017/s0021911814001685. S2CID 67841003.
  • Major, Andrea (2011). "Tall tales and true: India, historiography and British imperial imaginings". Contemporary South Asia. 19 (3): 331–332. doi:10.1080/09584935.2011.594257. S2CID 145802033.
  • Mantena, Rama Sundari. The Origins of Modern Historiography in India: Antiquarianism and Philology (2012).
  • Moor-Gilbert, Bart. Writing India, 1757–1990: The Literature of British India (1996) on fiction written in English.
  • Mukherjee, Soumyen. "Origins of Indian Nationalism: Some Questions on the Historiography of Modern India". Sydney Studies in Society and Culture 13 (2014). online.
  • Nawaz, Rafida, and Syed Hussain Murtaza. "Impact of Imperial Discourses on Changing Subjectivities in Core and Periphery: A Study of British India and British Nigeria". Perennial Journal of History 2.2 (2021): 114–130. online.
  • Nayak, Bhabani Shankar. "Colonial world of postcolonial historians: reification, theoreticism, and the neoliberal reinvention of tribal identity in India". Journal of Asian and African Studies 56.3 (2021): 511–532. online.
  • Parkash, Jai. "Major trends of historiography of revolutionary movement in India – Phase II". (PhD dissertation, Maharshi Dayanand University, 2013). online.
  • Philips, Cyril H. ed. Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon (1961), reviews the older scholarship.
  • Stern, Philip J (2009). "History and Historiography of the English East India Company: Past, Present, and Future". History Compass. 7 (4): 1146–1180. doi:10.1111/j.1478-0542.2009.00617.x.
  • Stern, Philip J. "Early Eighteenth-Century British India: Antimeridian or antemeridiem?". Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 21.2 (2020), pp. 1–26, focus on C.A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian online.
  • Whitehead, Clive (2005). "The historiography of British imperial education policy, Part I: India". History of Education. 34 (3): 315–329. doi:10.1080/00467600500065340. S2CID 144515505.
  • Winks, Robin, ed. Historiography (1999), vol. 5 in William Roger Louis, eds. The Oxford History of the British Empire.
  • Winks, Robin W. The Historiography of the British Empire-Commonwealth: Trends, Interpretations and Resources (1966).
  • Young, Richard Fox, ed. (2009). Indian Christian Historiography from Below, from Above, and in Between India and the Indianness of Christianity: Essays on Understanding – Historical, Theological, and Bibliographical – in Honor of Robert Eric Frykenberg.

Miscellaneous

  • Steinberg, S. H. (1947). The Statesman's Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1947. Springer. ISSN 0081-4601.

Further reading

Wikimedia Commons logo Media related to British Raj at Wikimedia Commons Quotations related to British Raj at WikiquoteWikivoyage logoBritish Raj travel guide from WikivoyageWiktionary logo The dictionary definition of british raj at Wiktionary

  • Judd, Denis. The lion and the tiger: the rise and fall of the British Raj, 1600–1947 (Oxford University Press, 2005). online
  • Malone, David M., C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan, eds. The Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy (2015) ch. 4 and 5 on Raj.
  • Simon Report (1930) vol 1, wide-ranging survey of conditions.
  • Editors, Charles Rivers (2016). The British Raj: The History and Legacy of Great Britain's Imperialism in India and the Indian subcontinent.
  • Keith, Arthur Berriedale (1912). Responsible government in the dominions. The Clarendon Press., major primary source.

Year books and statistical records

  • Indian Year-book for 1862: A review of social, intellectual, and religious progress in India and Ceylon (1863), ed. by John Murdoch online edition 1861 edition.
  • Anuario del Instituto Imperial del Reino Unido, las colonias e India: registro estadístico de los recursos y el comercio de las posesiones coloniales e indias del Imperio Británico (2.ª ed.). 1893. págs. 375–462 . 
  • El Imperial Gazetteer of India (26 vols., 1908–31), descripción muy detallada de toda la India en 1901. Edición en línea.
  • Resumen estadístico relativo a la India británica, desde 1895 a 1896 hasta 1904-05 (Londres, 1906). Texto completo disponible en línea.
  • La Enciclopedia de la India: historia empresarial biográfica, histórica, administrativa y comercial (1908), biografías e ilustraciones.
  • Anuario Indio: 1914 (1914)
  • El Registro Anual de la India: Un compendio de asuntos públicos de la India sobre las actividades de la nación en materia política, económica, industrial, educativa, etc., durante el período 1919-1947 (disponible en línea).
    • Edición de 1930
    • Edición de 1921
    • Ediciones de 1919 a 1947