Relaciones exteriores de Taiwán

Después de que Burkina Faso rompiera relaciones con Taiwán en 2018, Eswatini siguió siendo el único aliado de Taiwán en África. ^{[ 136 ]} Taiwán tiene una embajada en Mbabane, Eswatini. El 7 de junio de 2016, la Agencia Nacional de Policía y el Servicio de Policía Real de Eswatini firmaron un pacto conjunto transfronterizo para la lucha contra el crimen, que incluía intercambios, investigaciones, visitas de personal, mejora de habilidades profesionales, aplicación de la ley y asistencia técnica. ^{[ 137 ]} El rey Mswati III ha visitado Taiwán diecisiete veces hasta junio de 2018 y ha prometido seguir reconociendo a Taiwán en lugar de a la República Popular China . ^{[ 138 ]} A junio de 2018, el embajador de Taiwán es Thomas Chen (陳經銓). ^{[ 139 ]}

Gambia reconoció a la República de China (ROC) desde 1968 hasta 1974, y nuevamente desde 1995 hasta el 14 de noviembre de 2013, cuando la oficina del presidente Yahya Jammeh anunció la ruptura inmediata de relaciones diplomáticas. ^{[ 140 ]} Durante este período, Taiwán otorgó cientos de millones de dólares en ayuda y préstamos a Gambia, gran parte de los cuales fueron desviados por el presidente Yahya Jammeh y sus allegados. ^{[ 141 ]} La República Popular China (RPC) reconoció a Gambia el 17 de marzo de 2016. ^{[ 142 ]} Tras el reconocimiento de Gambia, la RPC comenzó de inmediato a proporcionarle ayuda. El repetido cambio entre el reconocimiento de la RPC y la ROC se considera un ejemplo de diplomacia del talonario . ^{[ 141 ]}

Desde su independencia en 1971, Bangladesh ha mantenido intercambios bilaterales limitados con la República de China (ROC). A pesar de la recesión económica mundial, Bangladesh es el segundo socio comercial más importante de la ROC en el sur de Asia. Principalmente, Bangladesh exporta prendas de vestir, tejidos de punto, yute, cuero y artesanías a la ROC, e importa una variedad de textiles, maquinaria, productos electrónicos, acero y plástico.

El Acuerdo del Doble Décimo ^firmado el 10 de octubre de 1945 es el único documento legal entre las dos partes. La siguiente Conferencia Consultiva Política (República de China) [ ^{155 ]} estuvo marcada por la historia de la Guerra Fría y la política exterior estadounidense de contención en Asia Oriental después de la Guerra de Corea . ^{[ 156 ]} Antes de que estallara la Guerra de Corea, Estados Unidos se preparaba para un golpe de Estado a mediados de 1950 para reemplazar a Chiang Kai-shek con Hu Shih y Sun Li-jen y neutralizar el estatus legal de la República de China bajo el Fideicomiso de la ONU para bloquear cualquier reclamo legal de la República Popular China sobre Taiwán, como propuso el funcionario del Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos, Dean Rusk . ^{[ 157 ] [ 158 ] [ 159 ]} La Resolución de Formosa de 1955 ^{[ 160 ]} fue aprobada por unanimidad por el Congreso de Estados Unidos . Resolver la relación a través del estrecho requirió que ambas partes repensaran las definiciones de conceptos básicos como soberanía, "una sola China" y unificación. ^{[ 161 ]}

Las dos entidades políticas de adhesión ^{[ 162 ]} dieron como resultado la Campaña de la RPC para Reprimir a los Contrarrevolucionarios , el levantamiento de su ley marcial ^{[ 163 ]} en territorio de la RPC y, más recientemente, la promulgación de la Ley Antisecesión de la RPC hacia la ROC. Las dos partes no tienen medidas militares de fomento de la confianza (CBM) entre ambos lados del estrecho "para mejorar las relaciones militares de manera que se reduzcan los temores de ataque y el potencial de errores de cálculo militar". ^{[ 164 ] [ 165 ]} Las tensiones nucleares han aumentado desde que la RPC promulgó la Ley Antisecesión. ^{[ 166 ] [ 167 ] [ 168 ] [ 169 ]}

La postura del gobierno de que tanto Taiwán como China continental forman parte del mismo Estado no es universalmente aceptada entre la población de Taiwán. En particular, la Coalición Pan-Verde, partidaria de la independencia , considera a Taiwán y China como países distintos. Por el contrario, la Coalición Pan-Azul, partidaria de la unificación, sostiene que tanto Taiwán como China continental forman parte de la República de China (ROC). El expresidente Lee Tung-hui describió estas relaciones como « relaciones especiales entre Estados ». ^{[ 170 ]} Las administraciones de Chen describieron a Taiwán y China diciendo: « ...con Taiwán y China a cada lado del estrecho de Taiwán, cada lado es un país ». El expresidente Ma Ying-jeou retomó la postura del gobierno de principios de la década de 1990, calificando las relaciones con Pekín como relaciones especiales entre dos áreas dentro de un mismo Estado . Según Taiwán, ese Estado es la República de China (ROC), y por razones constitucionales, ni Taipéi ni Pekín se reconocen mutuamente como gobiernos legítimos. ^{[ 171 ] [ 172 ] [ 173 ]}

El término preferido por los gobiernos taiwanés y chino es « relaciones entre ambos lados del estrecho », en referencia al estrecho de Taiwán , que sirve de separador geográfico . La posición constitucional de Taipéi establece que el territorio de la República de China se divide en la «Zona Continental» y la « Zona Libre » (también conocida como «Zona de Taiwán»). Administrativamente, las relaciones entre ambos lados del estrecho no son gestionadas por el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Taiwán, sino por el Consejo de Asuntos Continentales , un instrumento del Yuan Ejecutivo . Las relaciones con Hong Kong y Macao también son gestionadas por el Consejo de Asuntos Continentales, si bien no todas las regulaciones aplicables a China continental se aplican automáticamente a dichos territorios.

Los gobiernos de Taiwán y China no interactúan directamente. Las conversaciones son llevadas a cabo por la Asociación China para las Relaciones a Través del Estrecho de Taiwán (ARATS) y la Fundación de Intercambio del Estrecho de Taiwán (SEF), organismos privados controlados y directamente responsables ante los poderes ejecutivos de sus respectivos gobiernos.

Hasta finales de la década de 1990, Hong Kong y Macao fueron colonias británica y portuguesa , respectivamente. Servían como puntos de tránsito neutrales para personas y mercancías que cruzaban el estrecho. Junto con Singapur, funcionaron como sedes para las conversaciones entre ambas partes en aquel entonces. Un resultado de estas conversaciones, fruto de un modus vivendi , fue el Consenso de 1992 , surgido de una reunión celebrada en Hong Kong ese mismo año. En virtud de este consenso, ambas partes coinciden en que tanto Taiwán como la China continental están bajo la misma soberanía de China, pero discrepan sobre cuál de ellas es la legítima representante de dicha soberanía. Dejando de lado esta discrepancia, ambas partes acordaron cooperar en asuntos prácticos, como el reconocimiento de las certificaciones autenticadas por la otra parte. ^{[ 174 ]}

Las relaciones entre Taipéi y Pekín mejoraron durante el gobierno de Ma con la promoción de los vínculos a través del estrecho y el aumento de los intercambios económicos y sociales entre ambas partes, pero las elecciones locales de 2014 las enfriaron nuevamente. ^{[ 175 ]} El 11 de febrero de 2014 se celebró una reunión de alto nivel en Nanjing que marcó la primera vez que China reconoció a los altos funcionarios del gobierno de Taiwán en asuntos relacionados con el estrecho de Taiwán. ^{[ 176 ]} El deshielo de las tensiones no fue bien recibido por la Coalición Pan-Verde para el movimiento independentista de Taiwán después de las elecciones presidenciales de 2000 y por la base ex injuria jus non oritur ^{[ 177 ]} de la Ley Antisecesión. El 7 de noviembre de 2015 se celebró una reunión entre los presidentes Xi y Ma para reafirmar el Consenso de 1992 antes de las elecciones generales de la República de China de 2016 y en medio de las pruebas de la Armada de los Estados Unidos sobre reclamaciones marítimas de área. ^{[ 178 ]} Tras las elecciones, Pekín cortó el contacto con el principal organismo de enlace con Taiwán debido a la negativa de la presidenta Tsai Ing-wen a respaldar el concepto de una sola nación china. ^{[ 179 ]}

Las reuniones de liderazgo entre la ROC e India se llevaron a cabo a principios de la década de 1940 antes de la independencia de la India de Gran Bretaña. ^{[ 180 ]} La ROC está incluida en la política de la India de Mirar hacia el Este . Las relaciones bilaterales entre la India y la ROC mejoraron a partir de la década de 1990, a pesar de la ausencia de relaciones diplomáticas oficiales. ^{[ 181 ] [ 182 ]} La India reconoce solo a la RPC. Sin embargo, los vínculos económicos y comerciales, así como los contactos entre personas, se han expandido. ^{[ 181 ]} Al igual que la RPC , la ROC disputa la frontera china con la India por Arunachal Pradesh . La Constitución de la ROC declara esta área como parte del sur del Tíbet y disputa la validez de la Línea McMahon .

El 1 de junio de 1920 se firmó un acuerdo de amistad entre la República de China e Irán . El 6 de febrero de 1922 se intercambiaron las ratificaciones, que entraron en vigor ese mismo día. ^{[ 183 ]} Estas relaciones terminaron en 1971 cuando Irán reconoció a Pekín. Ambos países mantienen una relación comercial no oficial y Taiwán importa una cantidad significativa de petróleo de Irán. Un periódico iraní publicó en su portada en diciembre de 2022 que Taiwán tiene un "derecho legal" a la independencia. ^{[ 184 ]}

Debido a la política de Una Sola China, Israel y Taiwán no tienen relaciones diplomáticas formales, pero cada uno tiene una oficina de representación en el otro país y, en la práctica, ambos países mantienen relaciones amistosas. ^{[ 185 ]} Existe un contacto considerable en los ámbitos de la ciencia y la tecnología, incluida la tecnología militar. ^{[ 186 ]}

A medida que las relaciones entre Israel y la República Popular China se han deteriorado debido a la guerra de Gaza , los lazos entre Israel y Taiwán continúan fortaleciéndose, impulsados ​​por la afirmación de que ambos son democracias aisladas. ^{[ 187 ]} Los miembros del Yuan Legislativo establecieron la Asociación Congresional Taiwán-Israel el 23 de febrero de 2024 para promover los intercambios entre personas; la cooperación en agricultura, tecnología y educación; y las visitas bilaterales. ^{[ 188 ]}

Las relaciones entre Japón y Taiwán se rigen por el Comunicado Conjunto Japón-China de 1972. Desde entonces, Japón ha mantenido relaciones no gubernamentales y de carácter técnico con Taiwán.

Malasia opera una oficina de centro comercial en Taipéi, ^{[ 189 ]} y la República de China tiene una oficina económica y cultural en Kuala Lumpur. ^{[ 190 ]}

Hasta 1945, la China nacionalista reclamó la soberanía sobre Mongolia, pero bajo la presión soviética y como parte del Tratado de Amistad y Alianza Sino-Soviético de agosto de 1945, reconoció la independencia de Mongolia. En 1953, debido al deterioro de las relaciones diplomáticas con la Unión Soviética, revocó este reconocimiento y volvió a considerarla parte de China. ^{[ 191 ] [ 192 ]}

El 3 de octubre de 2002, el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores reconoció a Mongolia como país independiente, ^{[ 193 ]} aunque no se tomaron medidas legislativas para abordar las preocupaciones sobre sus reclamos constitucionales sobre Mongolia. ^{[ 194 ]} Se abrió una Oficina de Representación Económica y Cultural de Taipéi en Ulán Bator, y Taipéi excluyó a Mongolia de la definición de " área continental " para fines administrativos. En 2006, se derogaron las antiguas leyes que regulaban la formación de estandartes y monasterios en Mongolia Exterior. Las oficinas establecidas para apoyar los reclamos de Taipéi sobre Mongolia Exterior, como la Comisión de Asuntos Mongoles y Tibetanos , ^{[ 195 ]} están inactivas. ^{[ 196 ] [ 197 ]} Sin embargo, las fronteras oficiales de la República de China no se han modificado. ^{[ 198 ]} El estatus oficial de reconocimiento es actualmente ambiguo, aunque en la práctica Mongolia es tratada como una potencia extranjera ordinaria.

Filipinas reconoce la política de Una Sola China, pero mantiene relaciones con la República de China (ROC) a través de la Oficina Económica y Cultural de Manila en Taipéi y la Oficina Económica y Cultural de Taipéi en Manila . Ambas oficinas se establecieron en 1975 y se organizaron como corporaciones sin fines de lucro. Filipinas es el país central de la Política de Expansión hacia el Sur 2016-2020 de la ROC, en la que la ROC planea impulsar mayores lazos. Esta iniciativa fue inicialmente bien recibida por la Administración Aquino ; sin embargo, la elección de la Administración Duterte en mayo de 2016 complicó la situación, ya que el presidente Duterte era considerado "pro-China" y, por lo tanto, preferiría mejores relaciones con China continental que con Taiwán. Analistas políticos durante un foro en Manila afirmaron que los lazos entre Filipinas y la ROC habrían conformado la mejor coalición en el Lejano Oriente si no existieran las disputas territoriales en el Mar de China Meridional entre ambas naciones. Filipinas apoya la membresía de la ROC en la UNESCO .

Singapur mantuvo relaciones no oficiales con la ROC y la PRC hasta 1992. En la Segunda Reunión Ministerial de la APEC, presidida por Singapur en 1990, se decidió la inclusión de la ROC a partir de la Tercera Reunión Ministerial en Seúl. ^{[ 205 ]} Tras el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas entre Singapur y la PRC el 3 de octubre de 1992, Singapur mantuvo estrechos lazos económicos y militares con Taiwán como parte de su intento de posicionarse como parte neutral. Surgió una disputa diplomática entre China y Singapur cuando Lee Hsien Loong visitó Taiwán un mes antes de jurar como Primer Ministro de Singapur . ^{[ 206 ]} El Ministerio de Defensa de Singapur procedió a corregir un informe erróneo del Liberty Times sobre un ejercicio militar conjunto entre Singapur y Taiwán en marzo de 2005. ^{[ 207 ]} Singapur es el único país extranjero que mantiene campos de entrenamiento militar en Taiwán y continúa enviando regularmente personal de infantería, artillería y blindados para entrenamiento. La República Popular China se ha ofrecido a apoyar la reubicación de algunas o todas estas instalaciones a Hainan . ^{[ 208 ] [ 209 ]} Sobre el tema de la participación de Taiwán en las Naciones Unidas, George Yeo y Mark Chen , los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de ambos países en ese momento, participaron en un acalorado intercambio de opiniones en 2004 entre ^{[ 210 ]} La insistencia de Beijing en que un TLC solo puede concluirse entre estados soberanos complica las cosas para Taiwán. En consecuencia, Singapur y Taiwán firmaron el "Acuerdo entre Singapur y el Territorio Aduanero Separado de Taiwán, Penghu, Kinmen y Matsu sobre Asociación Económica (ASTEP)" en noviembre de 2013. ^{[ 211 ] [ 212 ]}

La República de China reconoció el establecimiento de la Primera República de Corea en 1948.

El 4 de enero de 1949, la República de China (ROC) estableció una embajada en Myeongdong , Seúl . El 23 de agosto de 1992, la República de Corea (ROK) rompió relaciones diplomáticas con la ROC y posteriormente estableció relaciones diplomáticas con la República Popular China (RPC) como parte de su Nordpolitik , siendo el último país asiático en cambiar de rumbo. En 1991, durante los últimos meses de la Guerra Fría, Pekín y Seúl habían establecido enlaces entre la ROC y la RPC, respectivamente, que posteriormente se convirtieron en embajadas. ^{[ 213 ]}

Las relaciones entre Taiwán y Vietnam se desarrollan a nivel no oficial, ya que Hanói se adhiere a la política de una sola China y reconoce oficialmente solo a la República Popular China. Sin embargo, esto no ha impedido las visitas bilaterales ni los importantes flujos de migrantes y capital de inversión entre la República de China y Vietnam. ^{[ 215 ]} La República de China es un importante socio de inversión extranjera directa para Vietnam. ^{[ 216 ]}

Aparte de la propia República Popular China, Vietnam es el único país comunista que mantiene una relación no oficial con la República de China.

En 2020, la Cámara de Representantes de Bélgica aprobó una resolución de apoyo a Taiwán. En 2021, el Parlamento flamenco hizo lo mismo, aprobando una resolución de apoyo a Taiwán con 117 votos a favor, ninguno en contra y cuatro abstenciones. ^{[ 217 ]} Las empresas flamencas de energía eólica Jan De Nul y DEME participan en el desarrollo de parques eólicos marinos en Taiwán. ^{[ 218 ]}

Las relaciones entre la República Checa y Taiwán son significativas. Jaroslav Kubera , presidente del Senado de la República Checa , planeó una visita a Taipéi antes de su muerte, lo que provocó amenazas de represalias por parte del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de China . ^{[ 219 ]} Sin embargo, el sucesor de Kubera, Miloš Vystrčil , encabezó una delegación a Taiwán que llegó a Taipéi el 31 de agosto de 2020. ^{[ 220 ]}

El 9 de enero de 1950, Dinamarca se convirtió en uno de los primeros países europeos en reconocer a la República Popular China. ^{[ 221 ]} Si bien Dinamarca ha mantenido relaciones no oficiales con la República de China desde entonces, estas se han relacionado principalmente con el comercio, la cultura, la ciencia y los asuntos económicos. ^{[ 222 ]}

Estonia y Taiwán mantienen relaciones informales, con intercambios culturales y económicos a pesar de carecer de lazos diplomáticos formales. Taiwán está representado en Estonia a través de la Misión de Taipéi en Letonia . En los últimos años, Estonia ha mostrado un apoyo creciente a Taiwán, especialmente mediante delegaciones diplomáticas recíprocas y una actitud abierta hacia una posible oficina de representación taiwanesa en Tallin . ^{[ 223 ] [ 224 ]} Ambas naciones han cooperado en áreas como el comercio y la gestión de crisis, con contribuciones notables como las donaciones de Taiwán a Estonia durante la pandemia de COVID-19 y la crisis de refugiados ucranianos . ^{[ 225 ]}

En enero de 2021, el gobierno alemán solicitó al gobierno taiwanés que ayudara a persuadir a las empresas taiwanesas de semiconductores para que aumentaran la producción, ya que la escasez mundial de semiconductores estaba obstaculizando la recuperación de la economía alemana tras la pandemia de COVID-19. La falta de semiconductores había provocado la paralización de las líneas de producción de vehículos, lo que llevó al ministro de Economía alemán, Peter Altmaier, a contactar personalmente con la ministra de Asuntos Económicos de Taiwán, Wang Mei-hua, en un intento por lograr que las empresas taiwanesas de semiconductores incrementaran su capacidad de fabricación. ^{[ 237 ]}

Las relaciones diplomáticas entre la Santa Sede (Ciudad del Vaticano) y la República de China se establecieron el 23 de octubre de 1942 ^{[ 239 ]} y, con la presentación por parte del arzobispo Antonio Riberi de su carta credencial al presidente en 1946, la Delegación Apostólica de la Santa Sede en China obtuvo estatus diplomático. ^{[ 240 ] [ 241 ]}

La Santa Sede intentó reconocer a la República Popular China (RPC) tras el fin de la guerra civil, pero su petición fue rechazada y, por lo tanto, terminó reconociendo al Kuomintang (KMT) en Taiwán. Desde entonces, la Santa Sede y la República de China se reconocen mutuamente. ^{[ 242 ]} La Santa Sede mantiene negociaciones con la RPC para su reconocimiento; sin embargo, ha asegurado a la República de China que dichas negociaciones no perjudicarán sus relaciones con ella. ^{[ 243 ]}

Hasta 1970, Taiwán, como República de China, estaba representada por una embajada en Roma y un consulado general en Milán . ^{[ 244 ]} Esto era independiente de la Embajada de la República de China ante la Santa Sede , que, si bien se encuentra en territorio italiano, sigue acreditada ante la Ciudad del Vaticano . ^{[ 245 ]} Esto provocó confusión en 1989 tras las protestas de la Plaza de Tiananmen en Pekín, cuando los italianos protestaron frente a la embajada, creyendo que se trataba de la de la República Popular China. ^{[ 246 ]}

En 2014, Taiwán decidió no participar en la Expo 2015 de Milán después de que el Gobierno de Italia propusiera que estuviera representado como una entidad corporativa en lugar de como un país. ^{[ 247 ]}

En 2020, Taiwán donó equipos y suministros a Italia como parte de su diplomacia médica en respuesta a la pandemia de COVID-19. Entre los equipos donados se incluyeron 15 respiradores entregados a hospitales de la OMS en la región de Lombardía, una de las más afectadas, en abril de 2020. ^{[ 248 ]}

Today bilateral relations between Latvia and Taiwan are positive, with established economic ties, a visa-free travel regime in place between the two nations and the support of some Latvian parliamentarians towards the participation of the ROC in organizations such as the World Health Organization.^[249]

In November 2021, Taiwan opened its representative office in Vilnius under the name of "Taiwanese" (the first under this name in the world), with the Lithuanian office in Taipei to open in Spring 2022.^[250][251] Subsequently, the People's Republic of China has imposed numerous unofficial economic sanctions on Lithuania, recalled its ambassador in Vilnius, Shen Zhifei, and demanded Lithuania recall its ambassador in Beijing, Diana Mickevičienė.^[252][253]

Netherlands–Taiwan relations go back to the 1600s when the Dutch East India Company set up a colony on Taiwan. In the modern era they are defined by the high degree of foreign direct investment which flows between the two countries and long lasting economic partnerships between Dutch and Taiwanese firms.^[256]

In 2019 the Netherlands' House of Representatives passed a motion supporting Taiwan's participation in international organizations.^[257]

In the Chinese Civil War, the Soviet Union had a tumultuous yet strategic relationship with the Kuomintang-led Nationalist China until 1949. In the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958,^[260] Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev recommended the internationalization of the Taiwan Question and appealed to the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to intervene. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union called for the Ten Nations Summit in New Delhi to discuss the issue on 27 September 1958 as one of the precursors of the later Sino-Soviet split.^[261] Since the formation of the Russian Federation, Taiwan has exported many ferric materials to Russia in 2004–2005. In 2005, the total amount of the trade between the two economies was $2,188,944,473. Russia has a representative office in Taipei,^[262] and ROC has a representative office in Moscow.^[263] Russia keeps a positive balance in its trade relations with Taiwan mainly from crude oil, cast iron and steel, nonferrous metals, petrochemical products, ferroalloys, coking coal, timber, and chemical fertilizers. Russia imports mostly electronics and electronic parts, computers and computer parts, and home appliances. The two countries established unofficial diplomatic relations between 1993 and 1996. Taipei is targeting Russia for exporting opportunities and marketing potential.^[264]

In 2021, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Slovakia passed a resolution to support the attendance of Taiwan to the World Health Assembly.^[266]

The United Kingdom's relations with Taiwan^[269] are conducted unofficially through the British Office Taipei^[270] and the British Council in Taipei.

After the Chinese Civil War and the retreat of the KMT government to Taiwan, the United Kingdom broke off diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and recognised the People's Republic of China from 6 January 1950.^[271] In September 1962, Taiwan opened a representative office in London under the name of the Free Chinese Centre, which was later renamed the Taipei Representative Office in the U.K. from April 1992.^[272] The United Kingdom opened a representative office in Taipei in 1993 under the name of the British Trade and Cultural Office, which was later renamed the British Office Taipei in 2015.^[273]

In September 2020, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office ministers stated that the UK hopes Taiwan is allowed to attend the World Health Assembly as an observer.^[272]

Dominica established ties with Taiwan on 10 May 1983.^[274] In September 2001, Taiwanese Premier Chang Chun-hsiung visited Dominica to meet with Prime Minister Pierre Charles.^[275] On 23 March 2004, shortly after Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit took office, Dominica severed ties with Taiwan in exchange for ties with the People's Republic of China.^[276][277]

On 1 May 2018, the Dominican Republic switched. The government initially gave no reason, although it later said in the switchover ceremony that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China and that the switchover was to comply to the one-China policy. It was motivated by loans and investments worth US$3.1 billion. "History and socioeconomic reality" were cited as reasons for the switchover. Flavio Darío Espinal, a government executive, said that "In the following months and years, enormous opportunities for cooperation will gradually open up, not only in the commercial area, but also in the financial, technological, tourist, educational or energy fields. To take just one example, more than 135 million Chinese tourists visit international destinations annually. The establishment of these diplomatic relations will allow part of that tourism to flow into our country in the near future. And that is just one of the things that will improve."^[278][279]

On 20 August 2018, El Salvador broke ties with Taiwan and established them with the PRC. El Salvador now only recognizes the PRC. Just like Panama and the Dominican Republic, the event was broadcast nationwide on radio and television. Hours before the announcement, Taiwan (ROC) announced that it had broken ties with El Salvador, citing the imminent establishment of diplomatic and commercial ties with the PRC (China). El Salvador's president said that his government had decided to make the switchover due to UN Resolution 2758.^[280] The Taiwanese government said that the switchover was not influenced by the Chinese government, but rather, the switchover was done in response to Taiwan refusing to fund the construction of Puerto La Unión and El Salvador's 2019 Salvadoran presidential election.^[281]

On 18 March 2014, Guatemala's former president Alfonso Portillo pled guilty in the Federal District Court in Manhattan to a charge that he accepted bribes in exchange for recognising the ROC. President Pérez Molina said that Guatemala's relations with the ROC were and are strong and that the Portillo confession would not affect diplomatic relations between the two nations.^[282] Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined comment.^[283]

Haiti currently recognises the Republic of China over the People's Republic of China. In 2018, Taiwan offered a US$150 Million loan for Haiti's power grid in a bid to maintain diplomatic ties with the country once its neighbour, Dominican Republic severed ties with Taiwan along with Burkina Faso. In 2018, Haiti's president visited Taiwan to discuss economic issues and diplomatic relations.

In 2021, it was reported the new Honduras Government elected in the 2021 Honduran general election led by the Liberty and Refoundation party was considering recognizing China.^[284] This announcement came on the heels of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama having recently broken relations with the ROC;^[285] Taiwan lost a total of nine diplomatic partners during Tsai Ing-wen's presidency with the switch from Honduras.^[286] On 15 March 2023, the president Xiomara Castro said she has instructed her foreign minister to establish official relations with the PRC.^[287]

Taiwanese leadership criticized Honduras' transition by urging them not to "fall into China's debt trap". Honduras' foreign minister Eduardo Enrique Reina stated that the country had asked Taiwan to double its annual aid and renegotiate its debt to the island, which went unanswered. Taiwan's foreign ministry disputed this, stating that they were still actively engaged in bilateral talks with Honduras' government.^[288] President Tsai Ing-wen responded to the announcement by scheduling time to visit heads of government and state in nearby Belize and Guatemala.^[285] The ROC recalled its Honduran ambassador on 23 March, as Honduras began negotiations with the PRC.^[286] A 25 March statement confirmed that Honduras had completed the switch^[289] and their embassy opened in Beijing on 11 June.^[290]

On 13 June 2017, the government of Panama switched, breaking all ties with the ROC. Panamanians studying in Taiwan were given the choice of returning to Panama within 30 days or continuing their studies in China. Panama was motivated by promises of multibillion-dollar investments. The shift of recognition began with a letter sent in 2015 to the Chinese government that, according to Isabel Saint Malo, Panama's vice president, was titled "Panama wants to make ties with China". The contents of the letter have been kept confidential, as well as the reasons why it was sent. It has also been kept confidential who delivered the letter and assisted in the switchover process, a person described only as "a distinguished member of the Chinese community living in Panama".

The US ambassador to Panama, John D. Feeley, said that he had asked Panamanian PresidentJuan Carlos Varela about the switchover in 2016 but Varela lied to him, saying that there were no plans to make the switchover. Feeley also said that Varela did not tell him the truth until one hour before the nationwide announcement.

Others questioned why the Panamanian government continues to use equipment donated by Taiwan. The Panamanian government initially gave no reason, later saying that one reason was because "China is the second largest user of the Panama Canal" and President Varela said it was because he "couldn't accept it anymore" and "that's what every responsible leader would do". The Panamanian government officially said that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China and that the switchover was to comply with the one-China policy. The ROC government said that Panama was its "number one ally" and that it would not participate in Beijing's checkbook diplomacy. The Taiwanese government complained that Panama maliciously hid the switchover process until the last moment.

A Panamanian government agency later said that the switchover was because of Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen's violations and lack of regard to the 1992 consensus regarding China, Taiwan and the One-china policy. Panamanian newspaper La Estrella questioned the reasons Varela initially gave for the switchover, like "China has the world's largest population and the 2nd largest economy and user of the Panama Canal"; La Estrella called Varela's actions contradictory and said that the reasons Varela gave were the reality Panama has lived under for decades, so those could not be regarded as valid reasons for the switchover. The same newspaper also says that China's plans in Latin America convince Latin American nations easily, with apparent benefits in the short term but with dependency on China in the long term and that China is silently invading other countries and Latin America in general.^{[291][292][293]}

In the first year of diplomatic relations, 19 treaties were signed, including a Free Trade Treaty. Varela said that its main purpose was to allow Chinese nationals to easily invest in Panama. Controversies over the sudden switchover included lack of due process, unusually high levels of confidentiality, and the fact that a few weeks before the switchover, Taiwan had donated medical equipment to Panama. In 2018, the first flight from Beijing to Panama by Air China landed at Tocumen International Airport, with a technical stop in Houston. Varela called it a milestone in Panamanian aviation. Due to this new route, the Panamanian ministry of tourism expected at least 40,000 Chinese tourist visits per year. "History and socioeconomic reality" were later cited as reasons for the switchover. Varela said that the move was backed by diplomatic relationships dating from 1912 and that the move strengthened the existing relationships, despite the fact that those relationships were with the ROC, not the PRC. As a result, Panama City was almost immediately added to China's list of officially approved tourist destinations.^{[294][295][296][297]} The CCP government has offered the Panameñista Party-led government a free feasibility study for the planned 4th set of locks in the Panama Canal to gain a competitive advantage in bids for choosing the company to build the 4th set of locks, not to mention plans for a 1,200 hectare industrial park on the Pacific coast and a 4-hectare campus in Amador near the Biomuseo to house the PRC embassy in Panama. There are also fears that Panama could turn into a conflict zone between the US and the PRC, due to Panama's strategic location.

The ROC and the U.S. signed a formal treaty of commerce and navigation in 1948. ROC passport holders can thus be granted an E1 and E2 Visa, with indefinite renewal status, based on continued operation of their enterprise^[298] in the US.^[299] In 1979 the US recognised the PRC instead of ROC.^[300] Commercial^[301] (such as Trade and Investment Framework Agreement signed in 1994,^[302] TIFA^{[303][304][305][302]}), cultural and other substantial relations are currently governed, among other things, by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The Act does not recognise the terminology of "Republic of China". United States policy does not support or oppose Taiwan's independence; instead US policy takes a neutral position of "non-support" for Taiwan's independence.^[306]

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alex Wong officially^[307] visited the ROC in March 2018 to protest the amendment of the PRC Constitution that removed Presidential tenure restrictions.^[308] In July 2002, Minister of Justice Chen Ding-nan became the first Taiwanese government official to be invited to visit the White House after the switch.

While the U.S. acknowledged PRC's one-China principle in 1979,^[309] it did not accept the PRC's claim on Taiwan.^{[310][311][312]} The unofficial name "Taiwan" was mentioned in the Three Communiqués between the United States and China. Consistent with the United States' one-China policy, raising the ROC flag on an official government facility's property within U.S. territory is not approved by the United States.^[313][314]

Taiwan passport holders are included in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program for a stay of 90 days.^[315][316]

After 1979, the US–Taiwan Business Council continued to facilitate commercial activity (mostly semiconductor technology related) and arms sales service.^{[317][318][319]} The United States House of Representatives added an amendment to the fiscal year 2016 US defense budget that includes a clause urging the ROC's participation in the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise.^[320] The United States State Department has close bilateral cooperation with the ROC through Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs' Fulbright Program.^{[321][322][323]}

Recent disputes between the U.S. and the ROC include the ROC's ban on the import of U.S. beef and U.S. pork, which was resolved after the ROC adopted the new standard of a maximum residue limit for ractopamine in both beef and pork.^[324]

In 2007, a measure was introduced into the United States Congress that would dramatically strengthen US ties with the ROC.^[325] The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for the lifting of curbs on visits by high-ranking or top ROC officials. The Resolution noted that "whenever high-level visitors from the ROC, including the President, seek to come to the United States, their requests result in a period of complex, lengthy and humiliating negotiations." It further said: "Lifting these restrictions will help bring a friend and ally of the United States out of its isolation, which will be beneficial to peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific Region."^[326]

A bill was introduced to back the ROC's request to join the UN. The bill stated that the ROC and its 23 million people "deserve membership in the United Nations" and that the United States should fulfill a commitment "to more actively support Taiwan's membership in appropriate international organizations." The bill was introduced on 8 November 2007. The move was led by New Jersey Representative Scott Garrett.^[327]

Unofficial diplomatic relations are nevertheless maintained on both sides by means of de facto embassies, which are technically "private organizations" staffed and funded by the respective State Departments. The ROC's de facto embassy network is the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) with offices in Washington, D.C., 12 other US cities and many other countries without official ties. The US' analogous organization is the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). As of 2010, officials of the ROC had made quasi-official level US visits at a governmental and political level.^[46][328]

The U.S. State Department in July 2019 approved the selling of 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks and 250 Stinger missiles to Taiwan. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency said that the arms sale serves "US national, economic, and security interests by supporting" Taiwan's "continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability."^[329]

In August 2019, the Trump administration officially announced arms sale to Taiwan, worth USD eight billion, which includes the latest Lockheed Martin-built 66 new F-16C/D fighter jets.^[260] China immediately criticized the deal, citing it as detrimental to its sovereignty and interests.^[330]

On 9 August 2020, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar arrived in Taiwan. It marked the highest-level US official visit to Taiwan since 1979.^[331] As retaliation, the Chinese force jets flew over the mid-line of the Taiwan Strait, which is in the air defense identification zone.^[332][333] The visit was also the highest profile visit since the introduction of Taiwan Travel Act.^[334]

In August 2022, the U.S. House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi visited the island, an act that was strongly condemned by China.^[335]

China sent fighter jets and drones near Taiwan on 27 October 2024 in response to a new $2 billion U.S. arms package for Taiwan, escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.^[336][337]

In September 2006, the first regional summit of Taiwan's Pacific Island allies took place, hosted by Palau in Koror City. The meeting brought together President Chen and delegates from the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands and Kiribati.^[338] It was to become a regular event, known as the Taiwan–Pacific Allies Summit.^[339][340] A second regional meeting was hosted by the Marshall Islands in October, and President Chen attended.^[341] This resulted in the Majuro Declaration, in which Taiwan's six Pacific allies re-stated their recognition of the ROC's sovereignty, and promised to support the ROC's attempts to join the United Nations.^[342]

In June 2007, the ROC donated an aid package of €700,000, distributed among eight Pacific regional organisations.^[343]

In January 2008, following the victory of the Kuomintang in the ROC's elections, Kuomintang MP Yang Li-huan stated that under the new government Taiwan's interest in the Pacific could decrease.^[344] Three days later, however, it was confirmed that ROC Vice-president Annette Lu would lead a diplomatic visit to the Marshall Islands, Nauru and Solomon Islands.^[345]

In March 2008, President-elect Ma was reported as saying that his government would put an end to Taiwanese "cheque-book diplomacy" in the Pacific (or more specifically, similar to the condition of cestui que use diplomacy).^[346] In May of that same year, Ma called for what he referred to as a "cease-fire" in the competition between the ROC and the PRC for diplomatic allies. This followed a scandal due to allegations that Taiwan's Foreign Minister James Huang had attempted to buy Papua New Guinea's diplomatic allegiance.^[347][348] Papua New Guinea's foreign minister Sam Abal subsequently confirmed that his country had no intention of recognising the ROC.^[349]

In October, Taiwan cancelled a scheduled summit with its Pacific Island allies. Although the authorities cited "preparation problems", Radio Australia commented that "the decision appears to be an attempt by the new administration of President Ma Ying-jeou to keep the island's diplomatic activities low-profile and avoid offending China".^[350] In June 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that President Ma would "attend a [...] leadership summit between Taiwan and its South Pacific allies" in autumn. The summit, hosted by Solomon Islands, would be attended by the "heads of state of Taiwan's six allies in the region" and would focus on "countering the current economic contraction, climate change and how to strengthen the fisheries industry". Upon announcing the summit, the Ministry added that Ma had "developed a fondness for the Pacific region during his previous visit to Solomon Islands when he saw a handful of children at a market selling betel nuts and watermelons while wearing shirts donated by the people of Taiwan".^[351]

In July 2009, the ROC donated over €40,000 in a scholarship scheme benefiting students from Pacific countries, including those, such as Fiji or Papua New Guinea, that do not grant it diplomatic recognition. It donated €288,000 for regional development assistance programmes, to be used notably on access to water, sanitation and hygiene, renewable energy, solar photovoltaic assessments, fisheries management, education and youth training.^[352]

Taiwan has asked to be recognised as an official dialogue partner of the Pacific Islands Forum. That status is currently awarded to the PRC.^[353]

In February 2008, Australia reportedly "chastised Taiwan for its renewed push for independence" and "reiterated its support for a one-China policy".^[354] Australia-Taiwan relations are growing in non-political areas including an annual Bilateral Economic Consultation and both sides also established Joint Energy, Mineral, Trade and Investment Cooperation Consultation (JEMTIC) as well as an Agriculture Working Group meeting.^[355] Australia does not object Taiwan's participation in international organizations where consensus has been achieved,^[356] and Australia-Taiwan relations are commercially and unofficially-driven, such as the Australia-Taiwan Business Council,^[357] along with contacts in education, science, sports and arts.^{[358][359][360][361]}

Taiwan is unofficially represented in Australia by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Canberra (which has branches in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane) while Australia is similarly represented by the Australian Office in Taipei. Taiwan has an official, government co-sponsored branch office of Taiwan External Trade Development Council in Sydney.^[362] The Australian Consulate-General in Hong Kong is responsible for Visa and Citizenship matters for applicants in Taiwan.^[363] Perth has sister city relations with Taipei City and Brisbane has sister city relations with Kaohsiung City.^[364][365]

The ROC set up a trade mission in Fiji in 1971.^[366] In 1975, PRC established diplomatic relation with Fiji. The trade center became the Trade Mission of the ROC to the Republic of Fiji in 1988. In 1996, ROC and Fiji signed a 'mutual recognition' communique and Fiji set up its representative office named Fiji Trade and Tourism Representative Office in 1997 in Taipei. The Fiji office closed on 10 May 2017.^[367]

Kiribati, under the government of President Taneti Mamau, initially recognised the ROC but switched to the PRC later on.

From 1980 to 2003, Kiribati recognised the PRC. Relations between China and Kiribati then became a contentious political issue within Kiribati. President Teburoro Tito was ousted in a parliamentary vote of no confidence in 2003, over his refusal to clarify the details of a land lease that had enabled Beijing to maintain a satellite-tracking station in the country since 1997, and over Chinese ambassador Ma Shuxue's acknowledged monetary donation to "a cooperative society linked to Tito".^[368] In the ensuing election, Anote Tong won the presidency after "stirring suspicions that the station was being used to spy on US installations in the Pacific".^[369] Tong had previously pledged to "review" the lease.^[370]

In November 2003, Tarawa established diplomatic relations with Taipei^[369] and Beijing severed its relations with the country. For the PRC, the presence of the satellite-tracking station had made relations with Kiribati relatively important; the station had, in particular, been used to track Yang Liwei's spaceflight.^[371] Therefore, for three weeks the PRC called upon I-Kiribati President Anote Tong to break off relations with Taiwan and re-affirm his support for the "One China" policy. Only after those three weeks did the PRC sever relations,^[372] thereby losing the right to maintain its satellite-tracking base. The ROC began providing economic aid to Kiribati, while Kiribati began supporting Taiwan in the United Nations.

In 2004, President Tong said he believed the PRC was trying to influence his country.^[373] The comment was mainly due to the PRC's refusal to remove all its personnel from its closed embassy.^[371] Tong stated that the Chinese personnel, who remained in Kiribati against his wishes, were handing out anti-government pamphlets; he told New Zealand journalist Michael Field: "I am sure if we did this in Beijing, we would be in jail in half a second".^[374] Tong's brother and main political opponent, Harry Tong, responded by accusing Taiwan of excessive influence on Kiribati, notably of influencing the country's clergy.^[373]

In 2008, Taiwan settled Kiribati's unpaid bills to Air Pacific, enabling the airline to maintain its services from Tarawa to Kiritimati.^[375]

In November 2010, despite their lack of diplomatic relations, the PRC was one of fifteen countries to attend the Tarawa Climate Change Conference in Kiribati, and one of twelve to sign the resulting Ambo Declaration on climate change.^[376] On 20 September 2019, Kiribati switched diplomatic relation from ROC to PRC.^[377]

The Marshall Islands recognise the ROC and maintain an embassy in Taipei. The magazine Islands Business reported that President Litokwa Tomeing, elected in January 2008, might turn instead to the PRC.^[378] However, in office Tomeing expressed continued support for ties with Taiwan and met with ROC Vice President Annette Lu when she visited the Marshall Islands on 29 January 2008.^[379] The current Marshallese ambassador to Taiwan is Anjanette Kattil.^[380]

Micronesia recognized the Republic of China until 1989, switching its foreign recognition to the People's Republic of China. In 2023, shortly before his term as president ended, David Panuelo wrote an open letter accusing Beijing of bribing Micronesian officials for recognition and to stay out of a potential conflict, as well as spying on the Micronesian government and personally surveilling him. He furthermore advocated for returning to relations with the Republic of China and held meetings with Taiwanese foreign minister Joseph Wu to determine if it was possible.^[381]

Nauru recognized the Republic of China until 2024, before switching its recognition to the People's Republic of China.

In 1980, Nauru established official relations with the ROC. In 2002, however, the government of René Harris established relations with the PRC,^[382] and adopted the One China Policy.^[383] Consequently, Taiwan severed its relations with Nauru, and accused the PRC of having bought Nauru's allegiance with financial aid of over €90,000,000.^[384] A reporter for The Age agreed, stating that "Beijing recently bought off a threat by Nauru to revert to Taiwan only six months after opening ties with the mainland, offering a large loan to Nauru's near-destitute Government".^[369]

In 2003, Nauru closed its newly established embassy in Beijing. Two years later, ROC President Chen met Nauruan President Ludwig Scotty in the Marshall Islands. In May 2005, the ROC and Nauru re-established diplomatic relations,^[385] and opened embassies in each other's capitals. The PRC consequently severed its relations with Nauru.

The ROC is one of Nauru's two foremost economic aid partners (with Australia). In return, Nauru uses its seat in the United Nations to support the ROC's admittance proposal. Taiwan provides regular medical assistance to Nauru, sending specialised doctors to the country's only hospital.^[386]

In 2007, Scotty was re-elected, amidst claims that his electoral campaign had been funded by Taiwan.^[387] Scotty's opponents claimed that the ROC wanted to ensure that a pro-Taiwan government remained in power. Scotty was replaced by Marcus Stephen in December 2007. Following Stephen's election, President Chen telephoned him to congratulate him, assure him of the ROC's continued assistance for Nauru, request Nauru's continued support in return, and invite him to visit Taiwan.^[388]

Nauru remains the focus of diplomatic competition between Beijing and Taipei. In 2006, according to the New Statesman, President Scotty "was allegedly accosted by a horde of screaming Chinese officials who tried to drag him on to a plane to Beijing just as he was boarding one bound for Taipei".^[389]

In 2008, Nauru co-submitted a proposal to the United Nations, requesting that the United Nations General Assembly consider enabling "Taiwan's participation in the activities of UN specialized agencies". The proposal was rejected.^[390]

In 2011 WikiLeaks revealed that Taiwan had been paying a "monthly stipend" to Nauruan government ministers in exchange for their continued support, as well as a smaller sum to other members of parliament, as "project funding that requires minimal accounting". Reporting on the story, the Brisbane Times wrote: "One MP reportedly used his Taiwanese stipend to buy daily breakfast for all schoolchildren in his district, while others were happy to just pocket the cash". A "former Australian diplomat with close knowledge of politics in Nauru" stated that Nauruan President Marcus Stephen, Foreign Minister Kieren Keke and former President Ludwig Scotty, among others, had all accepted "under the counter" funding from Taiwan. The leaks revealed that "Chinese [PRC] agents had also sought to influence Nauru's elections through cash payments to voters, with at least $40,000 distributed in one instance in 2007".^[391]

WikiLeaks also revealed that Australia had, at one time, been "pushing" Nauru to break its relations with Taiwan and establish relations with the PRC instead. Then President Scotty had reportedly resisted on the grounds that it was "none of Australia's business".^[391]

In late 2011, Taiwan "doubled its health aid" to Nauru, notably providing a resident medical team on a five-year appointment.^[392]

From 11 June 2013 to 27 August 2019, under the government of President Baron Waqa, Nauru maintained its recognition of the Republic of China.

In 2018, a diplomatic row between the PRC and Nauru occurred at the Pacific Islands Forum when Nauruans would only stamp entry visas on personal passports of Mainland diplomats rather than diplomatic ones.^[393]

On 15 January 2024, Nauru chose to recognise the People's Republic of China, severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan.^[394]

While New Zealand does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the two countries still maintain informal trade, economic, and cultural relations. Taiwan has two Economic and Cultural offices in Auckland and Wellington. New Zealand also has a Commerce and Industry Office in Taipei.^[395][396]

On 10 July 2013, New Zealand and ROC signed a bilateral Economic Cooperation Agreement.^[397][398]

Palau recognises the ROC, and is one of the few countries to maintain an embassy in Taipei. Diplomatic relations began in 1999, five years after Palaun independence.^[399] ROC maintains an embassy in Koror City.^[400] The ROC provides scholarships to Palauan students, as well as computers for Palauan schools. In 2008, Mario Katosang, Palau's Minister of Education, stated:

We were given 100 Windows-based computers by Taiwan. The education sector uses predominantly Apple Macintosh computers, so I mentioned that we may also need software. Taiwan immediately delivered 100 brand new copies of Windows XP, and offered to train our computer technicians.^[401]

Travel from the Mainland to Palau is illegal.^[399][402]

Taiwan and Palau entered into a maritime cooperation agreement in March 2019. Taiwan agreed to fund the building of an eight-ton patrol boat in Palau. The agreement also allows Taiwanese patrol boats to resupply in Palau, personnel exchanges, and joint training. The first joint exercise occurred on 23 March when the Taiwanese coast guard frigate Hsun Hu No. 7 conducted a patrol mission with Palauan vessels.^[403][404]

Papua recognises the PRC.

In 2005, Papua New Guinea, along with Fiji, supported Taiwan's wish to join the World Health Organization.

The two countries established diplomatic relations on 23 May 1983.^[405] A ROC consulate general in Honiara was upgraded to an embassy two years later.^[406] Since 2011, the Solomons' ambassador to the ROC has been Laurie Chan, a Solomon Islands national of Chinese ethnic background, and a former Solomon Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs who supported his country's continued relations with Taiwan.^[407]

After pro-Taiwan Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare was ousted in a vote of no confidence in December 2007, and replaced by Derek Sikua, ROC President Chen telephoned Prime Minister Sikua, offering his congratulations and Taiwan's continued aid, and requested the Sikua government's continued diplomatic support. Chen also invited Sikua to visit Taiwan,^[388] which he did in March 2008. Sikua was welcomed with military honours by Chen, who stated: "Taiwan is the Solomon Islands' most loyal ally. [...] Taiwan will never forsake the people or government of the Solomon Islands."^[408] Solomon Islands has continued to recognise the ROC under Sikua's leadership.

In June 2019, secret negotiations with Australia were reported that involved the Solomon Islands reassessing if they wanted to switch recognition to the PRC with an internal deadline of mid-September to make a change or leave the status quo.^[409] In early September, they announced their intention to change recognition to the PRC.^[410] On 16 September, it officially broke its ties with Taiwan, switching its recognition to the PRC.^[411][117]

In June 2020 the Premier of Malaita Province, a critic of the switch in recognition, accepted rice from Taiwan as state aid. This was criticised by the national government, who called on him to respect the country's foreign policy.^[412]

Tuvalu recognises the ROC; Taiwan maintains the only foreign resident embassy in Tuvalu, in Funafuti.

Tuvalu supports the ROC's bid to join the United Nations, and Taiwan has provided Tuvalu with mobile medical missions.^[413]

In 2006, Taiwan reacted to reports that the PRC was attempting to draw Tuvalu away from the ROC. Taiwan consequently strengthened its weakening diplomatic relations with Tuvalu.^[414]

In 2019 –shortly after Kiribati and the Solomon Islands ended their relations with the Republic of China –Tuvalu reiterated their support for the ROC.^[415]

Vanuatu recognises the PRC. In November 2004, Prime Minister Serge Vohor briefly established diplomatic relations with Taiwan, before he was ousted for that reason in a vote of no confidence.^[416][417]

Paraguay recognizes Taiwan.^[419] Paraguayan leader General Alfredo Stroessner was a partner of Generalissimo Chiang. Many Paraguayan officers trained in Fu Hsing Kang College in the ROC.^[420]

Stroessner's 1989 ousting and his successor Andrés Rodríguez's reinventing himself as a democratically elected president, were immediately followed by invitations from Beijing to switch diplomatic recognition.^[421] However, the Taiwanese ambassador, Wang Sheng, and his diplomats were able to convince the Paraguayans that continuing the relationship with the ROC, and thus keeping the ROC's development assistance and access to the ROC's markets, would be more advantageous for Paraguay.^[422] Recognition of Taiwan was a matter of debate in the 2023 Paraguayan general election, with bilateral relations maintained after the results.^[423]

In 2007, the Venezuelan government refused to renew visas for five members of the ROC commercial representation in Caracas.^[424]

Relations with Venezuela have worsened because of the increasing partnership between the government of Hugo Chávez and the People's Republic of China, which has led to a more overt rejection of the Taiwan's legitimacy by Venezuela. During the 2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis, Taiwan has been supportive of Juan Guaidó and the opposition-led National Assembly.

•  Eswatini

• Holy See (Vatican City)

•  Belize
•  Guatemala
•  Haiti
•  Saint Kitts and Nevis
•  Saint Lucia
•  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

•  Marshall Islands
•  Palau
•  Tuvalu

•  Paraguay

•  Nigeria
• Somaliland
•  South Africa

•  Bahrain
•  Brunei
•  India
•  Indonesia
•  Israel
•  Japan
•  Jordan
•  Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
•  Kuwait
•  Malaysia
•  Mongolia
•  Oman
•  Philippines
•  Saudi Arabia
•  Singapore
•  Thailand
•  Türkiye
•  United Arab Emirates
•  Vietnam

•  Austria
•  Belgium
•  Czechia
•  Denmark
•  Finland
•  France
•  Germany
•  Hungary
•  Italy
•  Latvia
•  Lithuania
•  Luxembourg
•  Netherlands
•  Poland
•  Russia
•  Slovakia
•  Spain
•  Sweden
•  Switzerland
•  United Kingdom

•  Canada
•  Mexico
•  United States

•  Australia
•  New Zealand
•  Papua New Guinea

•  Argentina
•  Brazil
•  Chile
•  Colombia
•  Ecuador
•  Peru

Local media has referred to Taiwan's medical diplomacy related to the COVID-19 pandemic as "epidemic prevention diplomacy".^[464] In March 2020 Australia and Taiwan agreed to exchange 1 million liters of Australian alcohol to be used in making hand sanitizer for 3 metric tons of Taiwanese nonwoven fabric to be used in making facial masks.^[465]