Hispanopedia Wiki
Articulo de referencia

Theodicy

Gottfried Leibniz coined the term theodicy to justify God's existence in light of the apparent imperfections of the world. A theodicy (from Ancient Greek θεός theos , "god" and ...

Hispanopedia WikiContenido en espanolLectura gratuita

Gottfried Leibniz coined the term theodicy to justify God's existence in light of the apparent imperfections of the world.

A theodicy (from Ancient Greekθεόςtheos, "god" and δίκηdikē, "justice"), meaning 'vindication of God', is an argument in the philosophy of religion that attempts to resolve the problem of evil, which arises when all power (omnipotence) and all goodness (omnibenevolence) are attributed to God simultaneously.[1]

Unlike a defense, which tries only to demonstrate that God and evil can logically coexist, a theodicy additionally provides a framework in which God and evil's existence are considered plausible.[2] The German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Leibniz coined the term theodicy in his book Théodicée (1710), though numerous responses to the problem of evil had previously been offered.

Similar to a theodicy, a cosmodicy attempts to justify the fundamental goodness of the universe, while an anthropodicy attempts similar justification of human nature.

Definition and etymology

As defined by philosopher Alvin Plantinga, a theodicy is "an answer to the question of why God permits evil".[3] In this view, theodicy is a theological construct that attempts to vindicate God in response to the problem of evil, which appears inconsistent with the existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God.[4]

Another definition of theodicy is the vindication of divine goodness and providence in view of the existence of evil. The word theodicy derives from the Greek words Θεός, Theos, and δίκη, dikē. Theos is translated as 'God', and dikē can be translated as either 'trial' or 'judgement'.[5] Thus, theodicy literally means 'justifying God'.[6]

In the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, philosopher Nick Trakakis proposes three additional requirements that must be included in a theodicy:

  • Common sense views of the world
  • Widely-held historical and scientific opinion
  • Plausible moral principles[7]

Como respuesta al problema del mal, una teodicea se distingue de una defensa. Una defensa intenta demostrar que la existencia del mal no contradice la existencia de Dios, pero no propone que los seres racionales puedan comprender por qué Dios permite el mal. Una teodicea muestra que es razonable creer en Dios a pesar de la evidencia del mal en el mundo y ofrece un marco que puede explicar por qué existe el mal. [ 8 ] Una teodicea suele basarse en una teología natural previa , que busca probar la existencia de Dios; una teodicea busca demostrar que la existencia de Dios sigue siendo probable después de plantearse el problema del mal, al justificar que Dios permita que ocurra el mal. [ 9 ] Las defensas proponen soluciones al problema del mal , mientras que las teodiceas intentan responder a la pregunta. [ 7 ]

Pseudo-Dionisio Areopagita , filósofo y teólogo griego, define el mal por aquellos aspectos que muestran una ausencia de bien. [ 10 ] : 37 Los escritores de esta tradición veían las cosas como reflejo de "formas", por lo que el mal era un fracaso al no reflejar adecuadamente la forma apropiada, como un déficit de bondad donde debería haber estado presente. En la misma línea, el teólogo y filósofo San Agustín también definió el mal como una ausencia de bien; el teólogo y filósofo Tomás de Aquino definió el mal de manera similar, afirmando que "un hombre es llamado malo en la medida en que carece de una virtud, y un ojo es llamado malo en la medida en que carece de la facultad de ver". [ 11 ] : 37 La cuestión del mal como una ausencia del bien resurge en la obra de los filósofos Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel y Martin Heidegger , además del teólogo Karl Barth . Opiniones similares son compartidas por filósofos neoplatónicos como Plotino y el contemporáneo Denis O'Brien, quienes afirman que el mal es una privación. [ 12 ] [ 13 ]

there are at least two concepts of evil: a broad concept and a narrow concept. The broad concept picks out any bad state of affairs ... [and] has been divided into two categories: natural evil and moral evil. Natural evils are bad states of affairs which do not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. Hurricanes and toothaches are examples of natural evils. By contrast, moral evils do result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. Murder and lying are examples of moral evils. Evil in the broad sense, which includes all natural and moral evils, tends to be the sort of evil referenced in theological contexts ... [T]he narrow concept of evil picks out only the most morally despicable ... [it] involves moral condemnation, [and] is appropriately ascribed only to moral agents and their actions.[14]

The worldview of Marxism, "selectively elaborating Hegel", defines evil in terms of its effect.[10]:44 The philosopher John Kekes states the effect of evil must include actual harm that "interferes with the functioning of a person as a full-fledged agent".[15][14] Christian philosophers and theologians such as Richard Swinburne and N. T. Wright also define evil in terms of effect, stating that an "act is objectively good (or bad) if it is good (or bad) in its consequences".[11]:12[10]Hinduism defines evil in terms of its effect, saying that "the evils that afflict people (and indeed animals) in the present life are the effects of wrongs committed in a previous life."[10]:34 Some contemporary philosophers argue that focusing on the effects of evil is inadequate for a definition, since evil can observe without actively causing harm, while remaining evil.[14]

The philosopher Susan Neiman states that "a crime against humanity is something for which we have procedures, ... [and it] can be ... fit into the rest of our experience. To call an action evil is to suggest that it cannot [be fitted in]".[16]:8

El filósofo Immanuel Kant fue el primero en ofrecer una teoría puramente secular del mal, dando una definición evaluativa del mal basada en su causa, que es tener una voluntad que no es completamente buena. Kant ha sido una influencia importante para filósofos como Hannah Arendt , Claudia Card y Richard Bernstein. [ 17 ] "Hannah Arendt  ... usa el término ['mal radical'] para denotar una nueva forma de maldad que no puede ser capturada por otros conceptos morales." [ 14 ] Claudia Card dice que el mal es maldad excesiva; otros filósofos como Hillel Steiner dicen que el mal es cualitativamente, no cuantitativamente, distinto de la mera maldad. [ 14 ]

Los filósofos John Locke y Thomas Hobbes , además de Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, definen el bien y el mal en términos de placer y dolor. [ 18 ] [ 19 ] [ 20 ] Otros, como el filósofo Richard Swinburne, consideran inadecuada la definición anterior, afirmando que «el bien de los seres humanos individuales  ... consiste  ... en tener libre albedrío  ... la capacidad de desarrollar  ... el carácter  ..., de mostrar valor y lealtad, de amar, de ser útiles, de contemplar la belleza y descubrir la verdad  ... Todo eso [el bien]  ... no puede lograrse sin  ... sufrir en el camino». [ 11 ] : 4

La mayoría de los teóricos que escriben sobre el mal creen que la acción malvada requiere cierto tipo de motivación  : el deseo de causar daño o de obrar mal,  el placer (Steiner 2002), el deseo de aniquilar a todo ser (Eagleton 2010) o la destrucción de otros por el placer mismo (Cole 2006). Cuando el mal se restringe a las acciones que se derivan de este tipo de motivaciones, los teóricos a veces afirman que su objeto de estudio es el mal puro, radical, diabólico o monstruoso. Esto sugiere que su análisis se limita a un tipo o forma de mal y no al mal en sí mismo. [ 14 ]

Algunos teóricos definen el mal por las emociones asociadas a él. «Por ejemplo, Laurence Thomas cree que los malhechores se deleitan causando daño o sienten odio hacia sus víctimas (Thomas 1993, 76–77)». [ 14 ] El budismo define varios tipos de mal, uno de los cuales se define como el comportamiento resultante de la incapacidad de desapegarse emocionalmente del mundo. [ 21 ]

Los teólogos cristianos generalmente definen el mal en términos tanto de la responsabilidad humana como de la naturaleza de Dios: «Si adoptamos la visión esencialista de la ética cristiana  ... el mal es todo aquello contrario a la buena naturaleza de Dios  ... (carácter o atributos)». [ 22 ] La visión judía, si bien reconoce la diferencia entre la perspectiva humana y divina sobre el mal, se fundamenta en la naturaleza misma de la creación y las limitaciones inherentes a la capacidad de la materia para perfeccionarse; la acción del libre albedrío incluye el potencial de perfección derivado del esfuerzo individual y deja la responsabilidad del mal en manos humanas. [ 23 ] : 70

Como señala Richard Swinburne, «[Es] profundamente fundamental para toda la tradición de la religión cristiana (y otras religiones occidentales) que Dios ame a su creación y que esto implique que se comporte de manera moralmente buena hacia ella». [ 11 ] : 3 Dentro del cristianismo, continúa Swinburne, «Se supone que Dios es de alguna manera personal  ... un ser esencialmente eterno, omnipotente, omnisciente, Creador y sustentador del universo, y perfectamente bueno. Un ser omnipotente es aquel que puede hacer cualquier cosa lógicamente posible  ... un ser así no podría hacerme existir y no existir al mismo tiempo, pero podría eliminar las estrellas  ... Un ser omnisciente es aquel que sabe todo lo que lógicamente le es posible saber». [ 11 ] : 3–15 Swinburne añade que «la bondad perfecta de Dios es bondad moral». [ 11 ] : 15

Propósitos

Las teodiceas se desarrollan para responder a la pregunta de por qué un Dios bueno permite la manifestación del mal, resolviendo así el problema del mal. Algunas teodiceas también abordan el problema del mal "para hacer que la existencia de un Dios omnisciente , omnipotente y bondadoso sea compatible con la existencia del mal o el sufrimiento en el mundo". [ 24 ]

El filósofo Richard Swinburne afirma que «la mayoría de los teístas necesitan una teodicea, [necesitan] una explicación de las razones por las que Dios podría permitir que ocurriera el mal». [ 11 ] : 2

Según el teólogo Andrew Loke , las teodiceas podrían tener una utilidad terapéutica para algunas personas, aunque su propósito principal es proporcionar un argumento teísta sólido más que tener éxito como terapia. [ 25 ] Sin embargo, las teodiceas sí «buscan brindar esperanza a quienes sufren, demostrando que... los males pueden ser vencidos al igual que las tribulaciones menores». [ 26 ]

Historia

The term theodicy was coined by the German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz in his 1710 book Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal (Essays of Theodicy on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil).[27] Leibniz's Théodicée was a response to skeptical Protestant philosopher Pierre Bayle; in his biographical dictionary Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, Bayle wrote that he saw no rational solution to the problem of evil, after rejecting three attempts to solve it. Bayle argued that this state of affairs must simply be accepted, because the Bible asserts the coexistence of God and evil.[28]

In The Catholic Encyclopedia (1914), Constantine Kempf made the following argument: inspired by Leibniz's work, philosophers called their works on the problem of evil "theodicies", and philosophy focusing on God was brought under the discipline of theodicy. Kempf argued that theodicy began to include all of natural theology, meaning that theodicy came to consist of the human knowledge of God through the systematic use of reason.[29]

In 1966, the British philosopher John Hick published his book Evil and the God of Love, in which he surveyed various Christian responses to the problem of evil and then developed his own.[30] In his book, Hick identified and distinguished between three types of theodicy:

In the dialogue "Is God a Taoist?",[32] published in his book The Tao Is Silent (1977), Raymond Smullyan claims to prove that it is logically impossible to have sentient beings without allowing "evil", even for God—just as it is impossible for God to create a triangle in the Euclidean plane having a sum of angles other than 180 degrees. Therefore, the capability of feeling implies free will, which may allow for "evil", understood here as hurting other sentient beings. The problem of evil happening to good or innocent people is not addressed directly in this dialogue, but both reincarnation and karma are hinted at.[33][34]

Ancient religions

In his book God and Evil, the Jewish philosopher and theologian David Birnbaum states that "Writings and discourses on theodicy by Jews, Greeks, Christians, and Eastern religions have graced our planet for thousands of years."[35] For example, in his book The Search for God in Ancient Egypt, the German scholar Jan Assman writes that theodicy was an important issue in the Middle Kingdom of Egypt (2000–1700 BC), as "in Ancient Mesopotamian and Israelite literature".[36]

Philip Irving Mitchell of Dallas Baptist University notes that some philosophers have cast the pursuit of theodicy as modern, since earlier scholars used the problem of evil for other purposes—to support the existence of one particular god over another, explain wisdom, or explain a conversion—rather than to justify God's goodness.[37]

La historiadora Sarah Iles Johnston sostiene que las civilizaciones antiguas —como la mesopotámica , la griega , la romana y la egipcia— profesaban creencias politeístas que les permitieron abordar el concepto de teodicea de manera diferente. Estas religiones enseñaban la existencia de numerosos dioses y diosas que controlaban diversos aspectos de la vida cotidiana. Es posible que estas religiones primitivas evitaran la cuestión de la teodicea al atribuir a sus deidades los mismos defectos y celos que aquejaban a la humanidad . Ningún dios o diosa era fundamentalmente bueno o malo; esta enseñanza explicaba que las cosas malas podían sucederles a las personas buenas si enfurecía a una deidad, ya que los dioses podían ejercer el mismo libre albedrío que la humanidad. Dichas religiones enseñaban que algunos dioses eran más propensos a ser serviciales y benevolentes, mientras que otros eran más propensos a ser rencorosos y agresivos. En este sentido, se podía culpar a los dioses malvados de la desgracia, mientras que se podía suplicar a los dioses buenos mediante oraciones y sacrificios para que enmendaran las cosas. Todavía existía un sentido de justicia, ya que los individuos que estaban en paz con los dioses podían evitar el castigo. [ 38 ]

Sin embargo, la paradoja epicúrea ya había sido planteada hacia el año 300 a . C. por el filósofo Epicuro , según David Hume en 1779. Según Hume, esta paradoja describe el problema de conciliar una deidad omnipotente, con su benevolencia, y la existencia del mal. No obstante, si Epicuro abordó estos problemas específicos en los escritos que Hume le atribuye, dicha discusión no habría estado vinculada con la cuestión de un Dios omnibenevolente y omnisciente, como Hume supone. (Hume no cita ninguna fuente ni da a entender que los escritos de Epicuro sobre este tema tuvieran mayor relevancia que la mera tradición académica o el folclore). 

Teodicea bíblica

El relato bíblico de la justificación del mal y el sufrimiento en presencia de Dios muestra similitudes y contrastes entre la Biblia hebrea y el Nuevo Testamento. En cuanto a la Biblia hebrea, el Libro de Job se cita a menudo como fuente autorizada de discusión. [ 39 ] [ 40 ] : Capítulo 3: Job En la introducción a su libro El Antiguo Testamento , el crítico literario y filósofo George Steiner escribe lo siguiente:

The author of Job seeks to expand the understanding of divine justice ... beyond mere retribution, to include a system of divine sovereignty [showing] the King has the right to test His subject's loyalty ... The book of Job corrects the rigid and overly simplistic doctrine of retribution in attributing suffering to sin and punishment. It closes with a focus on the bond between creator and creation, on placing one in that, and on hope rooted in belief that God is in ultimate control.

It is generally accepted that God's responsive speeches in the Book of Job do not directly answer Job's complaints. In this book, God does not attempt to justify himself or reveal the reason for Job's suffering; instead, these speeches focus on increasing Job's overall understanding of his relationship with God. This approach exemplifies Biblical theodicy.[41]:21,28 Bible scholars generally agree that the Bible "does not admit of a singular perspective on evil ... Instead we encounter a variety of perspectives ... Consequently [the Bible focuses on] moral and spiritual remedies, not rational or logical [justifications] ... It is simply that the Bible operates within a cosmic, moral and spiritual landscape rather than within a rationalist, abstract, ontological landscape."[41]:27

The view presented in the preceding paragraph is demonstrated by God's first and second speeches in the Book of Job:

  1. God's first speech concerns human ignorance and God's authority. Job had seen himself as being at the center of events in the book, lamenting that God had singled him out for oppression. God responded that Job was not the center of events—God was. God's kingdom was complex, and he governed on a large scale. Since God has dominion over the earth, Job cannot conceivably condemn him, unless Job proves that he can perform all of the actions that God can.[40]:Chapter 3:Job
  2. God's second speech is against human self-righteousness. Job has vehemently accused God of thwarting justice as "the omnipotent tyrant, the cosmic thug". Some scholars interpret God's response as an admission of failure, but he proceeds to state that he has the power and, on his own timing, will ultimately bring justice.[40]:Chapter 3:Job

En su libro Fuego extraño: Leyendo la Biblia después del Holocausto , el erudito Tod Linafelt escribe que "Isaías es generalmente reconocido como uno de los libros más progresistas del corpus profético". [ 42 ] : 208 Los teólogos cristianos comentan que en la Biblia, "el sufrimiento se entiende como algo que tiene un significado trascendente  ... la acción humana puede dar a casos particulares de sufrimiento un significado místico que lo transforma en algo productivo". [ 43 ]

La teodicea en el Libro de Ezequiel (y en Jeremías 31:29-30) aborda la cuestión de la responsabilidad moral personal. El libro explica el poder del pecado al afirmar que «el punto principal se expone al principio y al final: “el alma que peca, esa morirá ”» . Para los cristianos, el «poder del pecado» fue abolido con la muerte y resurrección de Jesús , mediante las cuales todos los cristianos fueron perdonados y justificados. El punto principal del Libro de Ezequiel «se explica mediante el estudio de una familia a lo largo de tres generaciones». El libro no trata sobre la herencia, sino sobre la comprensión de la justicia divina en un mundo bajo gobierno divino. [ 44 ] : 82

En su libro Temas en el Libro de los Doce , el erudito Paul L. Redditt comenta que «la teodicea en los Profetas Menores difiere poco de la de Isaías, Jeremías y Ezequiel». [ 45 ] Por ejemplo, el primer capítulo del Libro de Habacuc plantea preguntas sobre la justicia de Dios, lamenta la inacción de Dios al castigar la injusticia y busca la acción de Dios en respuesta, para luego objetar lo que Dios elige. [ 40 ] : Capítulo 1 En lugar de entablar un debate, Dios le da a Habacuc una visión del futuro que incluye cinco oráculos (o mensajes proféticos de Dios) que forman una teodicea:

  1. Dios tiene un plan y ha fijado un tiempo para el juicio. Puede que tarde en llegar desde la perspectiva humana, pero llegará.
  2. Los oráculos de la desgracia confrontan la prevalencia del mal en el mundo y la justicia que esos actos han merecido.
  3. La visión de la manifestación de Dios es un reconocimiento del poder de Dios para abordar estos problemas.
  4. Dios, como guerrero, luchará por su pueblo.
  5. El canto de triunfo dice que los fieles prevalecerán aferrándose a la confianza y la esperanza. [ 40 ] : Introducción, Capítulo 3

En opinión de Redditt, Joel y los demás profetas menores demuestran que la teodicea y la escatología están conectadas en la Biblia. [ 45 ] : 201

In the Book of Psalms, Psalm 73 presents the internal struggle created by personal suffering and the prosperity of the wicked. The writer gains perspective when he "enters the sanctuary of God " (Psalm 73:16–17), seeing that God's justice will eventually prevail. The writer reaffirms his relationship with God, is ashamed of his resentment, and chooses trust.[40]:Chapter 3:Psalm 73 Later in the Book of Psalms, Psalm 77 contains true outspokenness toward God, in addition to determination to hold on to faith and trust.[40]:Chapter 3:Psalm 77

John M. Frame and Joseph E. Torres comment on these issues in their book Apologetics: A Justification of Christian Belief: For Christians, the scriptures provide assurance that the allowance of evil is for a good purpose based on relationship with God.[46]:184 In his book Providence and the Problem of Evil, Richard Swinburne writes that "Some of the good ... cannot be achieved without delay and suffering, and the evil of this world is indeed necessary for the achievement of those good purposes. ... God has the right to allow such evils to occur, so long as the 'goods' are facilitated and the 'evils' are limited and compensated in the way that various other Christian doctrines (of human free will, life after death, the end of the world, etc.) affirm ... the 'good states' which (according to Christian doctrine) God seeks are so good that they outweigh the accompanying evils."[11]:Intro.,51

The comments in the preceding paragraph are somewhat illustrated—according to Christian interpretation—in the Book of Exodus, when Pharaoh is described as being "raised up" so that God's name would be known throughout the world (Exodus 9:16). In Christian theology, this illustration is mirrored in Romans 9, where Paul appeals to God's sovereignty as sufficient explanation, with God's goodness known experientially by Christians.[46]:178–79

Augustinian theodicy

La lectura protestante y calvinista de la teodicea agustiniana , promovida principalmente por John Hick , se basa en los escritos de Agustín de Hipona , filósofo y teólogo cristiano que vivió entre el 354 y el 430 d. C. [ 47 ] La formulación católica (anterior a la Reforma) del mismo tema es sustancialmente diferente, como se describe a continuación. En el enfoque de Hick, esta forma de teodicea argumenta que el mal no existe excepto como una privación —o corrupción— de la bondad, y por lo tanto Dios no creó el mal. [ 48 ] Los eruditos agustinianos han argumentado que Dios creó el mundo perfectamente, sin maldad ni sufrimiento humano. El mal entró en el mundo a través de la desobediencia de Adán y Eva , y la teodicea presenta la existencia del mal como un justo castigo por este pecado original . [ 49 ] La teodicea argumenta que los humanos tienen una naturaleza malvada en la medida en que está privada de su bondad, forma, orden y medida originales debido al pecado original heredado de Adán y Eva; Sin embargo, la naturaleza humana en última instancia sigue siendo buena debido a que toda existencia proviene de Dios, pues si la naturaleza fuera completamente malvada (privada del bien), dejaría de existir. [ 50 ] La teodicea sostiene que Dios permanece irreprochable y bueno. [ 51 ]

In the Roman Catholic reading of Augustine, the issue of just war—as developed in his book The City of God—substantially established his position on the positive justification of killing, suffering, and pain as inflicted upon an enemy when encountered in war for a just cause.[52] Augustine asserted that peacefulness—in the face of a grave wrong that could only be stopped by violence—would be a sin. Defense of oneself or others could be necessary, especially when authorized by a legitimate authority. While not elaborating the conditions required for war to be just, Augustine nonetheless originated the phrase just war in his work The City of God.[53] In essence, the pursuit of peace must include the option of fighting with all of its eventualities, in order to preserve peace in the long term.[53] Such a war could not be pre-emptive but rather defensive to restore peace.[54]Thomas Aquinas, centuries later, used the authority of Augustine's arguments in an attempt to define the conditions under which a war could be just.[55][56]

Irenaean theodicy

The Greek bishop Irenaeus (died c.202), born in the early 2nd century, expressed ideas that explained the existence of evil as necessary for human development. Irenaeus argued that human creation consists of two parts: humans are made first in the image and then in the likeness of God. The image of God consists of having the potential to achieve moral perfection, whereas the likeness of God is the achievement of that perfection. To attain moral perfection, Irenaeus suggested that humans must have free will. To achieve such free will, humans must experience suffering, and God must be at an epistemic distance (a distance of knowledge) from humanity. Therefore, evil exists to allow humans to develop as moral agents.[57] In the 20th century, John Hick collated the ideas of Irenaeus into a distinct theodicy. He argued that the world exists as a "vale of soul-making" (a phrase that he drew from John Keats) and that suffering and evil must therefore occur. He argued that human goodness develops through the experience of evil and suffering.[58]

Compensation theodicy

According to the strong version of compensation theodicy that is advanced by the Iranian philosopher Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad, there are two elements that, when considered together, can solve the problem of evil:

  1. El bien primordial dentro del mal, aunque no sea mayor que el mal mismo ni recaiga sobre la misma persona afligida. Este elemento resuelve el problema de la futilidad de los males.
  2. La compensación en la otra vida. Este elemento, como factor complementario, puede explicar cómo la justicia de Dios es compatible con el mal.

Según la versión fuerte de esta teodicea, si los males se compensarán, la existencia de algún bien basta para justificarlos, aunque no se produzca un bien mayor en este mundo. Del mismo modo, si los males se compensarán, no es necesario que se distribuyan equitativamente. Incluso si el mal no produce ningún bien para un individuo, mientras que produce algún bien para otros, es razonable que ocurra. [ 59 ]

Críticos como Bruce R. Reichenbach argumentan que la teodicea de la compensación no justifica adecuadamente la existencia de males atroces, especialmente cuando estos no generan mayores beneficios o cuando afectan desproporcionadamente a individuos inocentes. Sostiene que la teoría corre el riesgo de tratar a los individuos simplemente como medios para un fin, menoscabando así su valor intrínseco. [ 60 ]

En respuesta, los defensores argumentan que la tutela única de Dios sobre la humanidad permite infligir sufrimiento cuando este tiene un propósito mayor en la otra vida. Estos defensores sostienen que la omnipotencia de Dios garantiza que todo sufrimiento será compensado de una manera que, en última instancia, conduce a una mayor satisfacción para quien lo padece. [ 61 ]

teodicea origenista

En respuesta directa a la descripción de la teodicea que hace John Hick, el filósofo y teólogo Mark Scott ha indicado que ni Agustín de Hipona ni Ireneo de Lyon ofrecen un contexto adecuado para analizar la versión teísta de la teodicea propuesta por Hick. Como teólogo entre los Padres de la Iglesia que articuló una teoría de la apocatástasis (o reconciliación universal ), Orígenes de Alejandría proporciona una comparación teológica más directa para analizar la presentación de la salvación universal y la teodicea que hace Hick. Ni Ireneo ni Agustín respaldaron una teología de la salvación universal comparable a la de John Hick. [ 62 ]

Teodiceas relativamente menores

El filósofo Michael Martin resume lo que él llama teodiceas "relativamente menores" de la siguiente manera: [ 63 ]

  • La teodicea del Dios finito sostiene que Dios es totalmente bueno ( omnibenevolente ), pero no todopoderoso ( omnipotente ).
  • La teodicea del mejor de los mundos posibles , una teología tradicional defendida por Leibniz, sostiene que la creación es el mejor de los mundos posibles.
  • La teodicea del pecado original sostiene que el mal entró en el mundo a causa del pecado original de la humanidad.
  • La teodicea de la armonía suprema justifica el mal argumentando que conduce a "buenas consecuencias a largo plazo".
  • La teodicea del «grado de deseabilidad de un estado consciente» ha sido considerada una «teodicea compleja». Sostiene que el estado de una persona se considera malo solo cuando le resulta indeseable. Sin embargo, dado que Dios no puede hacer que el estado de una persona le resulte deseable, el problema teódico no existe. [ 64 ]
  • La teodicea de la reencarnación sostiene que las personas sufren el mal a causa de las malas acciones que cometieron en una vida anterior.
  • La teodicea del contraste sostiene que el mal es necesario para que las personas puedan apreciar o comprender el bien.
  • La teodicea de la advertencia racionaliza el mal como una advertencia de Dios a las personas para que enmienden sus caminos.

El filósofo estadounidense Alvin Plantinga propuso una defensa centrada en demostrar la posibilidad lógica de la existencia de Dios. La versión de Plantinga de la defensa del libre albedrío argumentaba que la coexistencia de Dios y el mal no es lógicamente imposible y que el libre albedrío explica la existencia del mal sin contradecir la existencia de Dios. [ 65 ]

islam

La teodicea se aborda en la teología islámica en diversas escuelas, incluidas las tres escuelas sunitas —asharismo , maturidismo y atarismo— , así como la escuela mutazilita .

Ashʿarismo

La mayoría de los teólogos sunitas analizan la teodicea desde un punto de vista metaético antirrealista . [ 66 ] Los teólogos ash'aritas sostienen que los juicios morales ordinarios provienen de la emoción y la convención social , que son inadecuadas para condenar o justificar las acciones divinas. [ 66 ] Los ash'aritas sostienen que Dios crea todo, incluidas las acciones humanas, pero distinguen la creación ( khalq ) de la adquisición ( kasb ) de acciones. [ 67 ] Los ash'aritas permiten a los individuos esta última capacidad, aunque no postulan la existencia del libre albedrío en un sentido más amplio del término. En palabras de Al-Shahrastani (1086–1153): [ 67 ]

Dios crea en el hombre el poder, la capacidad, la elección y la voluntad de realizar un acto, y el hombre, dotado de este poder derivado, elige libremente una de las alternativas y tiene la intención o la voluntad de realizar la acción, y, en correspondencia con esta intención, Dios crea y completa la acción.

Ash'ari theology insists on ultimate divine transcendence; moreover, it teaches that human knowledge regarding this transcendence is limited to what has been revealed through the prophets, so that on the question of God's creation of evil, revelation must be accepted bila kayfa (without asking how).[68][67]

Maturidism

In contrast to Ash'arism, Maturidism adheres to moral realism—the human mind is able to grasp good and evil independently from revelation[69]—yet disagrees with the Mu'tazilite assertion that God's wisdom entails creating only what is good. Good and evil, though real, are considered to be created by God; thus God is not subject to good and evil, and humans merely learn whatever God created. Blaming God for a violation of right and wrong is thus considered unmerited, since God created right and wrong originally.[70] Whatever is considered evil by humans would ultimately be good. A distinction exists between those who follow tawhid (or monotheism) and those who reject it. Maturidi cites Surah Al Imran, verse 178, to indicate that God does not regard believers and unbelievers as equal; God would increase the sin of the sinners (and guide the believers).[70]

According to the Maturidite school of thought, ontological evil serves a greater purpose and is in essence secretly good.[71] God's wisdom is not considered to focus on choosing between good and evil; rather, it is concerned with putting things in their proper place. The existence of evil as distinct from good (or opposing good) is rejected throughout sources from Maturidite thinkers. Maturidi himself criticizes believing in the opposition of good and evil as a remnant of Persiandualistic religions.[72]Rumi likewise said in his refutation of Ahriman (the principle of evil) that "good cannot exist without evil" and "there is no separation between them".[73]

Atharism

The Hanbali legal scholar Ibn Taymiyya, whose writings became influential in Wahhabism, argued as follows: while God creates human acts, humans are responsible for their deeds as the agents of their acts.[74] Ibn Taymiyya held that divine creation is good from a causal standpoint, since God creates all things for wise purposes.[74] Thus, apparent evil is actually good in view of its purpose, and pure evil does not exist.[74] This analysis was developed further with practical illustrations by Ibn al-Qayyim, a scholar, jurist, and theologian.[74]

Mu'tazilism

Mu'tazila theologians approached the problem of theodicy within a framework of moral realism, according to which the moral value of acts is accessible to unaided reason, so that humans can make moral judgments about divine acts.[66] These theologians argued that the divine act of creation is good despite the existence of suffering, because it allows humans the compensation of a greater reward in the afterlife.[66] The theologians posited that individuals have free will to commit evil, and they absolved God of responsibility for such acts.[66] God's justice thus consists of punishing wrongdoers.[66] Following the demise of Mu'tazila as a school, its theodicy was adopted in the Zaydi and Twelver branches of Shia Islam.[66]

Ibn Sina, the most influential Muslim philosopher, analyzed theodicy from a purely ontological, neoplatonic standpoint; he aimed to prove that God, as the absolutely good First Cause, created a good world.[66] Ibn Sina argued that evil refers to either to a cause affecting an entity (such as being burned in a fire), in which case evil is a quality of another entity, or to an entity's imperfection (such as blindness), in which case evil does not exist as an entity. According to Ibn Sina, such qualities are necessary attributes of the best possible order of things, so that the good they serve is greater than the harm they cause.[66]

Philosophical Sufi theologians such as Ibn Arabi were influenced by the neoplatonic theodicy of Ibn Sina.[66] The scholar Al-Ghazali anticipated the optimistic theodicy of Leibniz in his dictum "There is nothing in possibility more wonderful than what is".[75] The theologian and philosopher Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, who represented the mainstream Sunni view, challenged Ibn Sina's analysis and argued that it merely sidesteps the real problem of evil, which is rooted in the human experience of suffering in a world that contains more pain than pleasure.[66]

Alternatives

Jewish anti-theodicy

In 1998, the Jewish theologian Zachary Braiterman coined the term anti-theodicy in his book (God) After Auschwitz; the term was used to describe Jews, in both a biblical and a post-Holocaust context, whose response to the problem of evil is protest and a refusal to investigate the relationship between God and suffering. An anti-theodicy acts in opposition to a theodicy and places full blame for all experience of evil onto God, but it must rise from an individual's belief in and love of God. Anti-theodicy has been likened to Job's protests in the Book of Job.[76] Braiterman wrote that an anti-theodicy rejects the idea that there is a meaningful relationship between God and evil, or that God could be justified for the experience of evil.[77]

Emmanuel Levinas, a French Jewish philosopher

The Holocaust prompted a reconsideration of theodicy in some Jewish circles.[78] The French Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, who had been a prisoner of war in Nazi Germany, declared theodicy to be "blasphemous", arguing that it is the "source of all immorality"; he demanded that the project of theodicy be ended. Levinas asked whether the idea of absolutism survived after the Holocaust—he proposed that it did. He argued that humans are not called to justify God in the face of evil, but to attempt to live godly lives; rather than considering whether God was present during the Holocaust, the duty of humans is to build a world where goodness will prevail.[79]

El erudito David R. Blumenthal, en su libro Facing the Abusing God , apoya la «teología de la protesta», que vio reflejada en la obra de teatro de Elie Wiesel , El juicio de Dios (1979). Blumenthal sostiene que los supervivientes del Holocausto no pueden perdonar a Dios y, por lo tanto, deben protestar contra él. Blumenthal cree que una teología similar se presenta en el Libro de Job, en el que Job no cuestiona la existencia ni el poder de Dios, sino su moralidad y justicia. [ 80 ] Otras voces destacadas en la tradición judía incluyen al autor ganador del Premio Nobel Elie Wiesel (mencionado anteriormente) y a Richard L. Rubinstein (especialmente en su libro The Cunning of History ). [ 81 ]

Menachem Mendel Schneerson , el séptimo Rebe de Chabad Lubavitch (una dinastía judía jasídica ), buscó dilucidar cómo la fe (o confianza, emunah ) en Dios define las condiciones previas trascendentales de la antiteodicea. El rabino Schneerson respaldó la actitud de "protesta santa" que se encuentra en las historias de Job y Jeremías, así como en las de Abraham ( Génesis 18 ) y Moisés ( Éxodo 33 ); argumentó que una fenomenología de la protesta, llevada a sus límites lógicos, revela una profunda convicción en la justicia cósmica, como se ejemplifica por primera vez en la pregunta de Abraham: "¿Acaso el Juez de toda la tierra no hará justicia?" (Génesis 18:25). [ 82 ] Recordando el ensayo de Kant de 1791 sobre el fracaso de todos los intentos teóricos de teodicea, [ 83 ] el rabino Schneerson identifica una teodicea práctica viable con el mesianismo . Su fiel antiteodicea se desarrolla en una larga carta, fechada el 26 de abril de 1965, a Elie Wiesel. [ 84 ]

Hannah Arendt offers notable resistance to this trend of anti-theodicy in her works The Origins of Totalitarianism and—more sensationally—in her reporting on the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann, which was collected in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem. Without resorting to transcendental authority, purely by observation, Arendt arrives at a conclusion similar to Augustine's theodicy: She ascribes Adolf Eichmann's evil actions to a lack of empathic imagination and to the thoughtlessness of his conformity to norms of careerism within the Third Reich. She finds a thoughtlessness or total absence of consideration for other perspectives at the center of his behavior. The quality of this lack she describes as "the banality of evil". Arendt did not intend to propose "the banality of evil" as a technical term or fixed denomination by which to describe the void of empathic imagination that she observed—it simply happened to be a phrase in her description that was appropriated by the reviewing press and by other scholarly responsa. Banality is only a facet or particular quality of her vantage point in looking into this emptiness.

Christian alternatives to theodicy

A number of Christian writers oppose theodicies. The theologian J. Todd Billings deems constructing theodicies to be a "destructive practice".[85] In the same vein, the philosopher Nick Trakakis observes that "theodical discourse can only add to the world's evils, not remove or illuminate them".[86][87] As an alternative to theodicy, some theologians have advocated "reflection on tragedy" as a more appropriate reply to evil.[88] For example, Wendy Farley believes that "a desire for justice" and "anger and pity at suffering" should replace "theodicy's cool justifications of evil".[89] Sarah K. Pinnock opposes abstract theodicies that would legitimize evil and suffering. However, she endorses discussions of theodicy in which people ponder God, evil, and suffering from a perspective of practical faith.[90]

David Bentley Hart, an American philosopher and theologian

In an essay for The Hedgehog Review, the scholar Eugene McCarraher called David Bentley Hart's 2005 book The Doors of the Sea "a ferocious attack on theodicy in the wake of the previous year's tsunami" (in reference to the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean).[91] As Hart states on page 58 of the book: "The principal task of theodicy is to explain why paradise is not a logical possibility." Hart's unwillingness to concede that theodicy has any positive capacity to explain the purpose of evil is consistent with many Greek church fathers. For example, in his book Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, the philosopher Eric D. Perl writes as follows:

Dionysius' ...refusal to assign a cause to evil, then, marks not the failure but the success of his treatment of the problem. To explain evil, to attribute a cause to it, would necessarily be to explain it away, to deny that evil is genuinely evil at all. For to explain something is to show how it is in some way good. ...Only by not explaining evil, by insisting rather on its radical causelessness, its unintelligibility, can we take evil seriously as evil. This is why most "theodicies" fail precisely insofar as they succeed. To the extent that they satisfactorily account for or make sense of evil, they tacitly or expressly deny that it is evil and show that it is in fact good. Dionysius' treatment of evil, on the other hand, succeeds by failing, recognizing that the sheer negativity that is evil must be uncaused and hence inexplicable, for otherwise it would not be negativity and would not be evil. It has been wisely remarked that any satisfactory account of evil must enable us to retain our outrage at it. Most theodicies fail this test, for in supposedly allowing us to understand evil they justify it and thus take away our outrage. For Dionysius, however, evil remains outrageous precisely because it is irrational, because there is no reason, no justification for it. The privation theory of evil, expressed in a radical form by Dionysius, is not a shallow disregard or denial of the evident evils in the world. It means rather that, confronted with the evils in the world, we can only say that for no reason, and therefore outrageously, the world as we find it does not perfectly love God, the Good, the sole end of all love. And since the Good is the principle of intelligibility and hence of being, to the extent that anything fails to partake of that principle it is deficient in being. The recognition of evils in the world and in ourselves is the recognition that the world and ourselves, as we find them, are less than fully existent because we do not perfectly love God, the Good.

The theologian Karl Barth viewed the evil of human suffering as being ultimately under the "control of divine providence".[92] Given this view, Barth deemed it impossible for humans to devise a theodicy that establishes "the idea of the goodness of God".[93] For Barth, only the crucifixion could establish the goodness of God. In the crucifixion, God bears and suffers what humanity suffers.[94] This suffering by God Himself makes human theodicies anticlimactic.[95] Barth found a "twofold justification" in the crucifixion:[96] the justification of sinful humanity and "the justification in which God justifies Himself".[97]

The Christian Science religious movement offers a solution to the problem by denying that evil ultimately exists.[98][99]Mary Baker Eddy (the founder of Christian science) and Mark Twain had contrasting views on theodicy and suffering, which are well-described by the historian Stephen Gottschalk.[100]

Redemptive suffering, based in Pope John Paul II's theology of the body, embraces suffering as having value in and of itself.[101][102] In her book Wandering in Darkness, the philosopher Eleonore Stump uses psychology, narrative, and exegesis to demonstrate that redemptive suffering, as found in Thomistic theodicy, can constitute a consistent and cogent defense for the problem of suffering.[103]

Free-will defense

As an alternative to a theodicy, a defense may be offered as a response to the problem of evil. A defense attempts to show that God's existence is not made logically impossible by the existence of evil; God's existence does not need to be true or plausible, merely logically possible. The American philosopher Alvin Plantinga offers a free-will defense: in this argument, he claims that human free will sufficiently explains the existence of evil; at the same time, he maintains that God's existence remains logically possible.[104] Plantinga argues that, if God's existence and the existence of evil are to be logically inconsistent, a premise must be provided which, if true, would make them inconsistent; since none has been provided, the existence of God and evil must be consistent. Free will furthers this argument by providing a premise which, in conjunction with the existence of evil, entails that God's existence remains consistent.[105] Opponents have argued that this defense is discredited by the existence of evil not related to humans—such as droughts, tsunamis, and malaria.[106]

In his book, Evil, Sin and Christian Theism (2022), the theologian Andrew Loke develops a "big picture" free-will defense, arguing that God's justification for allowing suffering is not based primarily on an argument from future benefits, but instead on the nature of love which involves "allowing humans to exercise their free will in morally significant ways".[107] Loke employs an approach in which "Christian theism provides the big picture and uses a combination of theodicies" in defense of a moderate version of skeptical theism.[108] This big-picture approach, according to him, helps to put the problem of evil and suffering in a larger perspective that answers the major questions inherent in a worldview. Such questions include the following: "What is the greatest good? What is the meaning of life? Where do I come from? Where am I going?" Loke argues that Christian theism provides the most comprehensive and consistent answers to these questions: "the greatest good is to have a right relationship with God, the source of all good. The meaning of life...is to live our lives for the greatest good;...to glorify God and enjoy him..."[109] In Loke's view, the bigger picture of a just, all-powerful, and loving God who will ultimately defeat evil serves as the backdrop against which all temporal suffering can obtain a meaningful understanding.[109]

Cosmodicy and anthropodicy

A cosmodicy attempts to justify the fundamental goodness of the universe in the face of evil, and an anthropodicy attempts to justify the fundamental goodness of human nature in the face of the evils produced by humans.[110]

Considering the relationship between theodicy and cosmodicy, the theologian Johannes van der Ven argued that the choice between theodicy and cosmodicy is a false dilemma.[111] The theologian Philip E. Devenish proposed what he described as "a nuanced view in which theodicy and cosmodicy are rendered complementary, rather than alternative concepts".[112] The theologian J. Matthew Ashley described the relationship between theodicy, cosmodicy and anthropodicy as follows:

In classical terms, this is to broach the problem of theodicy: how to think about God in the face of the presence of suffering in God's creation. After God's dethronement as the subject of history, the question rebounds to the new subject of history: the human being. As a consequence, theodicy becomes anthropodicy—justifications of our faith in humanity as the subject of history, in the face of the suffering that is so inextricably woven into the history that humanity makes.[113]

Essential kenosis

Essential kenosis is a form of process theology (related to "open theism") that allows a person to affirm that God is almighty, while simultaneously affirming that God cannot prevent genuine evil. In this view, because God—out of love—necessarily gives freedom, agency, self-organization, natural processes, and law-like regularities to creation, God cannot override, withdraw, or fail to provide such capacities. Consequently, God is not culpable for failing to prevent genuine evil. The work of the philosopher Thomas Jay Oord explains this view fully.[114][115]

The theologian Gijsbert van den Brink effectively refutes any view that holds that God has restricted his power because of his love, saying that it creates a "metaphysical dualism"; moreover, it would not alleviate God's responsibility for evil, because God could have prevented evil by not restricting himself. Van den Brink then elaborates an explanation of power and love from a Trinitarian perspective which equates these two qualities; he also explains what he calls "the power of love" as representative of God's involvement in the struggle against evil.[116]

See also

Citations

  1. ↑Pecorino, Philip A. (2000). "Chapter 3: 'Philosophy of Religion', Section 11: Problem of Evil". An Introduction to Philosophy: An Online Textbook. Queensborough Community College. Archived from the original on 6 September 2023.
  2. ↑A defence is "an effort to show that there is no formal contradiction between the existence of God... and the existence of evil." Michael Rea and Louis B. Pojman, eds., Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (Cengage Learning, 2015, 7th ed.), 229.
  3. ↑Plantinga, Alvin (1974). God, Freedom, and Evil. William B. Eerdmans. p. 10.
  4. ↑Tambasco, Anthony J., ed. (2002). The Bible on Suffering. New York: Paulist Press. p. 1. ISBN 0-8091-4048-9.
  5. ↑"δίκη". A Greek–English Lexicon. Tufts University – via The Perseus Project.
  6. ↑"Theodicy". Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 11 August 2021. Retrieved 20 October 2013.
  7. 12Trakakis, Nick (31 March 2005). "The Evidential Problem of Evil". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 16 January 2012.
  8. ↑Bunnin, Nicholas; Tsui-James, E. P. (2002). The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Blackwell Publishing. p. 481.
  9. ↑Geivett 1995, pp. 60–61
  10. 1234Wright, N. T. (2006). Evil and the Justice of God. Downer's Grove, Illinois: Intervarsity Press. ISBN 978-0-8308-3415-0.
  11. 12345678Swinburne, Richard (1998). Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-823799-5.
  12. ↑O'Brien, D. (1996). "Plotinus on matter and evil". In Gerson, L. P. (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 171–195.
  13. ↑Plotinus (1969). The Enneads. Translated by Mackenna, S. Revised by B. S. Page (4th ed.). London: Faber.
  14. 1234567Calder, Todd (Winter 2016). "The Concept of Evil". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  15. ↑Kekes 1998, 217
  16. ↑Nieman, Susan (25 August 2015). Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-16850-0.
  17. ↑Kant, Immanuel (2003). Kant: Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: And Other Writings. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-59049-3.
  18. ↑Locke, John (1836). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Glasgow: B. Griffin and Co.
  19. ↑Hobbes, Thomas (2018). Leviathan. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Lerner Publishing Group. ISBN 978-151-248609-4.
  20. ↑Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (2009). Theodicy. Cosimo. ISBN 978-1-61640-295-2.
  21. ↑Thera, Nyanaponika (2008). The Roots of Good and Evil: Buddhist Texts translated from the Pali. Buddhist Publication Society. ISBN 978-955-24-0316-3.
  22. ↑Onyango Okello, Joseph B. (2017). Evil and Pain: A Critique of the Materialistic Account of Evil. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock. ISBN 978-1-5326-0134-7.
  23. ↑Leaman, Oliver (1995). Evil and Suffering in Jewish Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-41724-4.
  24. ↑Pecorino, Philip A. (2000). "Chapter 3: 'Philosophy of Religion', Section 11: Problem of Evil". An Introduction to Philosophy: An Online Textbook. Queensborough Community College.
  25. ↑Loke, Andrew Ter Ern (2022). Evil, Sin and Christian Theism. Routledge. p. 11.
  26. ↑Loke, Andrew Ter Ern (2022). Evil, Sin and Christian Theism. Routledge. p. 8.
  27. ↑Leibniz 1734
  28. ↑Lennon, Thomas (7 February 2003). "Pierre Bayle". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 22 January 2012.
  29. ↑Kempf, Constantine (2012). "Theodicy". The Catholic Encyclopedia. Retrieved 4 September 2012.
  30. ↑Cheetham 2003, p. 40
  31. ↑Hall 2003, p. 132
  32. ↑Smullyan 1977, p. 86
  33. ↑Perspectives on Reincarnation: Hindu, Christian, and Scientific. Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute. 18 January 2019. ISBN 978-3-03897-535-9. OCLC 1105767117.
  34. ↑Freschi, Elisa (12 October 2021). "Is the Theory of Karman the Solution to the Problem of Evil? Some Thoughts from Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta". Religions. 12 (10): 862. doi:10.3390/rel12100862. hdl:1807/107705. ISSN 2077-1444.
  35. ↑Birnbaum, David (1989). God and Evil. Hoboken: Ktav. p. 4.
  36. ↑Assman, Jan (2001). The Search for God in Ancient Egypt. Translated by Lorton, David. Cornell University Press. p. 169.
  37. ↑Mitchell, Philip Irving. "Theodicy: An Overview". Dallas Baptist University. Retrieved 17 July 2012.
  38. ↑Johnston 2004, pp. 531–547
  39. ↑Steiner, George. "Introduction". The Old Testament (Modern Library ed.).
  40. 1234567Ko, Grace (2014). Theodicy in Habakkuk. United Kingdom: Paternoster.
  41. 12Scott, Mark S. M. (2015). Pathways in Theodicy: An Introduction to the Problem of Evil. Fortress Press. ISBN 978-1-4514-6470-2.
  42. ↑Linafelt, Tod, ed. (2000). Strange Fire: Reading the Bible After the Holocaust. New York University Press. ISBN 0-8147-5165-2.
  43. ↑Pinnock, Sarah K. (2002). Beyond Theodicy: Jewish and Christian Continental Thinkers Respond to the Holocaust. New York: State University of New York Press. ISBN 0-7914-5523-8.
  44. ↑Blenkinsopp, Joseph (1990). Ezekiel. Louisville: John Knox Press. ISBN 0-8042-3118-4.
  45. 12Redditt, Paul L. (2003). Thematic Threads in the Book of the Twelve. New York: Walter De Gruyter. ISBN 3-11-017594-0.
  46. 12Frame, John M. and Torres, Joseph E. (2015). Apologetics: A Justification of Christian Belief. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P&R.
  47. ↑Mendelson, Michael (12 November 2010) [24 March 2000]. "Saint Augustine". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 9 October 2011.
  48. ↑Menn 2002, p. 170
  49. ↑Corey 2000, pp. 177–78
  50. ↑Green 2011, p. 779
  51. ↑Geivett 1995, p. 19
  52. ↑Holmes, Robert L. (1 September 2001). "A Time For War?". Christianity Today. Retrieved 28 April 2013.
  53. 12Holt, Andrew (2005). "Augustine of Hippo". Crusades-Encyclopedia. Retrieved 28 April 2013.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: deprecated archival service (link)
  54. ↑"Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War". National Institute for the Renewal of the Priesthood. 23 January 2007. Archived from the original on 3 November 2013. Retrieved 28 April 2013.
  55. ↑"The Just War". Catholic Education Resource Center. Archived from the original on 23 May 2013. Retrieved 28 April 2013.
  56. ↑Gonzalez, Justo L. (1984). The Story of Christianity. San Francisco: Harper. ISBN 0-06-185588-X.
  57. ↑ Davis 2001, pp. 40–42
  58. ↑Stump 1999, pp. 222–227
  59. ↑Mousavirad, Seyyed Jaaber (2 July 2022). "Theory of Compensation and Problem of Evil; a New Defense". European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 14 (2). doi:10.24204/ejpr.2022.3357. ISSN 1689-8311.
  60. ↑Reichenbach, Bruce R. (9 November 2022). "Assessing a Revised Compensation Theodicy". Religions. 13 (11): 1080. doi:10.3390/rel13111080. ISSN 2077-1444.
  61. ↑ Mousavirad, Seyyed Jaaber (noviembre de 2024). "Teodicea de la compensación revisada; una respuesta a Bruce R. Reichenbach" . Religious Inquiries . doi : 10.22034/ri.2024.445849.1884 .
  62. ↑ Scott, Mark (2012). Orígenes y el problema del mal . Oxford University Press.
  63. ↑ Martin, Michael (1992). Ateísmo: una justificación filosófica . Temple University Press. págs. 436–454 . 
  64. ↑ Martin, Michael (1992). Ateísmo: una justificación filosófica . Temple University Press. págs. 444–45 . Martin encuentra esta teodicea en Schlesinger, George (2012), Religion and Scientific Method , Springer.y lo considera insatisfactorio.
  65. ↑ "Teodicea, mal natural y teoría de la simulación" . The Global Architect Institute . 7 de febrero de 2022. Consultado el 8 de junio de 2022 .
  66. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Shihadeh, Ayman (2005). «Sufrimiento» . En Meri, Josef W. (ed.). Civilización islámica medieval: una enciclopedia . Routledge. pág. 772. ISBN  978-0-415-96692-4.
  67. 1 2 3 Jackson, Roy (5 de febrero de 2014). ¿Qué es la filosofía islámica? . Routledge. págs. 32–33 . ISBN  9781317814047.
  68. ↑ Sonn, Tamara (2009). «Tawḥīd» . En Esposito, John L. (ed.). The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World . Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-530513-5.
  69. ↑ Leaman, Oliver (2015). Enciclopedia biográfica de la filosofía islámica . Bloomsbury. pág. 311. ISBN  978-1-472-56945-5.
  70. ^ Alper , Hülya (2013). "Maturidi'nin Mutezile Eleştirisi: Tanrı En İyiyi Yaratmak Zorunda mıdır?" [ La crítica de Maturidi a Mu'tazila: ¿Tiene Dios que crear lo mejor? ] . KADER Kelam Araştırmaları Dergisi (en turco). 11 (1): 17-36 .
  71. ^ Millas, L. (2018). Introducción al estudio de la religión. Vereinigtes Königreich: EDTECH. pag. 70
  72. ↑ Bürgel, J. Christoph (1999). "El zoroastrismo visto en fuentes islámicas medievales". Percepciones musulmanas de otras religiones . págs. 202–212 . 
  73. ↑Asghar, Irfan (2021). The Notion of Evil in the Qur'an and Islamic Mystical Thought (MA). The University of Western Ontario.
  74. 1234Hoover, Jon (2014). "Ḥanbalī Theology". In Schmidtke, Sabine (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 642. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696703.013.014. ISBN 978-0-19-969670-3.
  75. ↑Peterson, Michael L. (2011). "Religious Diversity, Evil, and a Variety of Theodicies". In Meister, Chad (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Religious Diversity. p. 162.
  76. ↑Marty & Taliaferro 2010, p. 17
  77. ↑Gibbs & Wolfson 2002, p. 38
  78. ↑Pinnock 2002, p. 8
  79. ↑Patterson & Roth 2005, pp. 189–90
  80. ↑Blumenthal 1993, pp. 250–51
  81. ↑Rubinstein, Richard L. The Cunning of History.
  82. ↑Genesis 18:25
  83. ↑Über das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodizeehttp://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/germanphilosophy/files/2013/02/Kant-On-the-Miscarriage-of-all-Philosophical-Trials-at-Theodicy.pdf
  84. ↑http://www.chighel.com/opening-statement-7a/Archived 1 August 2015 at the Wayback Machine The original letter in Yiddish is found in R. Menachem Mendel Schneerson, Likutei Siḥot, Vol. 33 (New York: Kehot, 1962–2001), pp. 255–60.
  85. ↑Todd Billings, "Theodicy as a 'Lived Question': Moving Beyond a Theoretical Approach to Theodicy", http://www.luthersem.edu/ctrf/JCTR/Vol05/billings.htmArchived 13 February 2011 at the Wayback Machine Accessed 25 September 2013. About the author: http://www.westernsem.edu/about/faculty-staff/.
  86. ↑Nick Trakakis, "Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?", Springerlink.com, accessed 19 December 2009.
  87. ↑Franklin, James (2020). "Antitheodicy and the grading of theodicies by moral offensiveness". Sophia. 59 (3): 563–576. doi:10.1007/s11841-020-00765-w. hdl:1959.4/unsworks_71905. S2CID 225461563. Retrieved 29 June 2021.
  88. ↑Donald W. Musser and Joseph L. Price, eds., A New Handbook of Christian Theology (Abingdon Press, 1992), s.v. "Tragedy."
  89. ↑Wendy Farley, Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: a Contemporary Theodicy (Westminster John Knox Press, 1990) 12, 23.
  90. ↑Sarah Katherine Pinnock, Beyond Theodicy (SUNY Press, 2002), 135, 141.
  91. ↑A Divine Comedy, The Hedgehog Review
  92. ↑Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (T & T Clark, 1957), IV-1, 246.
  93. ↑Barth, Church Dogmatics, III-1, 368.
  94. ↑Barth, Church Dogmatics, II-2, 165.
  95. ↑Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV-1, 246.
  96. ↑Barth, Church Dogmatics, II-2, 223.
  97. ↑Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV-1, 564.
  98. ↑Ben Dupre, "The Problem of Evil", 50 Philosophy Ideas You Really Need to Know, London, Quercus, 2007, p. 166: "Denying that there is ultimately any such thing as evil, as advocated by Christian Scientists, solves the problem at a stroke, but such a remedy is too hard for most to swallow."
  99. ↑Whale, J. S. The Christian answer to the problem of evil. 1948
  100. ↑"Rolling Away the Stone: Mary Baker Eddy's Challenge to Materialism" (Indiana University Press, 2006) 83, 123, etc.
  101. ↑Reimers, Adrian J. "Human Suffering and Jon Paul II's Theology of the Body". Archived from the original on 28 December 2014. Retrieved 8 August 2017.
  102. ↑"Catholicprimer.org"(PDF). www.catholicprimer.org. Archived from the original(PDF) on 8 August 2017. Retrieved 8 August 2017.
  103. ↑Stump, Eleonore (2010). Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering. N.Y. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-927742-1.
  104. ↑McGrath 1995, p. 193
  105. ↑Plantinga & Sennett 1998, pp. 22–24
  106. ↑Bart D. Ehrman (13 October 2009). God's Problem: How the Bible Fails to Answer Our Most Important Question – Why We Suffer. HarperCollins. p. 12. ISBN 978-0-06-174440-2.
  107. ↑Loke, Andrew Ter Ern (2022). Evil, Sin and Christian Theism. Routledge. p. 203.
  108. ↑Loke, Andrew Ter Ern (2022). Evil, Sin and Christian Theism. Routledge. p. 5.
  109. 12Loke, Andrew Ter Ern (2022). Evil, Sin and Christian Theism. Routledge. p. 13.
  110. ↑Carsten Meiner, Kristin Veel, eds., The Cultural Life of Catastrophes and Crises (Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 243.
  111. ↑Van der Ven 1989, p. 205
  112. ↑Devenish 1992, pp. 5–23
  113. ↑Ashley 2010, pp. 870–902
  114. ↑Oord, Thomas Jay (6 December 2015). The Uncontrolling Love of God: An Open and Relational Account of Providence. IVP Academic. ISBN 978-0-8308-4084-7.
  115. ↑Oord, Thomas (10 April 2010). The Nature of Love: A Theology. Chalice Press.
  116. ↑van den Brink, Gijsbert (1993). Almighty God: A Study on the Doctrine of Divine Omnipotence. Kampen, the Netherlands: Kok Pharos publishing House. pp. 263–73.

References

  • Adams, Marilyn McCord (1999). Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-80148-686-9.
  • Ashley, J. Matthew (2010). "Reading the universe story theologically: the contribution of a biblical narrative imagination". Theological Studies. 71 (4): 870–902. doi:10.1177/004056391007100405. S2CID 55990053.
  • Assman, Jan (2001). The Search for God in Ancient Egypt trans. David Lorton. Cornell University Press
  • Birnbaum, David (1989). God and Evil. Ktav Publishing House
  • Blumenthal, David R. (1993). Facing the Abusing God: A Theology of Protest. Westminster John Knox Press. ISBN 978-0-66425-464-3.
  • Bunnin, Nicholas; Tsui James, E. P. (2002). The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0-631-21908-8.
  • Cheetham, David (2003). John Hick: a critical introduction and reflection. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7546-1599-6.
  • Davis, Stephen T. (2001). Encountering evil: live options in theodicy. Westminster John Knox Press. ISBN 978-0-664-22251-2.
  • Devenish, Philip E. (1992). "Theodicy and Cosmodicy: The Contribution of Neoclassical Theism". Journal of Empirical Theology. 4.
  • Ehrman, Bart D. (2008). God's Problem:How the Bible Fails to Answer Our Most Important Question – Why We Suffer. HarperCollins Publishers. ISBN 978-0-06-117397-4.
  • Geiviett, R. Douglas (1995). Evil & the Evidence For God: The Challenge of John Hick's Theodicy. Temple University Press. ISBN 978-1-56639-397-3.
  • Inati, Shams C. (2000). The Problem of Evil: Ibn Sînâ's Theodicy. ISBN 1-58684-006-1. Global Academic Publishing, Binghamton University, New York.
  • Gibbs, Robert; Wolfson, Elliot (2002). Suffering religion. Psychology Press. ISBN 978-0-415-26612-3.
  • Hall, Lindsey (2003). Swinburne's hell and Hick's universalism: are we free to reject God?. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7546-3400-3.
  • Johnston, Sarah Iles (2004). Religions of the Ancient World: A Guide. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-01517-3.
  • Leibniz, Gottfried (1710). Theodicy.
  • Loke, Andrew Ter Ern (2022). Evil, Sin and Christian Theism. Routledge.
  • Marty, Marty; Taliaferro, Charles (2010). Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion. Continuum International Publishing Group. ISBN 978-1-4411-1197-5.
  • McGrath, Alister (1995). The Blackwell encyclopedia of modern Christian thought. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-19896-3.
  • Neiman, Susan. Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, 2002, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Revised edition, 2015.
  • Oord, Thomas Jay (2015), The Uncontrolling Love of God. Intervarsity Academic. ISBN 978-0-8308-4084-7
  • Patterson, David; Roth, John (2005). Fire in the ashes: God, evil, and the Holocaust. University of Washington Press. ISBN 978-0-295-98547-3.
  • Pinnock, Sarah Katherine (2002). Beyond theodicy: Jewish and Christian continental thinkers respond to the Holocaust. SUNY Press. ISBN 978-0-7914-5523-4.
  • Plantinga, Alvin; Sennett, James (1998). The analytic theist: an Alvin Plantinga reader. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. ISBN 978-0-8028-4229-9.
  • Scott, Mark S. M. (2009). "Theorising Theodicy in the Study of Religion"(PDF). University of Chicago Divinity School. Archived from the original(PDF) on 12 September 2015. Retrieved 21 November 2015.
  • Sharma, Arvind (2006). A primal perspective on the philosophy of religion. Springer. ISBN 978-1-4020-5013-8.
  • Smullyan, Raymond (1977). The Tao is Silent. Harper. ISBN 978-0-06-067469-4.
  • Stump, Eleonore (1999). Philosophy of religion: the big questions. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-20604-0.
  • Svendsen, Lars Fr. H.; Pierce, Kerri A. (2010). A philosophy of evil. Dalkey Archive Press. ISBN 978-1-56478-571-8.
  • Swedberg, Richard (2005). The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-80475-095-0.
  • Van der Ven, Johannes A. (1989). "Theodicy or cosmodicy: a false dilemma?". Journal of Empirical Theology. 2 (1).
  • Watson, Simon R. (2019). "God in Creation: A Consideration of Natural Selection as the Sacrificial Means of a Free Creation". Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses. 48 (2): 216–236. doi:10.1177/0008429819830356. S2CID 202271434.
  • Woo, B. Hoon (2014). "Is God the Author of Sin? – Jonathan Edwards's Theodicy". Puritan Reformed Journal. 6 (1): 98–123.
  • Woodhead, Linda (2001). Peter Berger and the Study of Religion. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-41521-532-9.
  • "Theodicies" entry by Laura W. Ekstrom in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • "The Problem of Evil" entry by Michael Tooley in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • Brown, Paterson. "Religious Morality", Mind, 1963.
  • Brown, Paterson. "Religious Morality: A Reply to Flew and Campbell", Mind, 1964.
  • Brown, Paterson. "God and the Good", Religious Studies, 1967.
  • Herbermann, Charles, ed. (1913). "Theodicy". Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company.
    • Theodicy at New Advent
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Theodicy&oldid=1359723371"